Live fact checking in electoral debates and "fake news" debunking are increasingly becoming part of our daily lives, while – in many democratic countries – governmental investment in strategic communication (StratCom) is growing exponentially.

While we so often talk about disinformation, what exactly do we mean by it and how different is it from other phenomena such as propaganda, misinformation, conspiracy theories, hoaxes and so on?

In his recent book "Active Measures: The Secret History of Disinformation and Political Warfare," Thomas Rid characterizes disinformation as false or misleading information that is deliberately created and disseminated with the intent to deceive, manipulate, or influence an audience.

We can identify a combination of intentionality, emotional appeal, and strategic distribution, often employing sensationalism, manipulative techniques, and targeting specific audiences.

Disinformation is often designed to undermine trust in individuals, institutions, or processes and frequently comes from sources that disguise or obscure their true origins and goals. It spreads rapidly and – once released – it can produce its negative effects, even after being debunked.

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Disinformation is not a new phenomenon, and – while its current form is shaped by modern technology and our advanced communication methods – efforts by humans to manipulate other humans through misleading information are as old as civilization itself.

Roughly 3,200 years ago, the Egyptian Empire, led by Pharaoh Ramesses II, went to war against the Hittite Empire under King Muwatalli II. The two armies clashed at Kadesh, near what is now the Lebanon–Syria border. After being outmaneuvered, ambushed, and surrounded, Ramesses II managed to break through the Hittite ranks, narrowly avoiding capture. The battle ended in a stalemate, at best, for the Egyptians.

In the aftermath, Ramesses II embraced "alternative facts" and commissioned an imposing victory monument to impress his unaware subjects depicting the pharaoh triumphantly slaying and trampling his enemies. He also had poems written that celebrated his supposed victory. The reality that he barely escaped death did not matter and did not stop him from declaring "mission accomplished." No ancient Egyptian fact checker called the trick at the time.

Since Kadesh, every era and civilization has witnessed the powerful manipulating information to gain and maintain power, while their opponents have used similar tactics to challenge them. The tools in this ongoing battle have often been their subjects and, in more recent times, their citizens. If information is power, then so too is the ability to misuse it.

If we fast forward to the twentieth century, totalitarian regimes became masters of disinformation, using it to control their people and undermine their opponents. While much is known about Nazi manipulation under Joseph Goebbels and his omnipresent Ministry of Propaganda, far less attention has been paid to the long-standing and established tradition of Soviet disinformation (дезинформация).

Mark Hollingsworth, in his book "Agents of Influence: How the KGB Subverted Western Democracies," references a former KGB disinformation chief who revealed that Soviet intelligence allocated roughly 25 percent of its budget to traditional espionage, while the remaining 75 percent was dedicated to "a slow process focusing on what we called ideological subversion or active measures."

During the Cold War, the Soviets effectively employed disinformation to undermine U.S. and Western legitimacy around the world. In one campaign codenamed "Operation Denver," the Soviets managed to convince many –  especially in what we now call the Global South –  that the AIDS epidemic originated in a U.S. laboratory and was released by the FBI to target minority communities, by leveraging fabricated science and sympathetic media outlets.

The AIDS story quickly gained traction, proliferating across Soviet newspapers, magazines, radio broadcasts, and television. In 1987 alone, it appeared 40 times in Soviet media and was covered in over 80 countries in more than 30 languages.

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Soviet techniques of disinformation as a tool of foreign interference did not disappear with the Soviet Union itself, but found fertile ground and flourished in Putin's Russia, in line with his KGB past.

In January 2016, the "Lisa case" captured headlines and stirred public debate in Germany for weeks. A 13-year-old Russian-German girl named Lisa had gone missing for 30 hours, and Russian state media, particularly Channel One Russia, falsely reported that she had been raped by migrants.

However, the story was entirely fabricated; German police later confirmed that Lisa had spent the night with a friend. Despite the truth, the false narrative was aggressively reported in both Russian domestic and foreign media (RT, Sputnik and RT German language) and spread through social media, leading to diplomatic tensions between Germany and Russia.

Although the case was quickly debunked, the Russian operation achieved its intended outcome by radicalizing and weaponizing the debate on migration and multiculturalism in Germany. As a result, even after the fabrication was exposed, demonstrations were organized through social media, involving members of the German-Russian minority as well as far-right groups.

Following Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Moscow significantly ramped up its disinformation campaigns to serve multiple strategic objectives. These efforts are designed not only to rally domestic and international support for the war effort but also to weaken the democratic front supporting Ukraine.

To achieve this, Russian disinformation consistently attempts to infiltrate or instrumentalize pro-peace movements (as the Soviets did during the Cold War) and has increasingly appropriated the idea of anti-fascism, twisting it to align with their narrative. By doing so they aim to spread confusion in Western societies, divide public opinion, and – ultimately – undermine public and governmental support for Ukraine.

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In the summer of 2024, following her selection as the future EU Foreign Policy Chief, then-Prime Minister of Estonia, Kaja Kallas (Reform), became the target of a massive Kremlin-orchestrated disinformation campaign.

Russian propaganda began misrepresenting a family photo of a young Kaja Kallas, crafting a false narrative of privilege, family collaboration with both Soviet and Nazi regimes, and hypocrisy. According to investigative journalists at (Estonian news outlet) Delfi, the campaign centered on a photo taken between 1994 and 1995, long after the collapse of the USSR, yet it was used to falsely depict the Kallas family as beneficiaries of Soviet-era privilege.

The campaign was launched in late June, with the Russian propaganda outlet Sputnik and affiliated VKontakte (Russian social media platform – ed.) accounts initiating the smear campaign one day after Kaja Kallas' candidacy as EU High Representative was announced.

Amplified by Russian media and Kremlin-friendly social media accounts, the story – just one of many Russian attempts – gained undeserved visibility across various social media platforms and was further spread by bots and trolls, with the clear intent of undermining Kallas' candidacy.

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When we step back from specific cases to consider the broader picture, foreign-sponsored disinformation and external malicious manipulation pose significant threats to pluralistic democratic societies. These tactics are specifically designed to achieve two main objectives: increasing societal discord and division, and undermining our ability to distinguish between what is real and what is not, often by creating a false equivalence between the two.

The rapid rise and dissemination of artificial intelligence (AI), along with the fluid and increasingly plural information landscape shaped by social media, does not fundamentally alter the goals or nature of disinformation. Instead, they expand its reach and amplify its impact.

As Umberto Eco put it: "Social media gives legions of idiots the right to speak when they once only spoke at a bar after a glass of wine, without harming the community [...] but now they have the same right to speak as a Nobel Prize winner. It's the invasion of the idiots."

This appears particularly dangerous in complex, diverse, liberal-democratic societies where foreign interference (and domestic demagogues) can easily take advantage of the pluralism that characterizes open societies and where efforts to counter disinformation must also align – and rightly so – with the rule of law and uphold the freedom of information.

Paradoxically, undesired information poses far less of a threat to autocratic regimes – the primary sponsors of foreign malicious interference – where the lack of pluralism and a monopoly on media allow the regime to easily suppress any unwelcome messages, much like in Ramesses' Egypt.

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How can democracies counter such fundamental threats without sacrificing their freedoms and openness?

Politics has a key responsibility to prevent extreme societal polarization and divisive culture wars, which create fertile ground for malicious interference and deception. To drain the swamp in which disinformation thrives, mutual toleration between political adversaries should take precedence over an enemy mentality.

Similarly, institutional restraint can help reduce the politicization of institutional mechanisms and prevent the political misuse of constitutional rules. Overall, we should nurture the idea of democracy as a repetitive game in which both sides of the political spectrum have legitimate aspirations and opportunities to govern.

This principle of mutual toleration should also be applied at the societal level, where raising awareness of malicious interference, its threats, and tactics serves as the best antibody against foreign-sponsored disinformation.

In this respect, the principle of total defense enshrined in Estonia's National Defense Strategy rightly emphasizes societal awareness and democratic resilience as key pillars of the country's ontological security.

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France and Estonia – Together against Disinformation (FREETAD)

How can academic institutions contribute to strengthen the democratic texture of the societies within which they operate?

It goes without saying that academia and universities, as key components of open societies, can play a crucial role in reducing polarization, increasing awareness, and building resilience through education and research.

At the University of Tartu, we take our commitment to strengthening democratic resilience seriously. One of our initiatives to contribute to the security of our pluralistic democratic societies is the project "France and Estonia – Together against Disinformation" (FREETAD), funded by NATO's Public Diplomacy Division, and launched in conjunction with the 20th anniversary of NATO's 2004 enlargement.

By hosting the project at the Johan Skytte Institute of Political Studies and collaborating with French partners from prestigious academic institutions and think tanks, we aim to raise societal awareness and exchange relevant experiences with our French partners. As disinformation increasingly targets the youth and vulnerable groups, one of our key activities included student-led group projects including French and Estonian students tackling different aspects of disinformation, from election interference to climate change denialism and targeting of minorities.

To exchange experiences with our French colleagues, we are hosting a fact-finding mission of French experts to Estonia in October, featuring high-level visits in Tartu and Tallinn and a scenario planning exercise aimed at further enhancing strategies to combat disinformation.

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