War historian: Neither Ukraine nor Russia adept at operating large forces
The full-scale war initiated by Russia in Ukraine continues to be a war of attrition, and neither side has yet developed sufficiently to operate with larger military formations, said military historian Igor Kopõtin.
In an interview on the "Ukraina stuudio" talk show, military historian Igor Kopõtin acknowledged that the war between Russia and Ukraine remains a war of attrition, with both sides committing vast resources. "It closely resembles the operations of World War I, where both sides expended substantial material and manpower, yet failed to achieve clear operational or military objectives," he explained.
Kopõtin emphasized that drones have brought a significant shift in warfare from a military theory perspective, being used in the air, on land and at sea, performing a variety of tasks. Moreover, drones are now employed even at very low levels, such as by squads and platoons, demonstrating their comprehensive role in modern conflict. However, according to Kopõtin, drones have not yet succeeded in delivering operational victories on the battlefield.
"We haven't seen any purely drone-achieved victories. Drones, as military technology, are still tools in the hands of people, and the success of an operation or war depends on how the general staffs or command centers of either warring side can understand the impact of this military technology on the battlefield, integrate it into operational concepts and apply it effectively to turn tactical success into operational victory. Unfortunately, we haven't seen that yet," he noted.
Kopõtin believes that the Ukrainian offensive in Russia's Kursk region, which has lasted for weeks, has reached its culmination point.
"The military theorist Clausewitz called the culmination point the moment when the logistical lines of the advancing side become too stretched, the attacking forces become more dispersed and the advantage begins to shift gradually to the defending side, allowing the defenders to launch counterattacks against the attackers," the historian explained.
He added that defense is always stronger in war than offense. "It's always more difficult to carry out and organize an offensive. The attacking side suffers more losses. It is likely that the Ukrainians did not intend to expand their foothold in such a way that it would lead to a large-scale offensive toward Kursk or Moscow. There likely wasn't such an ambition. One important political aspect, however, is that a Ukrainian soldier's boot set foot on Russian soil, which provided a significant political boost and strengthened the Ukrainian military's morale," Kopõtin said.
According to Kopõtin, both Ukraine and Russia face a similar problem in the war – they have not yet developed the ability to operate with larger formations. The fighting, he explained, primarily involves brigades.
"The Russian offensive in the Donbas region is methodical, involving heavy use of artillery support, massive infantry attacks and, despite losses, attempting to conquer larger areas step by step, although the actual progress is minimal. The Ukrainians have indeed managed to achieve operational surprise – this is at least the second or even third time in the Ukraine-Russia war that the Russians did not expect an attack. They may have had intelligence, but they were not prepared for the offensive the Ukrainian army launched in the Kursk region. This element of surprise was crucial, and in the early days of August, when the operation began, the Ukrainians had considerable success," he explained.
"But again, we now see that the operation has essentially stalled, and the Russians have organized counterattacks. The problem is that neither Ukraine nor Russia is capable of grouping their operations to achieve strategic objectives. And, if we're talking about how this war could be resolved purely militarily, it depends on how quickly the general staffs in Kyiv or Moscow can learn from this experience and develop a new concept that can turn tactical success into operational success on the battlefield," Kopõtin added.
He also noted that Ukraine is learning quickly and developing its own style of warfare.
"They're not simply adopting all NATO principles of warfare. In my view, they are trying to develop their own national military strategy, combining elements of NATO warfare theory with some of the older principles used in the Soviet military school," the historian explained.
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Editor: Merili Nael, Macus Turovski