Student Finds Flaw in E-Voting, Seeks Nullification of Result (9)

Published: 10.03.2011 09:34

Electronic voting ( Photo: Postimees/Scanpix )

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A university student claims to have found a fatal flaw in the online election software that could make it possible for a virus to block certain candidates without the voter ever knowing that tampering had occurred. 

"Those who are operating the system have unfortunately not done their work well as they have not explained these risks to the electoral committee and candidates," said Paavo Pihelgas, a student at the University of Tartu, who has sent the election committee a complaint seeking nullification of the election result.

Pihelgas - who has no evidence that any intrusions occurred, only a potential security hole - said he started poring over the system earlier this year looking for flaws after hearing project manager Tarvi Martens say on TV that e-elections were more secure than old-fashioned paper voting.

On February 8-10, the program to be used for e-elections was announced during a public system test and Pihelgas downloaded it into his computer and began programming code on the basis of that application.

Pihelgas said on ETV that it took him 4-5 days to find a major flaw that he said he believes the system developers are aware of - a hypothetical virus could block a vote given to a certain candidate and make it appear as if the vote had in fact been given and sent to the electoral committee.

Pihelgas sent a letter of caution to the committee and the media in late February. 

Project head Martens met Pihelgas face to face on February 28, and Martens acknowledged that individual computers were the weakest link. "It is a fundamental problem, that the state of the user's computer cannot be checked. What we can do and what we do do is that we identify such anomalies," said Marten on ETV. 

Three IT specialists interviewed by ETV said that the malicious scheme looked good on paper but nearly impossible to implement in real life.

Martens, too, said: "It is not possible if only because it would take time to spread such a virus and since each time the voter application is different, it would have to be attacked in a different manner. If the voter application is released on the first day of election, it would be impossible so quickly to construct such malware and circulate it in sufficient quantity," said Martens.

Pihelgas accuses the election committee of "waffling" and says risks could be hedged further by giving voters a passcode with their electronic voter cards, and by implementing a vote confirmation system where the user is prompted for the passcode.

Martens says such a solution is not realistic and that there is no such thing as absolute security. He says a battery of security observers working with CERT Estonia, including the Cyber Defense League, monitor the web on a volunteer basis at all times, especially during elections.

Pihelgas's complaint will be passed on to the Supreme Court, which has seven days to respond. 

 

Kristopher Rikken   
  

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Comments (9)

  • James

    10.03.2011 11:44

    If I understand correctly, I don't think it is correct to say that the passcode/confirmation system is not realistic. This is precisely what they plan to do in Norway. See here for more information:

  • knut albers

    10.03.2011 13:55

    This is only one issue with E-Voting. I would like to refer to my comment on the ERR article "Online Voting Touted as More Secure than Paper Ballots", published 17.01.2011. E-Voting is undemcoratic at the core as the votes are not verifiable by the general public and not anonymious by nature (passcodes would not change that either). That is already enough said and it does not need a hypotetical attack scenario. Most Western democracies banned E-voting (E-voting machines), including a growing number of States in the U.S. This should give a serious hint that Mr. Martens is on a completely loss with their propaganda for their E-Voting 'solution'. That E-voting is unsecure has been already proven by different groups on similar/ equivalent systems (Suisse ID e.g.), including by the internationally respected Chaos Computer Club (CCC). Mr. Martens should respect that findings and subordinate to the basic principles of a democracy.

  • avatar

    auslane

    11.03.2011 12:18

    @democracy - rubbish. Just how do you propose the average person 'identifies the system as good and trustworthy enough'? If they could do that in the first place then they wouldn't be infected by a virus or have their PC compromised by a rootkit etc. And why did Pihelgas (apparently) not submit a working example of such an attack? The 'usual' way of demonstrating security flaws ... actually involves DEMONSTRATING the attack, not 'sending letters of caution to the media'. No offense to the editors, but the media - in general - know little about the nitty-gritty of IT security.

  • democracy

    11.03.2011 13:04

    @auslane: and yet you prove the same attitude. E-voting is for every citizen and must be transparent and understandable by every citizen (as paper voting is). It is not a spere for "IT-professionals" to deal with - it is a public matter! Therefore very good that ERR report and I even urge to investigate further.

  • avatar

    auslane

    11.03.2011 14:12

    @democracy - what same 'attitude' do you mean? I seriously doubt that many voters even 'understand' how on-paper voting works, how the votes are tallied or how their vote contributes (or doesn't contribute) to the election of officials. This is no different with e-voting. Or are you seriously suggesting that someone must 'understand' each tool - be that tool a mobile phone, car, computer or e-voting website - before that tool becomes useful?

  • Leo Kalme

    12.03.2011 06:14

    Auslane, before you take a word how e-voting works, you should read a few reports of e-voting systems security analysis. The ideal system should be understandable for everyone who ever wants. It is obvious that many people don't take time to even find out how traditional voting works but if they wanted, they can. E-voting cannot be made secure with current fundamental architecture of Internet and PC. However, Estonian NEC (National Elections Commission) assures that the system were checked for any kind of involving and attacks. They advertise flawed solution and spread the corruption by that manner. They should not only withdraw results of the e-voting but members of NEC who let that system to come in use, should be sent to The European Court of Justice,

  • democracy

    14.03.2011 18:58

    @auslane: I meant the same attitude as Martens shows. Do you really compare mobile phone apps with e-voting? Martens has no idea of democracy and the fundamentals of a civil society.

  • Open E-lections

    15.03.2011 11:08

    All software used for e-voting should be open sourced (both client side and server side software). Just like paper voting is not a secret process but open to scrutiny. There needs to be a way for a voter to verify that her vote was properly counted, this could be done by issuing a unique anonymized identifier after voting. A voter could then look up his vote later in a published log file of all anonymized votes. If the server software is also open source anyone can verify that this identifier is indeed anonymous. The software running on the servers needs to be verified with a checksum by representatives from each party as well as a number of neutral observers during the elections - thus guaranteeing to the public that the software has not been tampered with. Making e-voting more reliable and trustworthy is done by introducing total openness into the system and allowing for verification each step of the way.

  • ameeriklane

    16.03.2011 16:33

    It seems like the solution to this potential risk is to notify the voter by some other means to let them konw their vote was received. For example, sending them an email or notice by post, or posting on some other secure site a message to say their vote was received.