The U.S. is striking Iran, and Iran is striking back at those countries in the region where American soldiers and military bases are located. Where has the situation now reached, what is happening?

The attackers were the U.S. and Israel, and I think the Israeli factor is something we tend to forget. Even during the cease-fire that seemed to hold briefly in June, and at the level of negotiations, it was clear that there was closer dialogue than before. In practice, more tankers were moving through the Strait of Hormuz compared to previous months. There were fragile signs of hope — the kind diplomats usually try to build trust on and move toward more serious talks.

But Israel stayed out of those discussions, and there was no sign that Israel was ready to compromise. There is still no mutual understanding between Israel and Iran. The United States, which tried to resolve things through goodwill, has now swung to the other extreme and is again trying to solve the issue through force.

Recent signals have shown that relations between U.S. President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu are not good. How strong a supporter is the U.S. of Israel today, given that Trump may want to pursue a somewhat different policy?

The best starting point is to ask whether the Trump administration would really pull the rug out from under Israel. That is extremely unlikely. Despite friction or even public contradictory rhetoric — which we have seen between Netanyahu and Trump — the Trump administration is not going to rein in Israel, pull back, or enter into conflict with Israel in order to protect Iran or reach an agreement with Iran. That is illogical and highly improbable.

Whether this could happen under future U.S. administrations, considering how public support for Israel has shifted, is another matter. But the current administration in Washington is very unlikely to do so.

Does this mean that in this conflict we should watch Israel rather than the U.S.?

We must watch both, because U.S. interests are broader. The establishment in Washington — those in power and those who make military decisions — have far more diverse interests than Israel, whose goal is to throw Iran into chaos and weaken Iran's influence in the region, without thinking too much about the consequences.

For the U.S., the table is much wider. It has other allies in the region. But it will not enter into conflict with Israel over Iran.

Mutual strikes continue. We know the U.S. has the world's strongest military. What are Iran's strengths that keep it from collapsing?

Iran has asymmetric warfare capabilities. In late February and especially in March, the main blows were felt by its southern neighbors, primarily the United Arab Emirates. But now Iran's focus has shifted westward. Kuwait has been hit hardest in recent weeks, including critical infrastructure. Iranian drones have struck desalination plants that produce fresh water from seawater — extremely vital infrastructure.

Drones have also flown toward Jordan. It is difficult to assess what this means. The tension is lower than in March, but the attacks are real, and the escalation over the past two weeks has only gone in one direction — upward.

The U.S. has been bombing Iran for months. How does Iran still have military capability, given that the U.S. can strike very precisely?

You cannot eliminate drone attacks. Drones are easy to launch from various places and easy to produce. Iran clearly has the capability to keep the attack tempo high — and it is a very large country.

What does the U.S. want from Iran today, and what does Iran want from the U.S.? Has this changed since February?

There has been no change. The cease-fire that was announced was simply a gesture of willingness to understand each other. But there has been no fundamental breakthrough.

For the U.S., the number one issue is Iran's nuclear capability and its unequivocal abandonment of it. In addition, Iran's regional activities, including its missile program, which threatens neighbors and other regional states. Curtailing or abandoning the missile program is what the U.S. seeks.

Iran, on the other hand, signals that it is ready to discuss all of this — but then comes a list of its demands: lifting sanctions, paying reparations for current war damages, and likely some form of control over the future of the Strait of Hormuz. These preconditions are things no one will grant without Iran making concessions.

Listening to what both sides demand, it seems like a dead end. Neither side can make concessions. How long could this last? Could it become a 30‑year war?

We haven't seen wars that long. Bashar al‑Assad survived the Arab Spring and strong foreign intervention in Syria — with Russian support — and even his situation turned around after 15 years.

A long, drawn‑out conflict is always possible. We've seen conflicts that remain suspended, lingering like a cold war. But today the bet seems to be that Israel sees a window of time in which it can settle scores with Iran and reduce the threat it perceives. That window is exactly as long as the Trump administration remains in office — the next couple of years.

So during that time, seeing a larger war than in March is quite likely.

Trump has called Iranian negotiators liars and reacted emotionally. How different are U.S. and Iranian negotiation styles, and could they clash?

Possibly, but that is not the main obstacle. Cultural or linguistic differences are not the core problem. The core problem is that Iran sees itself as a regional power with a certain role, and the U.S. does not see any role for Iran — at least not for the current regime.

There is no room for compromise yet. No breakthrough has occurred — not at the negotiating table, nor on the battlefield. Both sides are in a stalemate. Eventually it must tilt one way or the other, and we will know when that moment comes. A turning point in this region will not remain secret — but it has not happened yet.

Why hasn't the U.S. used greater force in Iran? The U.S. is essentially prolonging the war. Americans themselves are turning against it. A quick, decisive strike would be more useful.

There are a few reasons. Iran is large enough that without a ground operation it is very difficult to add a new dimension to the conflict or secure victory. Ground forces would be the next logical step.

That would mean possible casualties — something Washington fears. Today the U.S. can wage this war in a way where only a few die. Last week two U.S. soldiers were killed — small numbers compared to Iraq. That fear is real.

Another factor is U.S. allies in the region. Some are ready to fight Iran or urge the U.S. and Israel to do so. Others are very cautious — Oman, Qatar, Kuwait to some extent — who signal that the current Iranian regime must be tolerated and there is no need to go all the way. So even among U.S. allies there are disagreements.

What is happening in the Strait of Hormuz today? What ships dare to pass?

The number of ships has dropped significantly now that strikes have intensified. A few weeks ago, during the cease-fire, there were 20–30 tankers carrying oil, gas, fertilizers, agricultural goods. Today there are fewer than ten — and on some days none. We can track them from afar and know roughly where they are moving.

OECD statistics show that some oil tankers still move — important for Europe — but LNG exports from the region have essentially stopped.

Trump has promised to take control of the Strait of Hormuz and charge ships for passage. Could anyone actually end up paying him?

If safe passage is guaranteed, there would likely be payers. But the question is how to do this in practice. It would require physically seizing islands belonging to Iran. That brings us back to the ground operation that has been discussed — which has disappeared from the table for now, but could return with the next escalation.

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