I've previously discussed the work of Alpo Rusi, a former Finnish diplomat and adviser to President Martti Ahtisaari. Now, the focus is on his new book "We Will Not Isolate Russia" (Alpo Rusi, "Venäjää emme eristä," 2025).

The time period examined in the book coincides with Ahtisaari's presidency from 1994 to 2000. As the president's adviser, Rusi had the opportunity to observe many events up close, though he laments that much still remained hidden from him. Archives have since been opened and the book is filled with enough material to make summarizing it a challenge. It is dense with names, dates and a wide range of topics.

Broadly speaking, Rusi continues the theme of "Finlandization" and Finland's leadership striving to avoid isolating Russia. In practice, this meant many politicians effectively reverted to the foundations of the Soviet-Finnish friendship and cooperation treaty. Finnish foreign policy had long operated through Moscow; later, similar approaches were attempted within the European Union framework.

In the West, by the late 1990s, there was widespread fear that Russia might be cut off from Europe and efforts were made to avoid Moscow's isolation. A prevailing belief was that tighter integration of both the old and new European democracies with Russia was necessary.

Rusi believes that Russian intelligence services still had the ability to influence Finnish domestic and foreign policy during the 1990s. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Finland and Sweden found themselves in the same geopolitical boat, both involved in the Baltic states' paths to independence.

However, President Mauno Koivisto's stance on Baltic independence damaged Finland's reputation, allowing Sweden to take the lead in supporting the region. In 1992, Koivisto suggested that Lithuania should allow Russia to maintain a base in Klaipėda, similar to how the United States had bases in Germany. Ahtisaari did not continue this line. In 1994, Baltic issues were still on the agenda and the Finnish Foreign Ministry emphasized the importance of treaties between Russia and the three Baltic states, not only concerning the withdrawal of military bases but also on the rights of Russian-speaking minorities.

During his 1994 visit to Tartu, President Ahtisaari gave a speech at the university supporting Estonia's push toward the European Union, but added that from Estonia's perspective, integrating Russia into the accession process would also be beneficial.

The book devotes significant attention to Jaakko Kalela, head of the President's Office, who may be remembered in Estonia as Finland's former ambassador to Tallinn. According to Rusi, during the Soviet era, the KGB had classified Kalela as a "trusted contact" with the codename "Prof." His close ties to Russian intelligence services continued even after the Soviet Union's collapse.

Rusi writes that during the Soviet period, Kalela was considered a valuable source for strategic intelligence and an operational asset. It appears their personal relationship was not particularly warm.

In April 1995, Kalela officially traveled to Moscow to meet with Boris Yeltsin's foreign policy adviser, Dmitry Ryurikov. Ryurikov spoke to Kalela about relations with Estonia and expressed high hopes for then-Prime Minister Tiit Vähi's government. Later information suggested that Vähi's Coalition Party received funding support from Russian oligarch Gennady Timchenko, who had KGB ties. However, most of the meeting focused on Ryurikov's concerns over NATO expansion. Kalela reassured him that Finland was not considering joining NATO, as it did not feel a lack of security.

In addition to this official meeting, Kalela also met with Yevgeny Primakov, then head of Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), and told him that Finland's Security Intelligence Service (Supo) took Russia's security interests into account and would not hinder Russian intelligence activities, particularly those involving monitoring the Baltic states and NATO.

When Primakov later met with President Ahtisaari as foreign minister, he began the conversation by praising Kalela as an old friend. A year earlier, Primakov had sent Kalela a letter expressing satisfaction that he still held significant influence in shaping foreign policy. This served as a signal to Ahtisaari that Kalela's advice was worth heeding.

However, Supo's then-director, Eero Kekomäki, posed a problem in relations with Russian intelligence. According to Rusi, Kekomäki saw dismantling the old KGB networks as one of his key goals. He also warned the president that if contacts with the Russian embassy's resident agents continued, the United States might cut off cooperation with Supo. Ahtisaari then ordered those contacts to be terminated. Kekomäki was soon encouraged to retire, to be replaced by someone more suitable.

When Ahtisaari addressed the British Parliament in 1995, he did not consider the rapid accession of the Baltic states to the EU realistic, citing the problems they would bring. Finland also refused to publicly criticize the Soviet occupation. Around that time, the Finnish media began framing the country's security policy as one of "stability." From the fall of 1995 onward, foreign policy increasingly centered on Russia, a shift largely driven by the government of Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen.

Rusi also analyzes Finland's initiation of the EU's Northern Dimension. The idea was first floated by Ahtisaari in Tartu, but three years later it was repackaged through Prime Minister Lipponen's efforts as a Russia-driven initiative. The aim was to deepen the EU-Russia economic interdependence and bilateral ties. Finland's role was to convince its partners that Russia must not be isolated.

From the beginning, the Northern Dimension served as an auxiliary vehicle for enhancing Russia's geopolitical power. Rusi notes that Lipponen presented the idea without prior coordination with the president. The initiative was warmly praised by Vladimir Putin upon becoming Russian prime minister.

Rusi's account suggests that the views of President Ahtisaari, Prime Minister Lipponen and Foreign Minister Tarja Halonen on foreign policy were not always aligned, although Ahtisaari refrained from criticizing Lipponen.

At the time, "Finlandization" was not openly discussed in Finland. That is why the 1997 publication of Oleg Gordievsky and Inna Rogatchi's book "Sokea peili" ("The Blind Mirror") shocked the public. The book cast suspicion on many well-known figures. Strangely, the Finnish edition differed from the original Russian manuscript, which the publisher destroyed. The authors took the matter to court but received no compensation.

By the time Ahtisaari left office, Finland's strategic course had been firmly set: deepen ties with Russia even further, with the goal of strengthening EU-Russian interdependence. This special relationship continued until 2022. And that's about all that can fit here from this detail-packed book.

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