Other topics covered include how Kyiv perceives the West's strategy for helping Ukraine, whether a ceasefire is feasible, how far along are talks for Ukraine's NATO and EU accession, and how the upcoming U.S. presidential election might affect the course of the war.

Your predecessor Mariana Betsa arrived in Estonia before the full-scale war started and said she had to change how she worked quite thoroughly after February 24, 2022. You came to Estonia when the war was already raging. What were your instructions?

Yes, the war has forced us all to change how we work, even though it has been raging since 2014, since the occupation of Crimea and hostilities in Donbas. Russia's full-scale invasion on February 24, 2022 forced us to change our priorities. My priorities as ambassador are dictated by the war and Ukraine's interests. The main thing is to win this war, and this requires as many modern weapons and as much ammunition as possible. Yes, Estonia's means are limited, but your decision to donate all of your 152 mm and 155 mm howitzers to us will go down in history. The leading role you play in building international coalitions is just as important. Therefore, I see as one of my main tasks supporting that lead role and creating new formats that can help Ukraine win. We also understand that in order to win we need to launch weapons, munitions and robotic systems manufacturing. And we can do a lot with Estonia in this regard.

The other important topic is new sanctions packages and making them impossible to circumvent as Russia is always looking for gaps in order to procure the newest Western technologies for its drones and missiles. That is another area where we are working closely with Estonia. And of course, it means supporting our political dialogue on the highest possible level and involving Estonia in the execution of President Volodymyr Zelenskyy's peace formula. I believe that the Ukrainian president's recent Estonia visit is clear proof that we can maintain this level of mutual dialogue.

You mentioned President Zelenskyy's recent visit to Estonia. When I asked him about the possibility of a ceasefire, he said a break in the fighting would only benefit Russia. Are other Western partners asking similar questions? Are they broaching the subject of negotiations with Russia?

There was a break due to shell and equipment shortages – irrespective of what the Ukrainian side wanted. And Russia took advantage. Instead of looking for a solution through talks, the Russian Federation rallied and launched offensives on five stretches of the front. This artificial break cost us Avdiivka, which we had managed to defend for the last ten years. Yes, Russia suffered considerable losses – around 47,000 dead and wounded, over 300 tanks, five airplanes – but every such break, delay in supply gives Russia the chance to ramp up its aggressive policy toward Ukraine.

As concerns talks, allow me to remind you that we have broad-based experience of negotiating with the Russian Federation. We can recall the Normandy Format, the three-way contact group (made up of Ukraine, Russia and the leaders of Germany and France for Europe – ed.) and the Minsk agreements. The talks had over 200 rounds, ceasefire agreements were reached on around 20 occasions – the Russian Federation violated nearly every single one almost immediately. We also have experience from talks with Russia during the full-scale invasion. They ended because of the events in Bucha, Borodyanka and Izium where Russia orchestrated a genocide.

On top of all this, it is also a matter of what is being negotiated. The Russian Federation has never negotiated with us in good faith. Russia has been speaking the language of ultimatums, which Ukraine will not accept. We are not willing to trade our territory and people. Every time such negotiations come up, I would like to ask two questions. First, how much of your territory would you be willing to give up to pacify Russia? Which city, town or village would you amputate? And secondly – how will you look the people left in the occupied territories, people who will be killed, raped or mobilized against their will in the eye? These are not trivial questions and they need to be answered every time negotiations come up.

Allow me to also remind you that the Russia-Ukraine war is an existential conflict. It is a war for survival. Russia will not recognize the Ukrainian nation state, will not recognize the Ukrainian people's right to sovereignty and independence. It wants to destroy us by turning us into the "right" kind of Russians who speak "proper" Russian and will be merged with Russia. We realize that if Russia wins, there is no chance for Ukrainian survival.

What about Russia?

The war is existential also for Russia as it has opted for a neo-imperial paradigm but cannot build a new empire without Ukraine, because without the history of Ukraine, Russia's history boils down to 200-300 years. Without Kyiv, Russia cannot claim to be the birthplace of the Orthodox faith. Without Ukraine, Russia's contribution to global cultural context is heavily reduced. It also cannot develop its industry without Dnipro, Kharkiv and other Ukrainian industrial areas. That is what makes the war an existential one.

There isn't a single negotiations platform today able to withstand the depth of this existential conflict. Ukraine is doing everything it can to create such a platform. That is the aim of President Zelenskyy's peace formula, to propose, through consultations, negotiations, different formats and roundtable discussions, a global peace summit, put together a clear plan for achieving peace in Ukraine, so we could talk to Russia at a second international summit and reach a peaceful solution.

Right now, President Zelenskyy's plan looks like a demand for Russia to give up, and we are far from that happening today. How can we force Russia to take Zelenskyy's peace plan seriously? What kind of strategy should the West choose?

The only way to make Russia negotiate whichever plan is to hand it a military defeat first, and Ukraine is doing everything in its power to achieve that. We are short on artillery shells and modern weapon systems today.

I find that the West needs to commit to a strategy for Ukraine and what is happening there. We often hear pledges to support Ukraine for as long as it takes. It is good, and we appreciate the support. But it is not a strategy – or rather, it's a strategy the aim of which is to create a gray zone, a frozen conflict in the middle of Europe. It is a strategy that will stretch out the war over years, while Ukraine loses its best fighters.

We really want the West to decide on a strategy for Ukraine and defeating the Russian Federation on the battlefield. And if the West opts for this strategy, our partners will need to give us enough of the weapons we need to achieve it.

We can see the West failing to satisfy Ukraine's need for weapons and ammunition. We have been told of an "artillery coalition" that was supposed to supply Ukraine with a million artillery shells [inside one year]. Now, there is talk of a "drone coalition" with the target once again at one million drones. But how can we talk of a "drone coalition" if we haven't even supplied all the shells yet? Can you say how much of what the West has pledged it still owes Ukraine? And when has it promised to deliver?

It is difficult to answer this question in numbers because we cannot put a price on the blood of Ukrainian soldiers, destruction of Ukrainian cities and the murder of civilians. We understand one thing – that we are willing to fight for our freedom and independence. We need weapons, shells. Ukraine values our foreign partners' relevant efforts very highly. The problem is not that our allies are doing little, it's the sheer scope of what is happening in Ukraine today. And it requires additional rallying and efforts. Allies who have decided to support Ukraine's victory strategy must work with their defense industries because they cannot go on as if there was no war. We – I'm referring to Ukraine and our allies – must work together to achieve victory in this war. We need to realize that wartime needs outweigh business as usual.

Your predecessor Mariana Betsa and I talked early last summer. The main topics of discussion were a NATO summit and the expectation for the EU to launch Ukraine accession talks. What are the challenges you currently face on the diplomatic front?

Both European and Euro-Atlantic integration will remain on the agenda and as Ukraine's diplomatic priorities. We are spurred on by the success achieved together with our partners last December when the European Council decided to launch talks with Ukraine. But we also understand that the decision still needs to be made, which requires additional efforts on our part. We will continue doing our homework. We will continue working with the European Commission and individual Member States to launch the process of checking the compliance of Ukrainian legislation with that of the EU as soon as possible. We will continue working toward a favorable assessment from the Commission regarding the tasks they gave us last November. We are working toward a summit or a conference between governments to fully launch the negotiations process. We are awaiting a talks framework from the EU while we continue to work on these matters.

What about membership in NATO?

NATO remains our foreign policy priority. Let us be honest – from a national security perspective, there is no alternative for Ukraine other than joining NATO. Ukraine would strengthen the North Atlantic Alliance, its eastern flank. We have unique experience of conducting battle operations against an enemy more numerous and better equipped than us. This experience is unique and we are willing to share it with our allies. Allies also need to understand that accepting us into NATO once is far cheaper than coming to our aid militarily or financially time and again. We have an ambitious goal here – to be invited to join the alliance at the NATO Washington summit in July. We are doing everything we can but cannot do it alone. We need our friends and allies who understand what is at stake today. And Estonia is one such ally.

Please explain why allowing Ukraine to join the alliance today is better than regular military and financial aid?

We are not talking about Ukraine becoming a NATO member automatically and overnight. Our goal is to be invited to join NATO at the Washington summit in July. The invitation alone will send an important signal to the Ukrainian people, Ukrainian soldiers and our enemies – the Russian Federation – the vital signal that Ukraine is part of the Western world, that NATO Allies perceive Ukraine as a future member. The question of Ukraine's actual NATO accession will be a longer-term matter. But an invitation could launch NATO mechanisms which are already supporting Ukraine in its struggle.

There will be a presidential election in the U.S. come November. Donald Trump's supporters are already blocking Ukraine aid packages in the Congress. What will you do should Trump win? Do you have a plan-B should U.S. aid come to an end or be reduced?

We value bipartisan support for Ukraine in the USA highly. We are convinced this support will hold as it is in both parties' interests. It is a matter of national interests for the U.S. We are placing our hopes and counting on their support. We understand there are difficulties in the decision-making process today, and unfortunately every such day of delay forces us to lose people and territory. But we believe that the Ukraine matter should unite the sides, instead of splitting them. And we are extremely grateful for the support of President Joe Biden, his administration, both houses of the Congress and the American people for their support over the first two years of the Russia-Ukraine war, as well as the leading role President Biden has played in mobilizing the Western world to back Ukraine.

That said, I would recall how crucially important decisions for Ukraine were made during Trump's presidency. For example, the first Javelin [anti-tank missiles] were sent to Ukraine under Trump. We also remember decisions under Trump to give Ukraine Mark VI and Island-class patrol boats. We remember the passing of the Crimea declaration that confirmed the policy of not recognizing the annexation of Crimea. We remember all of those things.

Still, which would you be more comfortable working with – Trump or Biden?

All I can say is that electing the U.S. president is up to the American people. Ukraine will cooperate with every legally elected American president. We hope to see America's continued leading role because we understand that however much the U.S. spends on supporting Ukraine today, it is still cheaper than putting out the fire and sorting out the chaos after a potential Russian victory. The latter would send the world's dictatorial and despotic regimes a clear signal that they can do what they want and violate international law with impunity and without there being an appropriate reaction.

There is a lot of talk of the need for unity when facing aggression in Ukraine. But recent changes in command, the resignation of armed forces commander Valeri Zaluzhnyi come as signs of lack of such unity in the top echelons. Why was it necessary to replace the commander now? What was the point?

In this case, I would not look for a black cat in a dark room, especially since it's not there. It is normal for there to be differences of opinion between military leaders and representatives of the government. It is a sign of a normal democratic country if people have positions they are willing to express or defend. It is a question of responsibility. And the responsibility for what is happening on the front and in the country as a whole lies on President Zelenskyy. He felt that the Ukrainian army and military leadership needed a push, a new approach to the campaign. And he made his decision accordingly. But I would point out that not just the commander of the armed forces was replaced, the changes concerned the entire military. It means it was an integral solution. Professional and valuable people who have been defending Ukraine from Russian aggression since 2014 were appointed. Therefore, I believe speculating further on this matter is inappropriate.

We can recall the ceremony where Zaluzhnyi was given the Hero of Ukraine award, the warm atmosphere there. President Zelenskyy invited him to remain a part of his team to put his know-how, professional character and experience to good use wherever it can benefit Ukraine. Therefore, differences of opinion are normal in a democratic country, while it is also normal for the head of state to take responsibility and make decisions he believes best serve Ukraine.

During our (ERR correspondents' – ed.) recent trip to Ukraine, mobilization was the hottest topic. Many in the rear fear a mobilization, while the soldiers in the trenches want to know about their chances of going on leave or quitting the army without leaving the front unmanned. Who will take responsibility for this unpopular but necessary step? The president, the minister of defense or the armed forces commander?

Indeed, the topic of mobilization is a delicate and sensitive one for the Ukrainian society. One needs to make unpopular but responsible decisions in war. The mobilization issue has many aspects chief among which is the moral aspect – every Ukraine citizen in the conscription age has a moral duty to fight for their country and defend Ukraine. There are no two ways about it. Just as Ukrainian citizens are morally obligated to work, contribute to the country's economic wellbeing and pay taxes. It is a way of supporting the soldiers defending our country on the front lines. But the topic also has a legal aspect, which we need to consider since Ukraine is a democratic country with rule of law.

Democracy means respecting a country's procedures and rules. And a decision for additional mobilization is also subject to certain procedures. You need a legal subject – in this case the defense ministry – to make the proposal to the parliament, which, if approved, will be signed by the president and executed by the government. The ministry has made its proposals today and the democratic process is underway. It is an important and all-encompassing initiative – it covers matters of rotation, leave and includes a lot of new elements based on two years of experience from the war. Once the law is passed and signed by the president, its execution will follow. That is when we will know how many people need to be mobilized and how to do that. Mobilization is a complicated logistical and economic process.

It is one thing to call up a soldier, while they also need to be outfitted with a uniform and weapons – we were just talking about the arms shortage. A soldier also needs training because Ukraine does not emulate the Russians in using fresh recruits as cannon fodder. We value our soldiers' lives, and they need to be properly trained and equipped before they go to battle. All of it requires legislative and executive steps, and we will return to this conversation if we deem additional mobilization resources necessary. Until then, any such discussion is premature.

Does this mean that the matter will be left to the parliament – it has only passed its first reading – until the new mobilization act is passed?

I'm convinced that every state organ takes responsibility for Ukraine's survival and wellbeing within its jurisdiction, and that Ukraine's MPs will make the right decision concerning the situation. Once the law is passed, we will carry it out on the executive level, which is when we will learn which additional resources we need, who we can arm and equip and how etc. That is why I would suggest concentrating on Ukraine's current needs. They are procuring enough modern Western arms, shells, equipment and additional funding for continuing the fight.

Ukraine will not have a presidential election because the country is at war. There will be a presidential election in Russia in March, and it seems to me we both know who will win. Do you see any possibility to end the war for as long as Vladimir Putin remains president?

The so-called March election in Russia constitutes a spectacle just like the "referendums" they held in occupied territories in Ukraine. The result is obvious, it will be organized by the Kremlin's political strategists and the savage will be reelected for another term. I'm convinced the process should be condemned by all countries that respect democracy, the rule of law and human rights principles. The civilized world should not recognize the results of these "elections." We should not legitimize Putin through international recognition of the election.

As concerns ending the war, I do not believe it boils down to whether Putin is reelected or not. Unfortunately, it's not Putin sitting in every Russian tank firing at Ukrainian positions today, flying every Russian plane bombing Ukrainian cities or firing missiles and drones at Ukrainian civilian infrastructure. I would put it like this: it is not Putin's Russia, it is Russia's Putin. Because Putin is a product of the Russian deep state, the deeper layers of Russian society, which was not punished for its cruelty in World War II or the savagery the Soviet Union visited upon occupied territories. The Russian deep state, which survived with great difficulty the defeat it was handed in the Cold War, is absolutely chauvinist and full of revanchist intentions. Today, this deep state has found its manifestation in Putin.

That is why it is my deep conviction that the end of the war is tied to beating the Russian Federation on the battlefield. Only after such a defeat, after those who gave the orders to commit crimes against humanity and genocide are brought to trial, after Russia compensates Ukraine for all the losses and damage – by the way, we are moving closer to confiscating frozen Russian assets – only then can we say the war is over. Without returning to justice, an end to hostilities or a ceasefire will not bring true and lasting piece to Europe.

Is this possible for as long as Putin remains in the Kremlin? Or do we need to wait for a new Russian leadership, one with which something can be agreed?

I am convinced that we need to do everything we can to destroy the Russian deep state, destroy the system that created Vladimir Putin. You know where we stand, where Ukraine stands in terms of negotiating with Putin – the outlook is negative. After what happened in Bucha, Borodyanka, Irpen, Izium, Kherson where they created literal torture chambers, visited genocide upon the Ukrainian people, we cannot afford to negotiate with someone like that. The International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant for him for the heinous crime of abducting and deporting Ukrainian children.

You cannot sit down to negotiate with someone whose hand you shouldn't even shake. The problem is that the Russian leadership formed during Putin's day is just as untouchable as the president. Therefore, deep and global change needs to happen inside the Russian Federation if true peace is to be achieved through negotiating in good faith and finding a solution both sides find acceptable. I hope these changes will happen.

Until recently, Alexei Navalny was the symbol of potential change. I know that many Ukrainians feel there are no "good Russians." How do you feel about Alexei Navalny? What is the significance of his death or murder in a Russian prison?

President Zelenskyy gave a clear assessment of the fact at the Munich Security Conference. Navalny's murder is a global event that once again emphasizes the cannibalistic nature of Putin's regime, that system. The problem of so-called good Russians is that they still believe change in Russia is possible without violence. It is a vegetarian policy that will not prove successful. Because the system's core, the deep state that was created in Stalin's day has not disappeared. And the only way to break it is by force, armed resistance. Therefore, I am sure that for the Russian opposition to find success, hit its targets, it needs to radically alter its tactics and fight for the goals it has set itself.

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