We should be careful not to confuse speculation with strategy. The reality is straightforward: a major war is raging in Europe, yet the Allies continue either to ignore it or to treat it as merely a regional conflict over territory. Russia has not changed its strategic objectives. Its aim is to destroy Ukraine's sovereignty and reshape the existing European security architecture - in other words, to weaken and ultimately dismantle NATO.

The uncomfortable truth is that we have done far too little to force the Kremlin to abandon these objectives or to make clear that pursuing them would come at an unbearably high price. Instead, we are creating, almost as a self-fulfilling prophecy, the impression that a Russian attack on NATO is inevitable.

Russia understands that it can confuse and paralyse us through information operations alone. Constant speculation about the Baltic states and Poland risks creating the impression that this is primarily a problem for two or three countries on Russia's doorstep, while the rest of Europe can somehow remain untouched.

We have seen this delusion before with Ukraine: if only the issue in Donbas could somehow be settled, peace would return. The same logic is now being applied to NATO's eastern flank. If Russia gets what it wants there, perhaps everyone else will be safe.

But this is not how Russian strategy works. We should not forget Moscow's December 2021 ultimatum, which demanded that NATO roll back its military infrastructure to the 1997 lines. Russia was not merely asking for a settlement over Ukraine. It was demanding a fundamental revision of Europe's security order.

And if Russia sees that even members of the Coalition of the Willing are unwilling to articulate a clear strategic objective — namely, helping Ukraine achieve victory and pushing back Russian aggression — why should the Kremlin believe that we will have the resolve to defend NATO itself?

Russia's campaign against the West would not necessarily begin with a conventional attack. It can start by undermining NATO from within: interfering in elections, amplifying polarising narratives, exploiting political divisions and spreading fear. It can seek to isolate Ukraine by limiting Western support and then test our willingness to stand together.

This is already a war in which Russia is using terror against the West, and we need to recognise that reality if we are serious about bringing it to an end.

The first step is strategic clarity: Russia will not stop simply because we ask it to. It will stop when the costs of continuing its aggression become greater than the benefits it expects to gain.

That means the Coalition of the Willing should, at a minimum, pursue three concrete objectives.

• First, we need a substantial increase in military support for Ukraine — for example, a minimum of 0.25% of GDP annually — alongside continued support for Ukraine's financial system to help cover the costs of the war.
• Second, we should prepare for a military humanitarian mission to protect Ukrainian cities and critical strategic infrastructure from Russia's massive aerial terror campaign.
• Third, we need to apply decisive economic pressure on Russia so that its war machine can no longer operate at its current scale.

If we fail to do this, we should expect more acts of Russian terror across Europe. Defense companies and their executives may become targets. We must also be prepared for false-flag operations in which Russia could attempt to blame Ukraine for an attack causing casualties in a NATO country.

And we must recognise another vulnerability: our own political divisions. Russia is actively seeking to deepen them through interference and information operations. Developments in the France and Germany, as well as in Poland, show how important it is that our political disagreements do not become a strategic gift to the Kremlin.

Above all, we need to stop the submissive avalanche of speculation along the lines of: "Help, the Russians are coming!"

This kind of defeatism does not strengthen deterrence. It weakens it. Instead of endlessly speculating about where Russia might attack next, we should be talking - and acting - to ensure that Russia loses the war of aggression it started. And we should make clear that such aggression will have serious consequences for the dictatorship ruling Russia.

The fear that decisive action might somehow undermine strategic stability is itself becoming a tool of Russian escalation. If every step that could strengthen Ukraine or Europe is rejected because it might provoke Moscow, Russia learns precisely the wrong lesson: that fear works.

That is not deterrence. A new strategic stability in Europe cannot be built on permanent Russian threats, Western hesitation and Ukrainian sacrifice. It can emerge only when the security architecture of Europe is defended and strengthened — and when Russia has been defeated in the war of aggression it launched against it.

Our task is not to predict the next Russian attack. Our task is to make sure Russia understands that aggression will fail.

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