You've been in the job a week now. You have quite a busy schedule I imagine?

Yes, and I suppose that is how it will be for the next five years.

Your predecessor Josep Borell has said that diplomacy is the art of managing double standards. Have you acquired the skill in your first week, or do you plan to reshape the office?

I haven't thought about it like that. While I've taken quite a few meetings, I've always been able to say what we mean.

You headed straight to Kyiv for your first foreign visit and your Twitter (now X – ed.) account revealed that the EU wants Ukraine to win the war and will do everything it takes. Is that the European Union's strategic position?

There is no real way to argue against it. Wars aren't always won, but they definitely aren't won when you do not make winning a goal. If we turn winning into a goal, shape our strategies and tactics accordingly, it stands for more than giving Ukraine just enough to somehow hang on. It means giving more to allow them to ward off Russian aggression, and we're not there today.

Your arsenal consists of words, diplomacy and promises, but if we're being honest, the keys to the armory are still held in member state capitals. And you know better than I that those keys have not always been used or have only been used to open the door a little. In other words – Europe is not doing everything it takes.

It is as you say. The decisions to give weapons can only be made by member state capitals, and there are different ideas of what we're dealing with there, of what it would mean if Ukraine lost and Russia won this war. The extent of that threat for everyone – not just us here in Europe, but the world really. Looking at how Russia, Iran, North Korea and China, albeit a little more covertly, are working together, the matter goes far beyond Ukraine.

In other words, what does it really mean when you're saying that Europe is doing everything needed for Ukraine to win the war.

It means we need to keep convincing and nudging the member states in the right direction so they would do what it takes.

It amounts to a rhetorical trick, a non-promise for Kyiv in terms of Europe stepping up. But there is no strategic change, not at the level of capitals.

There is a big difference – because words do have power – between saying that Ukraine has to win and that Ukraine has to hold on.

What is the view taken in Kyiv – in a situation where Ukraine's biggest backer, the United States, has said that they'll need to lay down their weapons and negotiate?

They haven't said it yet. The Ukrainians remain quite hopeful. They've had some good contact with the incoming U.S. administration, and they are making persistent efforts for the new administration to understand why they need to be supported and why Putin mustn't be allowed to win the war. Somewhat surprisingly, the mood was not as dark as it seemed from where we are.

Is President Zelenskyy prepared to freeze the war on the condition that the territory Ukraine controls is accepted into NATO? While it sounds interesting, is it politically feasible?

I don't really see it being a possibility today, but everything still depends on European and U.S. aid. You cannot fight a war without weapons, and that is a problem.

Rumor has it Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban has been advising Donald Trump on how to resolve the Ukraine war. Have you been in contact with Trump's team to communicate your own advice?

We have not made contact yet, but we are actively looking for the opportunity.

To what extent does it worry you that it's Viktor Orban advising Trump's team?

We know where Viktor Orban stands. He believes that he has a so-called peace strategy – giving Russia what it wants for there to be peace. I say that we've already tried that. If we think of the Minsk agreements, in terms of just drawing a line and thinking that's enough to keep the peace – it is not. We will only end up with more wars, and I do not get why Viktor Orban fails to understand this or what his agenda is.

But it is true that his meetings with President-elect Trump's team have been the longest. While it is said that Trump's team doesn't have a plan yet and is only working on one, it is important to try and communicate and also get our ideas added in so to speak.

You also visited Malta during your first week in office. Did you meet with Russia's Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov?

I did not.

What is it a sign of that Lavrov is back in Europe, sittings behind tables where security is discussed for the first time since the start of the full-scale war?

It shows that things are moving and not necessarily in the best possible direction.

Do we need to admit that so-called powerplay politics are back in how the global order is shaped, as well as that Europe is very weak in those terms?

It does increasingly seem that might makes right again. That this world wants to return, but we must not let it.

We need to ally with states who understand that we need the rule of law, that the conditions of the UN Charter, which do not allow you attack countries and conquer territory with impunity, is still in effect. It is in everybody's common interest, and we need to work with African, Latin American and Asian countries that are also worried to see the rules-based world order fraying at the seams.

The EU foreign and security policy, which you have steered for a week now, has been designed in a completely different security situation, and one that does not compare to today. What should change in those mechanisms for Europe to survive in this completely altered global situation?

It's true. These structures were created very much in peacetime. We have different reports. For example, the Niinistö report, which tells us how we should prepare for full-scale war, and how it should be done at all levels of society. But as I said before, the realization that we need to do things differently is not all there.

A lot of issues boil down to finances, money.

There will be €500 billion worth of security bonds for states that wish to participate.

We're working with Defense Commissioner [Andrius] Kubilius on a so-called security white paper one part of which is funding – how to pay for developing the defense industry and investing more in defense. It's in the early stages. Different member states have different sensitivities regarding various funding models, but it is clear we must also look for out-of-the-box solutions.

How would you describe events in Georgia? Would comparing it to the Maidan be an exaggeration?

Every country is unique, but it is clear that the people of Georgia are demonstrating what they want, and it clashes with what the government wants. The latter have said that they will not stay on the European path. But that is just were the people want to be.

You will be moderating the EU Foreign Affairs Council for the first time on December 16. Do you intend to propose any decisive steps in terms of what to do about Georgia?

Yes, we will be discussing some. Considering the fact that the Georgian government has attacked peaceful protesters, used violence... These are not acceptable practices for a EU candidate state, and we have things in our toolbox that we can use in such situations. That is the debate today.

France and Germany are in the middle of government crises, there is a power transfer in the U.S. and there's war in Europe. Would it be an exaggeration to suggest you took office during what is perhaps the most precarious security situation in Europe of the past few decades?

I believe it would not be an exaggeration. The security situation is extremely difficult, and all these different factors coinciding makes for a perfect storm, which is something out adversaries are trying to use. The question is whether we can pull ourselves together to make sure such attempts fail.

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