I drove through the Ukrainian night from the front lines toward Estonia, listening to news from around the world. I had been visiting Ukrainian units testing the unmanned ground vehicle developed by the Estonian company Asax Innovation. A week of conversations with the men fighting on the front created a stark contrast with the messages coming from the West. The night grew darker than it had seemed before. In everything that was said, a shift could be felt.

Trump's rhetoric

The President of the United States, Donald Trump, presents himself as a proponent of peace. "War is terrible. A great many people have died on both the Russian and Ukrainian sides. This must be stopped immediately," is the essence of Trump's position — a stance echoed, with slight variations, by his ministers and MAGA propagandists. There is a noticeable discipline in messaging, indicative of a conscious communication strategy.

However, Trump's message must primarily be viewed through the lens of framing. Any reference to Russia as the aggressor — something still present in U.S. strategic communications under Joe Biden — has been deliberately omitted.

Furthermore, a subtle divide can be detected within Trump's camp. Robert F. Kennedy Jr. and Tulsi Gabbard have publicly justified Russia's aggression against Ukraine through conspiracy theories, while Elon Musk and Pete Hegseth approach the issue with disdain for Europe's establishment, which they see as complacent. The interaction of these two factions results in the position that the U.S. should allocate fewer resources to Europe, as the conflict is merely "a war between two Slavic peoples somewhere in Eastern Europe" (to use Steve Bannon's words) and does not concern U.S. national interests.

We may not like this perspective, but the truth is that the U.S. has no obligation to protect us. This is a fact, and it is from this premise that U.S. strategic communication omits anything that might appear morally unsavory.

For example, Trump consistently emphasizes how terrible the battles are and implies that for the fighting to end, Ukraine must also make concessions. This is how discussions about "territorial concessions," borders or the "acceptance of geopolitical reality" are framed.

But behind this rhetoric are real human fates. During the Russian occupation of Kherson in 2022, at least 70 percent of the city's population was lost. Notably, there were no major urban battles in Kherson and people were not fleeing combat. They were fleeing the Russian occupation's repressive rule, as the city experienced a deliberate and systematic ethnic cleansing.

Now, most of the refugees from occupied areas have nowhere to return to because their homes and apartments have been nationalized and often handed over to new settlers. The fate of these people has been omitted from peace rhetoric because acknowledging it would put negotiators in an ethically uncomfortable position.

Putin's rhetoric

Some Western politicians claim that the West itself is to blame for provoking Russia, an argument based on Vladimir Putin's repeated criticism of NATO expansion. However, far less attention is given to the message Putin has simultaneously conveyed, primarily to a Russian audience.

It was particularly noteworthy that, in his interview with Tucker Carlson, Putin spoke about "primordial Russian lands" and the "artificial Ukrainian state." The real significance of this interview lies in the revelation that NATO's so-called "aggressive" expansion is not Russia's only justification — alongside it exists a much more traditional motive: imperial expansion.

How does the Western political establishment, steeped in the Westphalian tradition of state sovereignty, explain the return of such imperialist thinking? The answer can be found in Tucker Carlson's interview with Piers Morgan, where Carlson openly states that "great nations have their own spheres of influence" and that these nations have the right to act within these spheres according to their national interests. A direct illustration of this mindset can be seen in Trump's statements regarding Mexico, Canada and Greenland.

Thus, the talk of NATO expansion gradually turns into a mere pretext, with its real purpose being the normalization of sphere-of-influence politics. And here lies the turning point for Europe, which has now been ushered toward irrelevance.

Where we are presently

As U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth stated quite explicitly in Brussels on Thursday, the United States intends to spend less on defending Europe, meaning that Europe must essentially decide for itself whose sphere of influence it belongs to.

A large segment of European politicians logically responded with statements of support for Ukraine, but the real test of commitment will be whether Europe is genuinely willing to send peacekeepers to Ukraine — knowing that this entails a potentially long-term obligation, one that could indeed escalate the war.

Negotiations are beginning from a point where the U.S. has already made concessions to Russia: Ukraine must surrender its people and territories and NATO's future enlargement has been put into question.

The Russians immediately raised the stakes. They have now reportedly added four new demands: regime change in Ukraine, the return of frozen Russian assets held in the West, restrictions on the size and armament of the Ukrainian military and NATO's withdrawal to its 1997 borders. In other words, they are reiterating the Kremlin's December 2021 ultimatum to NATO. Allies out of Estonia?

Some of these demands are mere posturing, but what happens next will depend entirely on Europe's concrete actions.

The moment that has been discussed for years has arrived. If Europe fails to secure a just and lasting peace for Ukraine, it will lose far more than just Ukraine. Russia has not grown stronger in the meantime, but Europe's vulnerabilities have become more pronounced.

It is likely that not all European countries will be equally mobilized. This leaves only one viable option: a "coalition of the willing" that would provide Ukraine with the kind of security guarantees that a larger NATO is currently unwilling to offer. Even now, a coalition of Ukraine, Poland, the Nordic countries, the Baltic states and the United Kingdom would be an alliance that Russia would have to take very seriously.

Fear of a new Munich Agreement will not move us forward; it would only confirm that Europe is incapable of acting independently. And while, in the grand scheme of things, I am just a volunteer and a reservist, I already cast my vote in favor of a closer alliance with those who do not need an explanation of the severity of the current threat. And despite its contradictions, I still consider the United States to be our ally.

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