Minister of the Interior Lauri Läänemets (SDE) said Estonia already had plans in place to secure land-based energy infrastructure by February, coinciding with the country's disconnection from the Russian electricity grid.

"Following the destruction of Estlink 2, we expedited these plans," Läänemets said. "This includes conducting new risk assessments, which may necessitate additional measures."

The minister stressed that as the number of connections decreases, the importance of the remaining ones increases.

In addition to the Estlink 1 undersea cable, Estonia is connected to the rest of Europe via three overhead lines linking Estonia and Latvia. The minister said these land-based lines can be repaired relatively quickly, so monitoring efforts focus on more complex and high-impact sites.

The key facilities for Estonia-Latvia connections include substations in Kilingi-Nõmme, Tartu, and Tsirguliina. The Harku substation is critical for Estlink 1, while facilities like the Kiisa backup power plant and the Kiisa, Püssi, and Viru synchronous condensers are essential for the upcoming desynchronization process.

Läänemets did not specify which sites the PPA focus on.

"It is a fact that the Estonian police force does not have the personnel to fully staff all of this infrastructure," Läänemets admitted, stressing that actions are guided by priorities and risk assessments.

"Infrastructure owners must also take various measures," he added. "Part of the security effort involves providing information, training, and helping them become more competent in enhancing security at their facilities."

PPA Deputy Director General Veiko Kommusaar noted that communication with critical infrastructure operators has become more frequent. This includes educating companies on how to identify suspicious items at their sites.

"We provide guidance on recognizing potential threats and the fastest ways to report them," the official explained.

He reiterated that the PPA currently does not provide manned surveillance for energy infrastructure. "This could change if information arises suggesting a specific threat to certain facilities. However, as of now, the responsibility for monitoring lies with the owners."

Many critical energy infrastructure sites are in rural areas, which police patrols rarely visit. Kommusaar said several sites are now under closer scrutiny: "This means we've increased both our response speed and awareness regarding these sites."

Läänemets added that organizing manned surveillance depends on police capacity and risk assessments.

"Simply stationing one or two patrols at specific points may not provide be a solution," he said. "Often, the solutions are different. We certainly do not have the resources to place officers at every corner. Decisions are made based on risk assessments and capacity."

Previously, the police have received additional resources to cover new tasks, such as hosting important guests, guarding the border, or enforcing COVID-19 restrictions. However, no additional funding has yet been allocated for monitoring energy infrastructure.

"All of this is ultimately guided by risk assessments," Läänemets reiterated. "Resources are not allocated arbitrarily. Sometimes we might perceive a threat to be greater than what the risk assessment indicates."

Kommusaar said that alongside reviewing risk assessments, the police are also calculating what additional resources would be required to strengthen monitoring.

"Which sites might have specific needs is not fully known yet, but we are working on these calculations. I believe the government will discuss these issues soon," he added.

In this context, it is noteworthy that shortly after the Estlink 2 cable was damaged, the naval patrol vessel Raju departed from the Port of Paldiski to guard the Estlink 1 route.

Läänemets pointed out that undersea infrastructure has been damaged in international waters, where any vessel can gain access.

"Within Estonian territory, not everyone can move freely. We have imposed sanctions that significantly restrict the movement of Russian citizens toward Estonia, making it much harder for them to enter," the minister stressed. "Of course, it is possible to try recruiting someone locally, but this is an issue that the Internal Security Service is undoubtedly addressing."

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