Incoming minister: Russia could use military force against Estonia in a year's time

Incoming Defense Minister Martin Herem says Russia could use an unknown level of military force against Estonia a year from now, meaning Estonia must assess whether its preparations are sufficient.
Herem, former Estonian Defense Forces commander, made the remarks as he prepares to take up the defense minister post following the resignation of Hanno Pevkur and the dismissal of Kaimo Kuusk as defense ministry permanent secretary.
Estonia must be ready to respond if such a scenario materializes, he added.
Is it true that you want a new threat assessment for Estonia and that this should be based on the assumption that Russia will strike Estonia within a year?
No, it is not so drastic as that. Our stance at the moment is that Russia is a threat, but then come all the types of assessments. Some say that could happen within three years of the end of the war in Ukraine, and others say within six months of that. And we all take that very seriously and all nod along. Then in the next moment, we have made our plans and do not take those threat assessments into account at all.
I think this needs to be pinned down somehow. I am not saying it would be inside a year. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte has said that it could be potentially three years after the war in Ukraine. German or Danish intelligence has stated that it could be possible six months after the war in Ukraine ends.
Everything else we are doing reflects that in no way whatsoever. We need to decide when it might be viable. Then we should review whether we will be prepared by that time, or whether we need to speed up certain processes so that we are prepared by that time. I would argue that this is simply not how we have been planning our activities today.
If a new threat assessment gets drawn up, what assumptions should be made about when Russia might strike Estonia?
The first step is to consider how quickly the war in Ukraine might come to an end. I would say that could happen within six months. Probably not tomorrow, but we should set some kind of deadline, and I think it could be within six months, though it be within three years. As to what the shortest possible time-frame is, I would say six months. The next question is: If all the world events and circumstances align and are amenable, how much time would Russia actually need to ready itself to carry out a military action which would in turn require us to deploy our wartime Defense Forces? In other words, mobilization — so we are talking about a real war. Again, I think it would not require more than six months for that.
This is because everything [Russia] is using up on a daily basis today will start accumulating once the war in Ukraine ends. If it has spent six months stockpiling the things it is currently expending, that will be sufficient to do something militarily against us.

That is why I say that our first deadline is when the war in Ukraine ends. Could it end within six months? Yes. How much time would they need to prepare? Six months? Yes. Fine. So, a year from now, Russia could use a military force of size "X" against us.
Are our preparations matching that? Are we capable of eliminating a military force of that size? And if we are not, then we should make those necessary preparations. Or there is another option: We can all sign off on keeping our fingers crossed that it will not happen and do nothing at all.
The third option is to note that it would be very bad if it were to occur, but we will make an effort, get certain things done and do them faster than we are doing now.
So in drawing up that threat assessment, should it indeed be based on the possible outcome that Estonia could be facing a real military threat within the year?
I am not confirming that one-year time.frame right now. I would like to talk to the intelligence agencies. They should also state that this is viable; I do not want to be doing this alone. That is also why I am not saying today whether we should work on the basis of one year or on three years. We should put this kind of framework down on paper for ourselves. But I have the feeling that this is not how things are being done today. That is completely comprehensible when you look at what politics is currently focused on: Herem as a person, the Reform Party, the prime minister's decisions, granting certain powers. Six officers wrote a long letter about why Herem must not be granted too much power, yet not one of them is talking about the threat.
As of today we would essentially be willing to sacrifice six months, by saying that nothing can be completed in that time-frame anyway. Let's wait for the elections. 'But come on, people, can you not see the threat?' 'Yes, we can see the threat', yet then everything becomes about politics all over again, which I find strange.
This anger towards someone, or the conviction that one's own course of action would be much better, has blinded everyone to the threat. Okay, let's say it happens within a year. At what point within that year would it take place? Ask that of, I don't know, [Isamaa chair Urmas] Reinsalu, [SDE leader Lauri] Läänemets, [Prime Minister Kristen] Michal or [Center Party chair Mihhail] Kõlvart. Ask them within what time-frame it could happen. Let them set the deadline themselves, and then ask whether, based on that stated deadline, we are now acting quickly enough.
But they are not dealing with that today. They are engaged in some kind of politics of principle. I would argue that ministries and government agencies actually operate in much the same way. [Current EDF commander Lt Gen. Andrus] Merilo says Russia could do something in 2027, whatever the basis for his claim may be. And everyone says this is serious, yet there is zero action.
We have been talking constantly, until we are foaming at the mouth, about the Russia threat. This is because talking about the Russia threat is obligatory and fashionable; it keeps you in the spotlight, but you do not actually have to believe in it. I want to change that somewhat.
According to information received by ERR, the disagreement between Herem and recently departed Ministry of Defense permanent secretary Kaimo Kuusk may have arisen precisely over the need to revise the threat assessment. Asked whether this was true, Herem said Kuusk should be asked about that. Kuusk could not be reached by the newsroom for comment as of the time the article was published. Herem declined to discuss Kuusk further.
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