The idea that debt-funded money could be used to strengthen European defense was already prospered two weeks ago when this grand plan was introduced. What does today's defense white paper add to that?

The funding points are one part of this white paper. Since an extraordinary General Affairs Council meeting was held two weeks ago, the financing issue was the most complicated topic there, and there was a sense that a prior discussion was needed to gauge the positions of member states and see whether these ideas could take off. We have now gained that understanding, and this white paper includes what could be done with that money, what should be done as a priority, what can be done together, and what can be done with partners from outside the EU.

What can be done together? There has been much talk about the fragmentation of Europe's defense industry — we buy different types of tanks that lack compatibility. What is the initiative to bring all this together to make everything more affordable? What are we actually doing for this, or what is the European Commission proposing?

There are several elements. Some concern regulations, such as how to make procurement processes for defense industry investments simpler. Everything related to financial accessibility as well, if there are rules, then what needs to be changed. But also, there are things we can do together: large projects like air defense, which involve multiple member states at once; large projects like military mobility, ensuring that all equipment can move between member states; major capabilities like long-range missiles, which we could develop together.

And separately, there are also very specific projects. For example, this white paper explicitly mentions a defense initiative for countries bordering Russia and Belarus. That is included as well.

The biggest common effort, of course, would be a genuine joint loan. If we are already doing everything else, why not do that as well? Thinking about the coronavirus recovery fun, it seems to me that a tram line in Tallinn can be built using European joint loans. But solving a fundamental issue, an existential threat to Europe, to borrow Emmanuel Macron's words, for that, a joint loan cannot be taken out? Why not?

The main problem is that Europe has actually borrowed on a very large scale. In hindsight, perhaps all the rule relaxations for covid and what was done then, we now realize that it was not as big a crisis as the one we are currently facing. But countries have been made fragile because debt burdens are extremely high, and at the moment, there is resistance to this so-called joint loan.

If we look at the different elements we can use: making better use of existing funds, for example, using the cohesion fund more effectively for military mobility, as well as grants and loans that member states can utilize. But yes, indeed, there are no joint Eurobonds or euro debt securities included in this.

But are these defense bonds completely off the table, or do you hope that a better moment might come when they can be put forward again?

I think that considering the need we have, this cannot be off the table simply because the investment needs in defense are so vast. Right now, when we talk about volumes – which is €800 billion – then in reality, borrowing together would allow us to borrow more cheaply, and borrowing together for joint projects is also reasonable.

Do you also believe that €800 billion will actually be added to European defense over four years? Is it a realistic calculation that member states will actually do this?

That depends on the member states, that is very true. These are the frameworks within which it would be possible to operate. But indeed, it depends on the member states how this will actually be implemented. And that, in turn, depends on how seriously the risk or threat is perceived. We know that understandings vary between member states — our sense of threat is much greater than in Spain or Portugal. That is why today, part of the discussion was about how we need to explain to people in Spain and Portugal as well that this is a threat to all of us. If you look at the map, Europe is a very small region.

Speaking of urgent needs, what has become of your idea to quickly send up to €40 billion to Ukraine, partly to compensate for U.S. aid if necessary?

Yes, that 40 billion, together with U.S. aid, is what we are currently providing to Ukraine in 2025. But it is clear that more aid is needed, which is why this initiative is also about how we could reach that goal. This is a long-term issue, and at the moment, large sums are stuck.

Right now, we are working on the short-term request that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky made. Namely, two million shells worth €5 billion which should be easier and quicker to secure because it is urgently needed.

But as I understand it, the rapid aid package that the German foreign minister spoke about back at the Munich conference — that Europe was about to provide — fell through? Why did it fall through? Why aren't we doing it?

Why do our plans fall through? Usually because in Europe, everyone has the right to block things. And when we have joint initiatives, very often they stall because not everyone agrees. This is something we need to work on. That is why our new initiative already takes into account that not everyone will come on board, it is a so-called coalition of the willing. But we need to move forward with it because Ukraine needs this aid now.

I've heard talk that some countries, not just Hungary and Slovakia, but also Spain, did not like the burden-sharing issue, specifically that their contribution is based on GDP. Is it true that the Spanish and some others simply do not want to contribute at the level they would be capable of?

That is true because it comes down to the perception of threats. The sense of danger in those countries is entirely different from ours, for example. That is why our proposal was burden-sharing — distributing the cost among those countries that do not perceive the threat as we do, just as we have shown solidarity in other situations. But yes, this is difficult. On one hand, there are words, but when words have to be backed up with actions, meaning real money, it always becomes more complicated.

Do you feel that this is also somewhat on you, that it did not succeed, or a failure that the package could not be implemented as you wanted?

Yes, every time you come forward with an initiative, of course, you want things to succeed. And indeed, we have not lost hope. The European Council meeting is on Thursday, and we are working intensively to get everyone on board so that we have a concrete message for Ukraine. Otherwise, this would already be the second council meeting where we talk but have nothing concrete to show.

In my opinion, as they say in English, "Put your money where your mouth is" — that is also an important message for Ukraine.

To conclude, a bit about the criticism that has recently been directed at you. German media wrote quite a harsh headline, saying that things are not going well for you. I do not know if I fully agree with that, but objectively, they pointed out several examples of things that perhaps have not gone as well as they could have. Are these just the initial hiccups of your first months in office, or is it inevitable that when you come here and try to push your fellow Europeans into action, some will inevitably get a bit annoyed?

That kind of thing comes with the job, criticism is part of the package. At the same time, there have also been many positive articles. But leadership is like this: if you lead from the front and others follow, then you are a leader. If you try to push forward with things that others do not follow, then it seems like you have failed. But I don't think it should be seen that way. If you only play it safe, then you will not actually be able to push things through.

And as I say, we have a good team, we are working on this, and of course, not everything will always succeed. But that does not mean we should not try.

Much has been said about where that one X post of yours came from, the one saying that the free world needs a new leader [following the row between Zelenskyy and Trump in the White House – ed.]. It caught global headlines. Some have criticized it, while others say it was a strong, forceful message and that it was right to state it openly. Was it meant for Europeans, to push them into action again, or was it also partly directed at the Americans, to express European frustration over the Oval Office squabble?

I would ask in return, how did you feel when you watched what happened in the Oval Office? The feeling I had was that Europe needs to do more. We must support Ukraine no matter what because Ukraine, which has been attacked by Russia, does not deserve such treatment. In a situation where we have a very clear aggressor and a clear victim, we must do everything to ensure that this aggression does not pay off. In fact, it was a call to Europe to pull itself together, because we are capable of it.

Ukraine is Europe!
We stand by Ukraine.

We will step up our support to Ukraine so that they can continue to fight back the agressor.

Today, it became clear that the free world needs a new leader. It's up to us, Europeans, to take this challenge.

— Kaja Kallas (@kajakallas) February 28, 2025

--

Follow ERR News on Facebook and Twitter and never miss an update!