Center Party leader: People's well-being should be a common goal in Estonia
It is a trait of totalitarian states to blame the enemy for anything that goes wrong. It should be a common goal for Estonia to ensure everyone's well-being and build a wealthy state in the service of this goal, Center Party head Mihhail Kõlvart tells ERR in an interview.
Let us look at the situation beyond day-to-day politics, even though it is a good place to start. The situation in Estonian politics is very stable today, which will probably not change before the next general election, if then – who can say what the results will be. A single party has almost 40 seats in the parliament, while the coalition controls 60 seats out of the total 101. I tuned in to the finance minister's no-confidence vote Wednesday night (the interview took place on October 26 – ed.) where a total of 26 votes were cast against the minister – that is the reach of the opposition in parliament. There are no other dramatic changes on the horizon either. Is Estonia in a stable political situation?
We should zoom out even more, look at what is happening in the wider world, in Europe. The status quo is always temporary. If we look at the two and a half years we have until general elections, it is a relatively short span of time, talking about the future and where Estonia is headed.
I think, and this is not an original point of view by any stretch, that the whole world is living in crises, and there will be more of them. The crises we have already survived were not the last, there will be more and they will have an effect on our lives. Not to mention the international political background, which is full of uncertainty, and uncertainty is often the soil from which crises grow.
But the number one question for Estonia is not whether the Reform Party will retain its position after the elections. Rather, it's where our country is headed. Major issues also go beyond the economy and security, and the biggest question of all, the existential question, is how to ensure population growth, who will be earning the money that helps pay our pensions in 20 years and what grand idea could unite us in the future.
We have to admit that consolidating society is not what politicians do. Politicians look for conflict, openings for confrontation to drum up emotions. The latter, and negative emotions in particular, are what make people turn out and vote. I believe it is the biggest problem of small societies, having too few people interested in maximally consolidating society.
It goes beyond politics, to physics in some ways – the only way to have a big result with a small resource is to maximally concentrate said resource. In social terms, this means consolidation. In the end, the number one question is what is our ultimate goal or goals that should unite us and take us forward in the economy and as a society.
There was a long period when membership in Western organizations served as that master goal – around 20 years ago, we joined NATO and the European Union.
The Reform Party, which was already winning elections at that time, declared, under then-chairman Andrus Ansip, the goal of joining the family of wealthy nations. Their slogan of becoming one of the five wealthiest countries in Europe, which was ridiculed, especially at the time, was in fact consolidating and clearly phrased.
It's interesting that I had planned to refer to it. I was skeptical and critical when it was first announced too. But it was the right thing. Not that it would have been achievable in the short term, but the conceptual understanding that society, the people needed a major goal, which is the only way to consolidate society.
But it's not enough. You also need a clear plan of action, and this is our next problem. We often see project-based public and private sector management. There is little synergy between different fields and we lack a grand narrative of where we all want to end up and what needs to be done to get there.
I see it as more than just philosophical rhetoric. I believe it is possible.
I don't know whether it's a good example or not, but China has a long plan, whereas their long plan is not a century or two – it's a thousand years, and it has the relatively simple goal of conquering the world.
They may not phrase or talk about it this way, but looking at the processes, at what they're doing, it seems quite a clear plan to me. They are going about it very systematically – conquering the global economy, territories – we can see it in Africa and efforts to support Chinese exports. Where it will all end up is another matter, but they do have a plan.
We touched on crises before and whether politicians can consolidate society. Looking at how the ruling party, the Reform Party, has treated with crises, they've used them to consolidate society around them in time for elections. This has worked well, whether we look at 2014 or 2023.
I think that major goals and political technology are not one and the same. They go hand in hand, but we're still talking about different things.
The Reform Party consolidated people to oppose three specific parties, calling it the EKREIKE (the derogatory nickname given to the coalition of the Center Party, Isamaa and EKRE – ed.) security threat.
While we might personally like or dislike Center, Isamaa or EKRE, they are still our people.
The Reform Party tried to turn them into enemies of Estonia and succeeded before elections – emotions were stirred, people started fighting against these parties as they felt they were the threat and enemy.
Later, that emotion waned, of course, as all emotions do in politics, and was replaced with the reality of tax hikes, despite prior promises to the contrary. Budget cuts were ordered, and things that had been pledged were taken back. That was the reality, and there is no way to paint that as a long-term goal or something that can unite people.
Looking back in history, one of the most united periods was the late 1980s, which is when our goal was to be free of the Soviet Union, to be able to decide matters for ourselves as a free people.
The 1990s were an extremely free time, even though they were not the safest from an individual's point of view and things were very confusing socially. However, there were more freedoms.
We hardly talk about freedoms these days, with new regulations, restrictions and limitations having become a daily occurrence, down to where we need to ask whether what our state agencies are doing is even constitutional in terms of fundamental freedoms. Recent weeks have produced examples where the justice chancellor or individual politicians have been forced to raise this point.
Perhaps the narrative people are looking for is not about getting rich or belonging somewhere rather than just making sure we haven't strayed too far from the original goal.
I agree that the level of consolidation was higher 30 years ago, when the Estonian people were fighting for freedom and independence, including among national minorities. An interesting fact we don't remember, or don't want to remember, is that the Russian population was largely consolidated around that struggle too. I believe we would do well to remind each other of this fact every now and again.
We have two problems today. One is that we try to justify every decision – right or wrong – by referring to the security crisis. Not to mention that if something doesn't go to plan – especially in the economy – we blame it all on the security crisis too. When we need to patch holes in the budget, instead of admitting it, we call it a defense tax, even though that is clearly not the case.
The reason this is dangerous is that it erodes the rulers' responsibility. It seems to me that there is less responsibility if every mistake can be blamed on the security crisis.
Not to mention that it is a trait of not even authoritarian, but totalitarian states to blame everything that goes wrong on the enemy. That is a dangerous tendency in itself.
The other problem is conceptual and lies in having to admit that while we were doing well – had grand goals, many freedoms, which are an important resource for social development – we became prideful and loud. We boasted our success compared to the other Baltic countries, how we were a world-famous digital state and could teach others how to follow suit.
While we've been boasting, today we must admit that both the Latvian and Lithuanian economies are growing faster than ours. Just as talk of Estonia being a progressive digital state is hardly appropriate in a situation where we're third from the bottom in the EU when it comes to developing artificial intelligence. Unfortunately, AI is the future of the digital state.
We cannot offer a longer perspective or discuss bigger goals.
Suggesting that the economy will be growing faster and economic decisions will be more progressive in Lithuania compared to Estonia would have sounded naive ten or even six years ago.
Today, everyone realizes that a small economy is pulled in the wake of exports and foreign investments. Small markets are always limited, there is no way around that. To develop your economy, you must look outward, which you can only do if you've got export potential and the ability to attract foreign investments.
While we keep talking about it, Lithuania has been taking systematic action. And it is not just about their banking tax, which we don't have – even though it is another good example. It is about the fact that in addition to talking about foreign investments, they are drafting corresponding legislation, creating bureaucratic windows of opportunity. In other words, when an investor comes, they find it much easier to get what they need and solve problems. There is also relevant tax policy. That is how systematic activities bring in foreign investments.
At the same time, it is a very state-centered approach, having the government put in place tax breaks and export subsidies – it is what Estonia avoided doing in the 1990s, which set it apart from all of its former peers.
Yes, because we believed, and this belief has been around for 30-40 years in the world, that the free market solves all problems. That there is no need for state intervention and guidance. The truth is that all successful economies engage in the latter.
Talking about doing things differently, we had the example of China... What baffled me in the previous crisis, the pandemic, was just how many free countries copied China's coronavirus restrictions. Ordering society to shut down, restrictions on movement, high-tech surveillance etc.
Estonia was among the more modest compliers, but we also copied every measure aimed against personal freedoms, which had seemed unthinkable only a few months earlier. Whereas we didn't stop to ask what it made us. Sweden was the exception, and it seems in hindsight that they did the right thing – respecting personal freedoms yielded the better result in the end.
Why didn't Estonia stay true to the idea of freedom in emulating Sweden? We used to be the ones who did things differently, while now we walked in China's footsteps, like much of the West did.
That is a fundamental and philosophical question indeed.
Basically, we exchanged liberty for hypothetical security, which did not turn out all that safe after all.
Well, yes, but it is what we know today. Back then, no one knew what it meant or where it could end up.
Estonia didn't know, in the early 1990s, where ignoring the recommendations of the International Monetary Fund, introducing the currency board system, going with flat taxes or abolishing customs tariffs would end up – these decisions were made because of the belief that more freedom would result in faster social development. Today, that faith in ourselves, in doing things differently seems to be a thing of the past.
We're talking about slightly different things. Bold decisions when building a society and state are one thing, while mortal fear is another. If people really got scared that Covid could cost them their life, it makes for another threat level altogether. Not to mention that this threat also had an immediate dimension. How the economy will develop will become clear in a few years or a decade, versus people dying near you and you might be next...
Whether those fears were completely objective or not makes for another matter, but the reason was not knowing and mortal fear, which are psychological processes and situation, on top of being social processes. The level of consolidation in society was very high for a short period toward the start of the pandemic.
What I believe was the biggest mistake – it weren't the restrictions even – was when we started manufacturing confrontation: those who wore masks versus the enemies who did not; those who were vaccinated versus the enemies who were not. This was a far more dangerous tendency than the restrictions themselves, because there was hysteria – people did not do what someone thought was the right thing to do, through which they became dangerous and the enemy. It had a much deeper effect.
Talking about freedom in general, it is not a moment, result or goal. Freedom is a process and one that includes historical experience – society needs a little more experience of what freedom means, how to maintain it. Also that it may be more important than some other values. We do not have enough of that experience today, which can be dangerous. As you pointed out before, we all see and accept how the state is willing to give up freedoms to regulate and intervene to a greater degree.
Relevant processes are two-pronged today, including what we're willing to accept ourselves and what's coming from the EU.
The latter makes for a separate process, the aim of which is the centralization of EU authority, or federalization. This process has been launched, and centralization or federalization always comes with new regulations, alongside the desire to exercise power in a centralized manner all over the Union.
We talked about regulations, restrictions and the European Union, which is responsible for much of it, while you also praised Lithuania for steering the country's economy. There is a controversy here. Should we have more guidelines, limitations and rules, next to giving officials more say in channeling the economy, or should we expect things to move in the right direction if we give people more freedom?
There is no right answer here. It is the art of finding and staying on the middle of the road. And we're still talking about different things. Lithuania's economic policy is pure protectionism, which clashes with EU directives, talking specifically about recent developments. Lithuania wants to protect its economy, wants to foster investments – in other words, it is what a specific country is doing to lend momentum to its economy the best way it knows how. These decisions may be correct or they may be incorrect, but at least they're making the effort.
The processes we are seeing in the European Union mean that member states will have reduced opportunities for independent decision-making in the future. The decisions will be made by Brussels, and this is not some Eurosceptic point of view, it's based on simple analysis. The European Union simply understands that if it wants to keep expanding, the apparatus cannot work without more common regulation.
Why has the European Union fallen behind the USA and China? Thirty years ago, the EU economy was almost on par with the U.S. Then, the EU started falling behind for two main reasons – one is enlargement, because every round used up more resources than it brought back; the second is bureaucracy, the achingly slow decision-making process that requires agreements and consensus in every single member state.
Someone has now decided that enlargement must continue, because it gives you a larger market, but more common regulation and operative Brussels-based decision-making are also needed for a more effective EU that can make decisions faster.
Again, this is the theoretical side of things, and questions remain in terms of how this could be brought about, as well as what the larger and smaller member states stand to gain or lose.
Why I remain opposed to federalization, personally, is the fact that smaller states have less to gain. We will lose our subsidies and will have to start subsidizing others instead, while we have precious little to offer that new market, which should open up as a result of enlargement. At the same time, potential new member states, such as Ukraine, do have something to offer, including products that would fiercely compete with our agricultural produce.
Looking at the base consensus in Estonia, among politicians and officials, when it comes to the EU and its authority, we do not argue with the Commission or major members states, like Germany or France; we do not challenge agreements we're party to either by default or as a result of various processes; nor do we challenge new plans a major member state, group of states or the Commission might have.
The Riigikogu's European Union Affairs Committee approves three thousand-page reforms and amendment packages as if in passing, likely without much scrutiny. And sure enough, officials tend to become very nervous whenever the committee looks like it wants to take a closer look at something or when its members develop questions.
On one hand, this is understandable. Estonia is not really capable of standing out either as a member state or a distinct market, but what would happen to us were Estonia to act in the opposite manner, which is not something we often see in the EU, except in the case of states that tend to be friendlier toward Russia?
Or let's take an even simpler example – dissatisfaction with the Nord Pool exchange. Should we wish to exit Nord Pool or alter the conditions of our participation, officials and politicians would tell us, relying on the base consensus, that we're being at odds with the EU. What should we do?
It is not just a political question, but also a practical one, that whenever a new directive lands...
It's also an ideological matter.
Yes, but it is also largely a question of resources. Whenever another EU initiative for legislative change arrives, when we get a specific document we need to put into effect, the possibility is there to if not challenge, then at least to seek consensus, explain why some regulations aren't a good fit for us and offer alternatives. But it requires analysis, for our officials to travel to Brussels, argue with politicians if necessary and practice the art of the deal.
This flexibility does exist, to a greater degree in some matters and smaller in others. But there is no obligation to just copy and paste EU documents.
Yet, that is precisely what we do
We do it because we do not have the desire or resources to do these things on a daily basis. Because it is a lot of work.
Firstly, analysis. We do not really seek analysis even when it comes to our own initiatives, including tax-related ones.
But we're wholly incapable of analyzing regulation coming from Brussels. Because if you decide to analyze things, you have to explain it to European officials, propose your own version – all of it is possible and the larger member states do it. None of them adopt European regulations in the copy and paste format. We do it, alongside other smaller member states perhaps.
Another example is the green transition. We virtually gave up oil shale energy. Was it because the European Union is requiring us to?
In truth, it was largely our own initiative, so we could drop oil shale post haste and demonstrate how progressive we are.
Your fellow Center Party member Jüri Ratas was prime minister when we took that decision.
I must admit that he was. We wanted to show the EU how progressive we are.
There are two aspects to consider: deadlines and compensation (the Just Transition Fund – ed.) Three hundred million euros is pocket change in this context. We could have gotten a lot more, but we wanted to show it was our initiative. I could spend ages talking figures.
It makes for yet another ideological matter. But do I understand you correctly in that if we had gotten more than €360 million in exchange for abandoning oil shale energy and shale oil, things would be well and good? Would it be okay if we had gotten €3.6 billion?
No. What I mean is that some things could be done more efficiently and more in line with our interests also inside the existing framework.
Now for the ideological aspect – giving up oil shale energy is an existential mistake. As far as I know, Germany has no plans to abandon coal.
They have, they're just being very slow about it.
They are taking it slow so they could quickly return to capacity if necessary. That is just what they did when the energy crisis hit.
Everyone understands that an energy source that you control in your own territory and don't need to import is a security guarantee.
We've seen how in the event of a crisis, including the Covid crisis in the EU, every country looks to its own problems first. They closed borders, made sure they had enough masks and isolated people... And I started by saying that there will be other crises.
And then we come and say that while we have no alternative, we also don't need this [oil shale energy]. Yes, oil shale is expensive, but this is overly formal logic. It is one thing what electricity costs, while it's another what the sector can guarantee for the region and the national economy.
Oil shale was a systematic sector – 4,500 jobs were directly tied to it, with another 15,000 associated indirectly. A sector that yielded resources and profits.
Speaking of Germany. If you consider its completely irrational decision of giving up nuclear energy or, more broadly, the political turns of Angela Merkel's Germany, which continue to shape Europe to this day, why did Merkel take these decisions in your opinion? Was it political conviction, unbelievable foolishness or, which is what a lot of people suspect, is a big part of German politics still under Russian control?
I don't know about the latter claim.
I don't either, that's why I'm asking. I cannot actively suspect German politicians of being quite that stupid.
A theory has been taking shape lately, kind of like a conspiracy theory. Looking at decisions countries are making and trying to analyze what could be the greater good or goal intended, if not now, then 10-20 years down the line, as well as to what extent there was analysis before the decision was made... I cannot do it and increasingly get the feeling that major countries, their leaders and politicians are indeed capable of making decisions based on emotion. That it is possible.
Looking at the decisions made, you often feel there's nothing to analyze here, no sense in trying to find an underlying narrative. They are just stupid decisions.
That Angela Merkel's decisions, which, on the one hand, shut down all of Germany's nuclear power plants and, on the other, built four extremely expensive gas pipelines in the Baltic to bring presumably cheap Russian gas to German consumers and industry, were pure folly? That there was nothing else to it?
I don't know. That's why I started going on about my theory.
We said before that there needs to be a grand goal, but it sometimes seems to me that politicians are manufacturing such projects because they want to achieve something. Another interesting theory.
You're the Center Party's chairman. Listening to you over the past half hour, looking at your recent interviews and statements and the fact you brought Jaak Madison to the Center Party, it seems that you are putting together a new goal for Center, a new narrative or image of some sort.
The Center Party has come through different crises in a short time.
Center really has been doing terribly. I believe we can agree there.
Yes.
I believe that there is a future for the Center Party if we can phrase our true goals, demonstrate that we have the potential needed to achieve them and propose real solutions.
I see an ulterior role for the Center Party, whereas whether we managed to play that part in the past, including inside the party, makes for another topic – but I see consolidating society and centrism as our goal, political ideology and narrative. It's not just pathos either – it is a real political ideology, not something that the Center Party cooked up. Social consolidation.
The other important aspect as I see it is that Center needs to be able to offer real solutions, not just slogans. And these solutions do not have to depend on ideology. Whether we have right- or left-wing policies, whether a banking tax or progressive income tax constitutes right- or left-wing ideology /.../ It makes no difference.
We need to propose workable solutions, solutions which we believe work, irrespective of ideologies others would attribute to them.
I watched a little-known ad dedicated to the Center Party's 33rd anniversary a week ago. Center members, from Kalle Klandorf and Aivar Riisalo to Jaak Madison and Mihhail Kõlvart, say various things about the party there. It was like taking a trip back in time to the Center Party of Edgar Saivsaar's day. Or was it a case of self-irony?
For example, in it, Kalle Klandorf says that it was Center who gave Estonian Railways back to the Estonian people. Was that a joke? The way it was directed was also reminiscent of another clip from 2004 in which Center members, all of whom have by now left the party, are marching in front of a moving locomotive.
The ad has to do with the party's history.
So it was irony then?
We wanted to remind people that we're the oldest and largest political party in Estonia and have come through various periods and stages. I believe the Center Party has historical achievements that are worth talking about today. But it was also a political message.
We cannot travel back in time, and you will have to make ideological choices. The choices you need to make seem clear. In the European Parliament, which you personally decided not to join, Center has one foot in the liberal group and the other in with the conservatives and nationalists. Will this remain the case in the long run? You will have to demonstrate to your voters which side you're on. Are you liberals or conservatives?
First of all, we only just left (Center quit the European Parliament's ALDE faction in September – ed.).
One of your members is a prominent MEP for the group.
Not a unique situation.
Does that mean you're plotting a course for conservatism?
Other parties allow members to belong to different groups.
But we've made our choice in the grand scheme of things. We will quit ALDE because a lot of our core positions are at odds with theirs.
We haven't picked our new political family in Europe yet, it requires analysis and we are not in a hurry.
I would return to the idea of consolidating society, that centrism is also an ideology for which there exists a theoretical basis.
Centrism does not mean lacking a position or relying on vague phrasing. No! We need to have concrete positions. Some might feel more conservative, others more liberal at times. But what's special about centrism is the desire to look for solutions and ideas that unite people, irrespective of whether they're liberals or conservatives. That is one aspect.
The other thing, which I have also talked about in the past, is that centrism aims for balance, not just inside the party but in society. If society seems to be leaning too much in either direction, the opposite course must be plotted for balance. This notion may sound a little arithmetical, but I believe it to be the case.
And I see that society, not just in Estonia but also Europe, is leaning heavily toward liberalism today. I would even call it ultraliberalism. Our aim today is to offer a counterbalance, which means that while we're centrists, our views are more conservative.
That requires a new party goal, new program and everything that goes with it.
Yes, and we are gradually working on those things. We will keep most of our program, but there will be new phrasing, goals and priorities.
I understand that the liberal-conservative axis is extremely vague, so let me rephrase – is the new Center Party a right- or left-wing force?
The Center Party is a centrist party. I'm not trying to dodge your question. I'm just trying to explain a situation where other ideological considerations that the simple right-left axis are possible. Not to mention that being traditionally right- or left-wing tends to translate to radicalism in modern Europe.
Concepts like "liberal conservatism" or "conservative liberalism" exist, and every left-center party has a lot of what would traditionally be associated with right-wing ideology.
Talking about right-wingers or left-wingers amounts to oversimplification. Let's take the Reform Party – a classical right-wing liberal party. But Reform soon realized that catering to entrepreneurs alone is no way to win elections and managed to offer a bigger pension rise than its competitors on the left.
Is Center aiming for ideological vagueness then?
There's nothing vague about it. We need to admit that society needs – and I can't stress this enough – consolidation and solutions not rooted in ideology.
You said that we cannot see a narrative or grand story with the potential of uniting Estonian society...
National security maybe.
That is rather a reaction to the crises that surround us, while we don't seem to have anything we inherently long for ourselves. What could it be from the point of view of the Center Party or its chairman?
Our shared goal should be the well-being of the Estonian people, which requires a strong and wealthy country.
Will you dust off the Reform Party's old slogan?
I would refrain from copying them and add that we need to engage in sectoral prioritization in the economy; we need to find the sectors we want to develop, where we want to foster high-tech, industry etc. for them to act as the locomotives of our economy. I believe it is very important. Many countries managed to ensure growth and general prosperity through such an approach, managed to pinpoint sectors where they consciously invested, which they supported and developed to eventually have success stories.
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Editor: Marcus Turovski, Laura Raudnagel