Western politicians were clearly perplexed by the Ukrainian military's advance into Russia's Kursk Oblast, as Russia is a nuclear power, and no one has captured even a small portion of its territory since World War II. The Western reaction was more than restrained. Evaluations were not rushed, and an expectant stance was taken, unsure of how Russia would respond.

Back in June of this year, Russian President Vladimir Putin stated during a meeting with foreign journalists at the St. Petersburg Economic Forum that if Russia's sovereignty and territorial integrity were at risk, he considered the use of nuclear weapons possible. Now, with Ukraine having seized a large part of Kursk Oblast, the nuclear issue remains notably absent from public discourse.

While there has been discussion about potentially amending Russia's nuclear weapons doctrine, this is part of a broader issue tied more to nuclear strategy. From this, one might infer that Vladimir Putin does not view Ukraine's incursion into Russia as a significant threat. He may consider it something that can be easily repelled or at least a temporary situation, as Ukraine clearly has no intention of permanently occupying Russian territory. This view is further reinforced by Russian propaganda, which downplays the Kursk action, modestly labeling it a Ukrainian provocation.

Russian political scientist Valeri Solovei, whose reputation is questionable, continues to explain the lack of nuclear threats by claiming that the country is actually being led by a Putin double, fully controlled by Nikolai Patrushev, who has a background in the FSB. Patrushev, according to Solovei, is against the use of nuclear weapons. Solovei alleges that the real Putin, who was gravely ill and on the verge of death, was once willing to take the entire world down with him. However, such a theory has not been taken seriously.

A more likely perspective is that China, one of Russia's biggest supporters and a key supplier for its defense industry, is firmly opposed to the idea of Russia using nuclear weapons.

Although China does not directly supply lethal weaponry in finished form, it has been accused of selling Russia components such as engines for air and sea drones, microelectronics, cruise missile parts, nitrocellulose used in explosives, machine tools essential to the defense industry and other materials critical for military production. Additionally, China is reportedly cooperating with Russia to produce drones within Russian territory. As a result, Russia is restrained by the risk of losing China's military support if it were to escalate the conflict with nuclear weapons.

Rubber band doctrine

Amid all these developments, one critical fact has received surprisingly little attention: the nuclear doctrine itself – specifically, the principles governing the purpose of nuclear weapons and how their use is prevented – has been undermined in light of the events in Kursk. From the perspective of Western countries, nuclear weapons are primarily intended as a deterrent, and their use can be avoided through a balance of nuclear capabilities between political blocs.

Given that Russia possesses the largest nuclear arsenal and, alongside North Korea, is one of the few countries threatening to use nuclear weapons preemptively, part of this doctrine has involved ensuring Russia's "untouchability" – in other words, maintaining Russia's stability and calm in the spirit of Henry Kissinger's approach during the Cold War with the Soviet Union.

Thus, Russia must not be provoked, nor should an unstable situation be allowed to develop there, where nuclear weapons could slip out of control. This has been the basis of U.S. policy toward Russia under President Joe Biden, particularly in relation to the war in Ukraine. The old doctrine, however, now feels like a stretched-out elastic waistband – though the pants have fallen down, they need to be quickly pulled back up.

Despite the new realities, there has been no decisive shift in Western leaders' thinking. Western long-range missiles are still not allowed to be used on Russian territory, nor have they provided the necessary weaponry for F-16s. Even a mid-September meeting between British Prime Minister Keir Starmer and U.S. President Joe Biden did not clarify the issue of long-range missiles.

On the other hand, even if a permissive decision were made, it would not be publicly announced, as it would provoke Russia too much. Putin has explicitly warned that he would view the use of long-range missiles against Russia as NATO intervention in the conflict. This threat also serves as a tactic to deter the West from granting Ukraine such capabilities.

But this isn't the only dilemma for the West. What President Zelenskyy is effectively demanding is nothing short of a rethinking and actual restructuring of global security policy. This would create an entirely new situation in which Western countries would permit their weapons to attack a nuclear-armed state like Russia – a move Russia would interpret as a war with NATO.

Is China a balancer?

Another significant aspect emerges in the evolving security processes. With Russia having announced its suspension of participation in the START treaty, which regulates the limitation and control of nuclear arsenals, and its growing dependence on China, the latter's stance is taking on entirely new importance from a security perspective (assuming these interpretations of China's stance by analysts are accurate).

Although Russia's reliance on China has arisen due to the war in Ukraine and may be a temporary phenomenon, it is important to consider that China's economic influence over Russia will continue. This is because Western sanctions against Russia are unlikely to disappear overnight, nor will existing contracts be abruptly terminated. The lifting of sanctions will depend on Russia's concessions regarding Ukraine.

China's influence on Russia provides China with significant leverage in the Pacific region. Given that the United States has pledged to ensure the security of Japan, Taiwan and the Philippines, it raises the question of whether the U.S. might be willing to trade concessions, such as Taiwan, or make compromises on China's territorial claims over other South China Sea nations in exchange for China restraining Russia.

Of course, it can only be speculated what Chinese leader Xi Jinping truly intends, but it is not out of the question that China could increase its influence over Russia not just for economic interests but also to negotiate over security matters in the Pacific region.

The defunct Russia myth

This evolving security picture also includes the collapse of the myth of an invincible Russia. It has become apparent that Russia is not the unbeatable superpower it was once made out to be, but rather a vast Potemkin village whose strength was heavily exaggerated. The reality is quite different. In the first year of the war, Russia lost most of its elite units and much of its modern military equipment. President Putin's rhetoric of "having no analogs" has been exposed as bluff, and Russia's Kinzhals (hypersonic missiles) have not proven unstoppable against Patriot missile defense systems. Russia is incapable of independently producing new high-tech military equipment (without Western components) in sufficient quantities, and its Soviet-era stockpiles are running out.

The Russian military is largely relying on manpower in a manner reminiscent of Stalinist tactics from World War II, where human life is treated as expendable. It is true that Russia's 1.5-ton glide bombs, with a range of 50 kilometers, dropped from aircraft, pose a serious challenge to Ukraine, and countering them will require an increase in Ukraine's air force capabilities – something that is still in the early stages of development.

The recent crash of an F-16 given to Ukraine has revealed deeper issues with the platform, raising concerns that, with such a short preparation time, Ukrainian pilots may not be fully capable of handling these jets in combat. This likely makes Western donor countries more cautious.

However, this does not change the reality of Russia's situation. Russia is far from being as threatening as it was once believed. Ukraine has shown that it is possible to strike Russia and even seize its territory. The once mighty Russia, as portrayed by the Kremlin, now finds itself in a humiliating dependence on donor countries from the Third World – namely North Korea, Iran and China. Russia no longer fits into the security framework that had previously existed. Yet, despite this clear message, the West has not yet decisively recalibrated its security policies to reflect the new reality.

Whether to bring back pre-war Russia

Alongside all of this, there is also talk of the possibility of "turning back the clock" for Russia – bringing it back into the fold of so-called normal countries with which it is possible to develop conventional cooperation. The emerging coalition of pariah states – Russia, Iran, North Korea and China – is far from being in the West's interest, especially if balancing Russia relies heavily on China.

In the context of the war in Ukraine, it is currently difficult for the West to openly discuss reintegrating Russia into its sphere, as this could appear as a betrayal of Ukraine and fuel conspiracy theories that the West is trying to reach a secret agreement with Russia behind Ukraine's back. While certain communication channels between the West and Russia are likely being kept open, any formal agreements seem to be a distant prospect at this stage.

The key question is whether Russia can change enough to reverse the course of history, and whether a peace agreement acceptable to all parties – including Ukraine – can be achieved, which would then allow for the lifting of sanctions against Russia.

According to discussions circulating in Russian political circles, the elite surrounding the Kremlin is reportedly divided between two factions: one advocating for the continuation of Putin's course (whether with or without Putin, should something happen to him) and the other seeking to reintegrate with the West. The latter group allegedly understands that restoring relations with the West requires a peace agreement that is acceptable to both Ukraine and the Western world – a formidable challenge for Russia.

While these debates may indeed be taking place, real changes will only be taken seriously if the Kremlin shows genuine willingness to shift course. So far, the trajectory of the war does not indicate any such intent from Moscow.

Peace rhetoric

A separate topic of discussion is the peace rhetoric from politicians in the West and other parts of the world, which often seems disconnected from current security principles. Peace initiatives have emerged from countries such as China, India, Turkey, Brazil and various African nations.

In the West, particularly in Europe, these discussions are often led by populist parties on both the right and left. However, divisions on this issue also run through mainstream governing parties. A notable shift in rhetoric can be observed before and after Ukraine's incursion into the Kursk region.

Before the invasion, Ukraine was in such a weak position relative to Russia that any call for peace talks effectively meant urging Ukraine to capitulate and accept Russia's terms. This would have resulted in Ukraine surrendering a significant portion of its territory, abandoning ambitions of joining NATO and the European Union, disarming its military, installing a pro-Moscow puppet government and likely facing the repression of its pro-Ukrainian elites. From a global security perspective, such an outcome would have been disastrous.

Recently, German politician Sahra Wagenknecht, from the Left Party (Die Linke), has gained attention for her calls to stop German arms supplies to Ukraine and lift the oil and gas embargo against Russia. She is also notably critical of NATO and the U.S., opposing the deployment of U.S. long-range missiles in Germany. For Germany, which is grappling with internal divisions, such rhetoric only fuels existing doubts and hesitations.

Populist propaganda often adopts the guise of pacifism or environmentalism, claiming that nothing is more harmful to people and the planet than war. Talking about peace in the context of ongoing conflict can be like tempting a drunk with a beer. Populists assume that voters are focused on immediate concerns and do not consider long-term consequences. Thus, the argument that a poorly negotiated peace now will only lead to a new war in the future may not resonate with these voters.

Europe, of course, has the experience of World War II, where Nazi Germany sought to avenge its defeat in World War I. However, that was long ago and no longer seems relevant in modern politics. Germany, Europe's largest supporter of Ukraine, is motivated more by guilt over Nazi war crimes than by geopolitical strategy, making the country fertile ground for populist pacifism.

Ukraine's invasion of the Kursk region has significantly altered the situation. Calls for peace talks no longer seem as drastic, and there is growing discussion of a potential agreement between Ukraine and Russia as something more realistic.

Ukraine now has leverage, giving it actual bargaining power in any future peace negotiations. To avoid internal political crises, any peace agreement must be acceptable to the respective societies, both in Ukraine and Russia. As previously mentioned, preventing another war hinges on securing a just peace. However, that peace is not likely to arrive tomorrow. There is still a long road ahead before that goal is reached.

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