The party currently in power – The Georgian Dream (GD) – predicts war and destruction if electoral victory goes to the opposition, arguing that too much eagerness to join the west would drag Georgia into a confrontation with its big neighbour, as it allegedly did in the case of Ukraine. The opposition parties, meanwhile, warn that should the GD win again, it would end western integration and thus leave Georgia in the Russian sphere of influence.

Party platforms consisting mainly of accusations against opponents have long been the main characteristic of Georgian politics, whereas positive campaign messaging remains a rather unusual phenomenon. After all, the opposition has been accused of allegedly drawing Georgia into a war already once. Bidzina Ivanishvili, the GD's leader and the top candidate on its electoral list, blamed then-President Mikheil Saakashvili for starting the war in 2008, which is why Ivanishvili deems it necessary to apologise to the South-Ossetians.

The opposition divided

A positive agenda is this time innovatively pursued by the Coalition 4 Change, or "the four remaining drops of serotonin in Georgian politics." This bloc consists of Nika Gvaramia, former owner and director of the opposition TV channel Rustavi 2 (who also served time in jail in 2022-23 for the alleged mishandling of the broadcaster's resources); Nika Melia, former leader of the United National Movement (UNM), the main opposition party; Elene Khoshtaria, one of the UNM's former female lead figures who founded her own party Droa! three years ago; and Zurab Japaridze, one of the leaders of the liberal Girchi party (famous for advocating the legalisation of possession of small amounts of marihuana). Most of them have split from the UNM, which is why there is an estimation that UNM voters (26 percent in both 2016 and 2020) will likewise be split.

The UNM's own list is headed by Tina Bokuchava, a young yet experienced US-educated politician who perfectly personifies the image of the UNM. The party's forever leader Mikheil Saakashvili, has well recovered in the hospital but, still imprisoned, hasn't been too active in the campaign. Probably, even Saakashvili himself does not know whether he will ever be able to fully return to the political stage, as he remains a rather controversial figure to many Georgians. After becoming president in 2004, Saakashvili initiated and implemented some remarkably efficient reforms, upon which today's Georgia still builds its success in several sectors. Yet, for the taste of many, Misha went a step too far in consolidating power. President Salome Zourabichvili has deemed it better not to pardon him to date.

The third main opposition force is the Strong Georgia coalition. Lelo, a so-called bankers' party, at its nucleus, had been founded before the 2020 elections and crossed the threshold of 3 percent at the time (now, it has been raised to 5 percent again). The coalition is led by two co-founders of the TBC bank: Mamuka Khazaradze and Badri Japaridze, who have recently faced a criminal investigation under the charges of fraud. (Because of the partiality of the current judiciary system, it is probably safer not to trust anyone who isn't facing such charges.)

Although Khazaradze and Japaridze are among the very few figures in Georgia's politics who do not carry any historical political baggage, bankers aren't necessarily the first choice for many Georgians squirming in economic hardships and debt. The Strong Georgia's list also includes many former and current professors. The coalition is campaigning with Georgia's 'Papa Jansen' image. It refers to Ilia Chavchavadze, a historic figure of the 19th century who defined his nation through homeland, language, and faith while also aspiring to bring contemporary European ideas to Georgia. How "Ilia's way" can solve modern Georgia's economic and social problems remains a bit unclear.

The most mysterious figure in the current electoral race is Giorgi Gakharia, former GD Prime Minister, who now heads his own For Georgia party. Gakharia may be the dark horse in the race for there was long considered to be a chance that he would resume cooperating with the GD, from which he departed in 2019. Nowadays GD leaders are fiercely opposing him. So, he may also become a lead figure in the new ruling coalition to be formed by current opposition forces.

Can the GD stay in power?

The GD is said to be more of an "officials" party rather than a party of politicians. Former Prime Minister and Minister of Defense Irakli Garibashvili, current Prime Minister and former Speaker of the Parliament Irakli Kobakhidze, and Tbilisi Mayor Kakha Kaladze (not running for a seat in the Parliament) are all very familiar faces to Georgians. Several of the GD's top figures have received their academic degrees in Germany. However, their charisma and image projected abroad have, for some reason, been less appealing compared to the UNM's smooth communication with the west.

The GD's current honorary chair and "the state owner," Bidzina Ivanishvili, who has always preferred to live isolated, has diminished his contacts with the outside world to the bare minimum in recent years. Since Ivanishvili doesn't enjoy publicity, it might come as a surprise to those who don't know much about his history that this man, who earned his money in Russia in the late 1990s, has spent millions of dollars on charity, supported Georgian culture, and renovated schools, hospitals, and cathedrals. Supposedly, he simply happened to lead the country as a result of a major disagreement with then-President Saakashvili, the leader of the party that Ivanishvili used to finance. Keeping Saakashvili away from politics has remained Ivanishvili's raison d'être to date. This time Ivanishvili is heading the electoral list of his party and also campaigning in public, which shows, the situation is serious.

The GD won roughly one million votes in the last elections – a success and popularity that it still owns to several factors.

First, the Georgian economy has done rather well in recent years; since 2021, the economic growth has been 9-10 percent on average.

Second, for those who are clearly against the UNM, its comeback seems to be a bigger nightmare than the prospect of GD staying in power.

Third, the Georgian Orthodox Church remains the most popular and trusted institution, and it supports the GD.

Fourth, the majority of Georgians share traditional values, especially in family matters, which is a firm platform for the GD.

Fifth, the fear of war can be a better motivator than the hope of a European future.

Sixth, the ruling party has state resources at its avail that the others lack, including command of the internal security services and influence over the composition of the electoral commissions.

Seventh, Ivanishvili, although also a French citizen, probably doesn't see how he can keep his country and personal property in Georgia once he has left power.

Eighth, approximately 300,000 Georgians are on state payroll: i.e., government and local officials, as well as law enforcement and education workers, etc. As they can't afford to lose their jobs, they and their family members are inclined to vote "properly." Moreover, around 600,000 Georgians live below the poverty line and thus rely on social security payments from the government. Many of their votes will probably go into the GD's pocket. Pressure and intimidation have allegedly been extensive during the last elections.

Between Europe and Russia

As the astounding 80 percent+ of Georgians want to join the EU, the GD knows that openly anti-EU rhetoric won't work. Instead, it continues advocating the country's European integration while also pushing through some questionable laws. Some of those have been adopted in just one year: the "foreign agents'" law; the "traditional family values" law (that also limits LGBTQ+ rights); and the "offshore" law (that facilitates transferring money from tax havens to Georgia). The GD's slogan – "to the EU with dignity" – is more aligned with Orbán's vision for Europe than with that of Brussels.

Although the GD isn't overtly propagating pro-Russian views, its actions speak louder than words. Those include Russian money and immigrants in Georgia; direct flights between many different regions of Georgia and Russia; and a substantial increase in trade flows between the two countries over the last three years. Moreover, Georgia has not joined any of the sanctions the EU imposed against Russia. The opposition, in turn, would like Georgia to join the EU based on honest criteria, thereby breaking away from the Russian sphere of influence.

What if the opposition wins? As was the case many times before, the key issue is the opposition parties' inability to cooperate in any other way rather than on paper, for a compromise in Georgian political culture may often be perceived as a defeat. Furthermore, as already mentioned, most of the country's politicians have some sort of political baggage, which contributes to mutual mistrust. All 19 opposition parties have signed the Georgian Charter, proposed by President Zourabishvili, but their willingness to cooperate remains in question, not least because there is no one clear leader.

The Charter is a pretty unusual solution and, theoretically, a step in the right direction, since ordinary democratic procedures have not brought the desired results over the past 20 years. However, it raises other questions such as the Charter's compliance with the Constitution. In particular, the initiative foresees the creation of a technical government that will be in office for one year, after which the new extraordinary, fully democratic election will be held. The interim prime minister and other ministers will be nominated by the current president.

The presidential election will be held in November. For the first time, the new Georgian president will be elected by the parliament and have even less real power than before. The GD has pledged to impeach the sitting president prior to that election in case it wins 2/3 of the seats (i.e., 100 mandates out of 150) in parliament.'

Come what may

It is difficult to predict the outcome of the election solely on the basis of opinion polls. All of the above-mentioned parties are expected to cross the 5 percent threshold. 63 percent of respondents say that they would like their country's course to change and to give new people an opportunity to change it. Yet, this sentiment doesn't translate directly into support for the opposition parties. Edison Research, an oppositional-leaning pollster, predicts the GD to receive 32 percent, while the government-affiliated Gorbi projects that 59 percent of the vote will go to the GD. The UNM can count on 20 percent or 13 percent, respectively, according to those two polls; support of each of the remaining opposition parties varies between 5-10 percent.

In the best-case scenario, the opposition can gain 50 percent or more, and it is also more likely to benefit from a higher turnout. In recent years, around 2 million people have voted regularly. If voter activity increases, the opposition's chances will also grow. Some votes will, nonetheless, be distributed among the smaller parties – who will not cross the 5 percent threshold – and, under the Georgian electoral system, will ultimately be re-allocated to the winner, that is the GD as a single party versus multiple opposition forces. The Dream is dreaming of a constitutional majority – 113 seats (75 percent) in the 150-seat parliament – which would allow it to govern the country purely by its sovereign will. Winning that many votes in an honest election will probably be impossible.

In line with the international recommendations and for the first time in Georgia's history, this election will be held under the fully proportional model, meaning there will be no majoritarian – in essence, regional and personal – mandates and candidates. The new system would enable the winning party to gain an even bigger share of seats. To what extent the parliamentary election in Georgian can be called democratic has already been debated over the last few cycles, and it will remain a relevant question for the time being.

The GD's leader seems to have come to the conclusion – either based on his own calculations or because of the interests stimulated from abroad – that only he, Bidzina Ivanishvili, can save the country from certain destruction, meaning war with Russia. Therefore, the measures that the GD will start adopting, in case of its electoral victory in October, will probably be tougher and stricter than ever before.

The next question is to what extent it is possible to bluntly falsify the results. For the first time, electronic vote-counting machines will be used, but it is yet to be seen whether they will contribute to a democratic or undemocratic process. With the outcome of this election difficult to predict, the international community has been preparing for both scenarios.

The day after…

What will happen after the election is over? It is hard to imagine that the GD will accept a loss to the opposition. Nor will the opposition stomach a defeat to the GD. Hence, no matter who claims victory, we can expect to see thousands on the streets again, although many of them are tired of protesting. The authorities have already responded with water cannons and rubber bullets, but hopefully, even more dangerous tools will not be deployed at the rallies. The GD has stated its intention to ban the opposition parties after it has clenched its parliamentary victory, which gives a reason to believe that neither the opposition nor the '"foreign agents" will be handled with kid gloves.

What do the Georgian people think of all this, though? They are tired. And frightened. "I really don't know whom I'm going to vote for. I am only sure of one thing — I will vote neither for the Georgian Dream nor for the UNM," one random Tbilisian told me… "The most important thing is that there is no war." Yet, looking to Europe for help, he added, "Can you, the west, do something?! You know, it is too risky for us here to take to the streets…"

Will Georgia one day, having left both Ivanishvili and Saakashvili in the past, find its way? The Russian bear has not loosened its grip on any of the EU's eastern partners countries. If either Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, or Armenia succeed in breaking away, will the others have a better chance? Let's hope for the best.

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This article was first published in Diplomaatia (in Estonian) here and on the ICDS website (in English) here.

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