Drone technology is currently developing faster than the state can procure it through conventional procedures. A solution that appears to be the best when technical specifications are being drawn up may already be yesterday's technology by the time the contract is signed. Therefore, Estonia's next important drone capability is not necessarily a new radar, sensor or counter-drone system. At least as important is the ability to establish, based on evidence and before making a purchase, what actually works under Estonian conditions.

The more Estonia invests in security, the more costly mistakes become. Purchasing millions of euros' worth of equipment without knowing how it works with other systems, what information it provides, who receives that information and what decision a person makes based on it is a matter of governance, resilience and the use of public funds.

The war in Ukraine has made drones one of the fastest-developing fields of technology. A countermeasure is found for a sensor, communications methods are changed, software is upgraded and algorithms are adjusted, while a cheaper and more effective alternative to a costly solution can emerge within a matter of months. The technology cycle has become considerably shorter than the traditional public-sector procurement cycle.

The Estonian government itself has acknowledged this change. Prime Minister Kristen Michal noted in the spring that drones have significantly changed airborne threats in a short period of time and that Estonia needs both multilayered drone defenses and an environment in which companies can develop new counter-drone solutions.

A single radar cannot create situational awareness

When discussing the drone threat, we tend to talk about equipment. Do we need radar, a radio-frequency sensor, an optical camera, a jammer, an interceptor drone and so on? But none of these creates an operational capability on its own. First, a drone has to be detected and then it has to be identified. Information from multiple sensors must be brought together, an assessment must be made as to whether the object poses a threat and someone must receive and understand that information in time to make a decision. Only then can action be taken if necessary.

What needs to be established is which model of detection, data exchange, decision support and cooperation actually works. This distinction becomes especially important at a facility providing an essential service. Imagine a (malicious) drone near an electrical substation, hospital, port or other critical facility. One sensor issues an alert, another does not confirm it and a third detects the object but classifies it differently. Who receives the information? Who decides whether it is a threat? Which agency is responsible? When should the police be involved? When should the facility's security team be involved? What information is sufficient to justify intervention in the first place?

The same problem arises when different agencies procure different solutions at different times. Each piece of equipment may be good on its own, but their data formats, operating models, threat assessments and command-and-control systems may not be compatible. The result may be that the state has a great deal of technology but still lacks a common operational picture. This is precisely the kind of fragmentation that should be avoided before major investments are made.

Developments among Estonia's allies show that the problem is increasingly well understood. In March this year, NATO launched its new Innovation Range in Latvia with its first campaign to test, assess, verify and validate drone and counter-drone technologies. Companies from allied countries and Ukraine, operational users and public-sector representatives were brought together at the Sēlija Military Training Area. It was the first of several testing activities planned for 2026.

NATO has applied the same principle elsewhere on the eastern flank, jointly testing drones, counter-drone systems, unmanned ground systems and communications solutions in an operational environment. NATO is conducting these tests because there is a vast amount of technology available and it is necessary to quickly determine what actually works, how it integrates with other systems and how it can be used operationally.

The European Union is moving in the same direction. The European Commission's new Action Plan on Drone and Counter-Drone Security, adopted in February, addresses incident prevention, drone detection, responses to malicious activity and strengthening European defense readiness together. The Commission's action plan places particular emphasis on secure equipment, command-and-control capabilities, industrial cooperation and the broader deployment of drone and counter-drone solutions. Testing and validation are becoming a core part of capability development.

Estonia has good reason to invest heavily in security in the coming years, but a larger budget also means greater responsibility for the technological choices we make as more equipment does not automatically translate into greater capability.

If organizations define their needs separately, conduct separate procurements and evaluate solutions according to different criteria, the result may be a collection of technological islands. One sensor operates in one place and another elsewhere, one agency has one operational picture and another has a different one, data is exchanged only partially or manually and the final operational decision-making process remains to be worked out after procurement.

The state's ability to act as a smart customer is becoming a key competency. A smart customer knows how to compare alternatives under the same conditions before making a major investment, make different components work together, measure results and involve the end user.

In public-sector innovation, the purpose of testing is precisely that learning on a limited scale makes it possible to avoid larger and more costly mistakes before full-scale implementation. Documents underpinning Estonia's public-sector innovation policy likewise treat testing as a means of evaluating new solutions before widespread deployment and reducing the risk of costly mistakes on a large scale. In the case of drone technology, this principle may prove particularly valuable.

Ability to make "small" mistakes needed before the next major tender

Estonia therefore needs a permanent capability to test solutions designed to mitigate drone threats under controlled conditions before they are relied upon to handle a real crisis or become the subject of a major investment.

The technology needs to be tested in real-world environments. An urban area, a port, energy infrastructure or the surroundings of a hospital all place very different demands on sensors. Interference, buildings, other radio signals and people's everyday activities all affect performance.

Data from different sensors must also be integrated. The detection accuracy of an individual device is of little use if an operational user has to monitor four different screens at once and determine whether they are showing the same object.

Not every threat scenario can be recreated in the real world and physically testing every combination would be too expensive. A digital model makes it possible to repeat the same scenario, change parameters and compare the performance of different solutions and processes.

A good counter-drone test examines whether the system correctly understood what it detected, whether the information reached the right person at the right time and whether that information enabled the right decision to be made. This is where technology and governance intersect.

Estonia's small size makes it possible to bring operational agencies, essential service providers, technology companies, researchers and government policymakers into a single testing framework. Estonian businesses would benefit as well. If a solution developed in Estonia can demonstrate that it works not only in a laboratory but in a real energy, port or other critical infrastructure environment and as part of an integrated decision-making chain, that is valuable to both the state and the company.

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