In the wake of damage to the Nord Stream and Balticconnector pipelines, 30 journalists from various European outlets, including Estonian Public Broadcasting (ERR), joined forces. The project, code-named "Russian Spy Ships," aims to uncover what Russian-origin paramilitary research vessels are actually doing in the North and Baltic Seas.

"Boriss" is a sailor who worked for seven months on the Russian research vessel Sibirjakov. In an interview to "Impulss," he spoke under a pseudonym and at great personal risk, revealing details about secret underwater operations in the Baltic Sea. His conversation with German journalists took place under the condition that his identity remain hidden. This interview is part of a larger international journalistic collaboration that began nine months ago.

"This is a hydrographic vessel, and its main job is cartography, or mapping the seabed. It monitors shipping routes, let's put it that way," Boriss said, describing Sibirjakov's activities.

"It maps the Baltic Sea floor, especially in narrow areas like straits and regions near major ports in the Baltic, such as Russia's ports in St. Petersburg and Kaliningrad," Boriss explained.

While civilian ships leave traces through Automatic Identification System (AIS) signals, Russian research vessels usually disable their tracking systems, making them virtually invisible at sea. To track these vessels, the investigative team used weather reporting systems as a backdoor. A Soviet-era rule still applies, requiring Russian vessels to transmit weather reports via Morse code. Anyone who knows the right radio frequencies can access this information.

"Who pays attention to weather reports? But the messages could be encoded. Military systems worldwide are famous for their ciphers. Special jargon, slang, whatever. Information can be transmitted even in a weather report," Boriss said.

"In maritime tradition, weather reports are sent to home bases. These are three to four-minute messages about the weather, such as wind speed, water salinity and temperature. But the message also includes the ship's location. More importantly, it reveals the ship's speed and destination," explained data journalist Joris Heijkant.

For example, on June 30 of last year, Sibirjakov sent a weather report that revealed it was in the Gulf of Finland at that moment. Further reports showed that Sibirjakov had been in the vicinity of the Balticconnector for several consecutive days.

"The Balticconnector is a very interesting case. In the months before the incident, there was a lot of activity around it. Something was likely being done there. This shows that these vessels often survey the seabed, often around our infrastructure. The Balticconnector is one such case where they likely operated. A few months later, the Newnew Polar Bear came and damaged the power cable. It makes you think," commented Heijkant.

Could it really be that a Russian research vessel spent several days in the Gulf of Finland last summer, just four months before the Balticconnector was damaged, purely by coincidence? Since Morse code data isn't always precise, the consortium of journalists turned to satellite images. After an extensive search, they finally found photos of a vessel whose location, length and even color matched Sibirjakov.

This raises the question: What are Russian ships actually doing near our waters? And more importantly, is the Estonian Navy aware of this?

"In the past two years, we haven't had any incidents where Russian-flagged ships entered Estonian territorial waters. Research vessels conduct various procedures, and we can't say that the Russian Federation's ships aren't allowed to survey their own so-called underwater infrastructure or cables, which they do. This is perfectly normal," said Navy Commander Cdre. Ivo Värk.

"Research vessels are involved in seabed surveying, and clearly, the Russian Federation has infrastructure running between Kaliningrad and Baltiysk. They investigate it, and we can't fault them for that because we do the same – we survey our own infrastructure," Värk added.

If Russian research vessels were examining Estonian infrastructure, such as the Balticconnector, Värk said it would be immediately noticeable.

"We would see that right away because our alarms would go off the moment someone approached our infrastructure. Our surveillance systems allow for that. Our operators are quite experienced and can detect it immediately. So, if something approaches and reduces speed, or its activity differs from normal, we know right away," Värk explained.

To confirm his words, Cdre. Värk and the Estonian Navy took the unprecedented step of releasing a radar image, recorded at the end of May last year at the request of "Impulss." The image shows all vessels, including Russian research ships, sailing "blind." It was revealed that Sibirjakov spent eight days, from May 29 to June 5 of last year, circling the Estonian and Finnish economic zones, completing roughly one circuit per day.

This corroborated the Morse code data, showing that Sibirjakov had spent several days near the Balticconnector last summer and crossed the area multiple times. At the time, the navy commander was Jüri Saska.

"In early June, the Baltops exercise typically begins. In 2023, if I'm not mistaken, it started from Tallinn. There were many NATO warships, American warships here. What usually happens then is intelligence gathering: radio signal collection, acoustic signatures – everything we do as well. They were in a place where they could be, using the freedom of navigation to do the job they were tasked with," Saska said.

"It's perfectly normal, in a way – everyone is spying on everyone. We spy, our partners spy and the Russian Federation spies too. It's standard military practice. What we do interests them, what our allies do interests them and probably our allies investigate what Russian Federation ships are doing," said Ivo Värk.

According to Saska, Russian research vessels aren't heavily involved in mapping underwater infrastructure because they already know where everything is.

"They know where it is, and if they need to find something, they know how to do it. What they can do, however, is simply linger. I could stop for three days, and by staying in international waters, all coastal states would feel uncomfortable, not knowing how to respond. I wouldn't need to do anything; just being there is enough," Saska said.

Defense Minister Hanno Pevkur (Reform) refrained from drawing direct links between the Sibirjakov and the Balticconnector incident.

"I'd prefer that our investigative bodies do their work and piece together these different pinpricks on the map – who was where, when and how. Only then can we start drawing conclusions," he said.

Whether or not the Sibirjakov was involved with the Balticconnector, Cdre. Ivo Värk made no secret that Russian research ships in the Gulf of Finland are concerning for the Estonian Navy.

"The problem is that, for several reasons, we don't always know what they're doing. We don't have the authority or the right to monitor them in such detail. It can pose a security risk, but at the same time, there's not much we can do about it. Monitoring and trying to understand what they're doing is the best we can do," Värk said.

"Anything on the seabed – whether a cable, power line or just an internet cable or gas pipeline – is a strategic object. It supplies energy and fuel to a potential enemy. It needs to be mapped. Everyone needs to know where it is because, in war, it must be destroyed to gain an advantage," Boriss commented.

This story was produced in collaboration with six outlets: ERR from Estonia, Pointer from the Netherlands, VRT from Belgium, NDR-WDR and Süddeutsche Zeitung from Germany and NRK from Norway. Additional contributions came from DR (Denmark), YLE (Finland), SVT (Sweden) and the BBC (United Kingdom).

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