You can bet on just about anything. If you look at the media, there is frequent discussion of whether and when Russia might launch a direct military attack against a NATO country. I went to the website of the betting platform Polymarket to see whether this topic had already made it there as well. And it had — in several versions. For example, 21 percent of bettors predict that a military conflict between NATO and Russia will begin before the end of this year.

If you look at the opinions of analysts, intelligence agencies, and politicians, they differ across a fairly wide spectrum, but most of those speaking on the subject still talk about the possibility of a conflict, not its impossibility.

Some time ago, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk placed a Russian attack in the near term, believing it could happen within a matter of months. Experts at the Institute for the Study of War write that Russia is approaching the zero phase of a military conflict, reorganizing military districts, building bases near the Finnish border, while in Europe acts of sabotage, GPS signal jamming, and other provocations are being recorded.

Dutch military intelligence writes in its annual report that Moscow could initiate an armed conflict with the West within a year after hostilities in Ukraine end. U.S. columnist David Ignatius notes in the Washington Post that a Vladimir Putin who feels defeated and cornered will become even more dangerous and may decide to start a war with Europe while it is still unprepared for an armed conflict.

Foreign Russia watcher Andrei Kolesnikov cites, in support of this view, the opinion expressed ten years ago by former Kremlin adviser Gleb Pavlovsky: when trapped in a strategic dead end, the Kremlin team simply raises the stakes and shifts to escalation.

And so on — there are predictions extending three years, five years, and various other time frames. But the common denominator is the understanding that Russia is and will remain a military threat, and that this threat could materialize at any moment. If asked whom to believe, I would answer: everyone. Simply put, all scenarios are possible, and preparedness must be shaped accordingly. Or rather, one should start from the assumption that an attack begins tonight, then look at how to repel it, and from there improve readiness day by day.

A Russian attack is predicted both in the case that it emerges victorious in Ukraine and in the case that Moscow is defeated there. In other words, no matter how things turn out in Ukraine, a Russian attack on Europe may still occur.

Fortunately, there are also recommendations on what to do to make this outcome — if not avoidable — then at least less likely.

Repeated references have been made to a piece by Eugene Rumer, director of the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Carnegie Endowment. Rumer is convinced that regardless of how the war in Ukraine ends, Russia will emerge deeply dissatisfied, embittered, more insecure, and more dangerous.

He does believe that at least while the war continues, Russia will not attack any other European country. Afterward, however, it might — because nothing in Russian foreign policy suggests that the Kremlin would abandon its historical confrontation with Europe or adopt some new and different concept of security. This reference to history is chronic among many observers, and unfortunately there is a large grain of truth in it. In Soviet times there was a saying that Moscow felt secure only when Soviet border guards stood on both sides of the border. That is, as long as there is an independent state across Russia's border — especially a stable and strong one — Russia feels threatened.

And Russia has always wanted to get rid of that pesky Western Europe as something different and therefore dangerous. At present, Moscow seems to be in a better geopolitical position than before, because it has a partner in the form of Donald Trump's circle, which also wants to weaken Europe. At the same time, the war in Ukraine has resulted in a situation where all of Russia's western neighbors are, to put it mildly, unfriendly toward it. And relations with the U.S. are questionable as well. Temporarily, weakening Europe may benefit both sides, but in the long term Moscow has still regarded the Americans as its main enemies throughout the Cold War and afterward.

In the West, there are politicians who believe that attacking a NATO country would be too great a risk for Russia, especially in the near term. But as Eugene Rumer notes, even immediately before the major aggression against Ukraine, it was believed that such a move would be absurd and a colossal mistake. The aggression began nonetheless. That is, Putin's circle assesses risks differently — especially when the regime sees war as the only way to stay in power.

Therefore, as an increasing number of thinkers conclude, one must simply be prepared and create a situation in which the balance of power is clearly in the West's favor. Only a clear prospect of defeat might restrain Moscow. And it would be wise to start by countering the current gray‑zone war, politely referred to as hybrid activity.

Regrettably, there are many statesmen in Europe who refer to the need for dialogue with Russia, as if that could help prevent military action. Vytautas Leškevicius and Julia Salabert of the Atlantic Council note in response that any dialogue must be preceded by the creation of credible deterrence, and they propose other measures to develop European capabilities as well. The general view is that supporting Ukraine in the war against Russia is currently the best way to keep Moscow in check.

For the future, it is worth listening to those who recommend new formats of security cooperation, especially in light of the U.S. becoming unreliable. And Ukraine should certainly have a place in Europe's future defense bloc, as the country that at present effectively has the strongest armed forces. According to President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Europe cannot have a sufficiently strong army to stand up to Russia without Ukraine and Turkey. Adding Norway and the United Kingdom would also provide the ability to ensure maritime security. There are many such new options, and it is worth orienting toward them in any case.

So far, little has been said about one possible Russian move: the use of nuclear weapons not initially on land, but in space — a desperate step along the lines of "after us, the flood." But that is a separate topic…

Recommended reading

• Rumer_European Security_v2 1.pdf
• Нападение России на НАТО — Колумнист проанализировал потенциальную угрозу для Европы от Путина / NV
• Огрызко рассказал, что творится в голове у Путина, подсказав, как остановить Россию раз и навсегда | Диалог.UA
• The Future of Eurasian Security After the Ukraine War | RealClearDefense
• bne IntelliNews - Zelenskyy proposes a new European version of Nato
• Europe needs a 21st-century containment strategy toward Russia - Atlantic Council
• Ядерная угроза в космосе — Россия готовит удар с орбиты, под угрозой Starlink / NV

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