Under an alleged diesel deal reached by phone between U.S. President Donald Trump and Russian leader Vladimir Putin, Russia is expected to supply the global market with an initial 300,000 metric tons of diesel fuel, followed by another 500,000 metric tons in November, then 1 million metric tons and, later, another 3 million metric tons "if possible." A total of 4.8 million metric tons of diesel has been promised.

At first glance, this seems like a large quantity. However, the actual impact depends on how quickly the fuel can be delivered and how much of it represents genuinely additional supply to the global market.

The U.S. consumes approximately 16 million metric tons of diesel per month, most of it domestically produced. The first promised shipment of 300,000 metric tons therefore represents less than 2 percent of one month's U.S. consumption. The 500,000 metric tons promised for November amounts to about 3 percent.

The entire promised 4.8 million metric tons would equal roughly 30 percent of one month's U.S. consumption, but no deadline has been set for its delivery and much of it may never reach the U.S. at all. If those 4.8 million metric tons were indeed delivered to the U.S. over the course of a year, for example, that would amount to 400,000 metric tons per month or 2.5 percent of U.S. consumption. It is ridiculous to assume that this could actually affect fuel prices in the U.S.

Still less is this a quantity that could fundamentally reshape the global fuel market over the longer term.

Another important consideration is that the diesel promised by Russia may not be — and most likely is not — newly produced fuel. At least some of it has already been produced and is sitting in storage facilities or export pipelines. Bringing this fuel to market could temporarily increase supply. However, if Russia simply sells fuel originally intended for existing customers to new buyers instead, total global supply will not increase at all.

Meanwhile, Trump's main objective in reaching the agreement, at least according to his own statements, is to lower fuel prices. The conclusion must be that Trump either hopes releasing Russian diesel onto the market will have a psychological effect and influence markets, intends to further ease sanctions on Russian oil exports or has simply allowed the Russians to pull the wool over his eyes. All three possibilities are rather depressing.

Agreement far more significant for Putin

Russia produced approximately 85 million metric tons of diesel in 2025, of which around 61 million metric tons was summer-grade diesel. Successful Ukrainian attacks on Russian refineries have significantly reduced production in 2026. At the same time, the Russians are facing a familiar seasonal problem: Winter always catches Russia by surprise. In winter, northern regions need cold-resistant diesel, but refineries that have been damaged and require repairs are unable to switch production quickly enough, if at all.

As a result, Russia may simultaneously face a surplus of summer-grade diesel and a shortage of winter-grade diesel. The summer-grade fuel must either be exported or stored. Once storage tanks are full, refineries have to cut production, further worsening Russia's fuel supply situation.

Putin therefore stands to gain considerably more from this deal than the relatively insignificant increase in export volumes might suggest. The temporary easing of U.S. sanctions allows Russia to sell fuel that would otherwise occupy storage capacity, leaving nowhere to put newly produced fuel. Refineries can now continue operating, generating additional export revenue.

Whether the Russians can actually deliver the promised quantities is another matter. According to various estimates, Russia exported approximately 27 million to 40 million metric tons of diesel in 2025. In the third quarter of 2026, seaborne exports had fallen to around 190,000 barrels (this may be an optimistic estimate from our perspective and does not appear to be based on complete statistics, but no better figures are currently available) or 26,000 metric tons, per day. That represents an 80 percent decline from the beginning of the year.

Thus, delivering the first 300,000 metric tons should not pose an insurmountable problem, provided sufficient stocks are available. The 500,000 metric tons promised for November is also feasible in principle.

However, exporting the entire promised 4.8 million metric tons at the current rate would take approximately six months. Even that assumes Russia diverts all its existing export volumes to the U.S. to fulfill the agreement. If Russia wanted to deliver those quantities in two months, for example, exports would have to roughly triple from their current level. That should be impossible, at least without restoring refinery capacity, particularly assuming Ukrainian attacks continue.

Trump can, of course, announce that he has brought millions of metric tons of additional fuel onto the global market and taken steps to lower prices. As we saw, his post to that effect on Friday drove oil prices down by more than 4 percent.

An actual, sustained decline in prices, however, requires that the promised fuel actually reach the market and that the shipments represent additional global supply rather than simply a redirection of existing exports — for example, diesel going to the U.S. instead of Brazil. A one-off shipment could affect prices for days, perhaps weeks, but it certainly would not resolve a longer-term shortage. Ultimately, I do not see the price decline Trump is hoping for materializing either in the U.S. or on the global market.

The most important effect of the agreement is political and psychological

The biggest weakness of the diesel deal is its striking asymmetry. As usual, the Russians have already gotten what they wanted, while the U.S. has received promises that are unlikely to be fulfilled. So far, Russia has had to do essentially nothing that was not already in its own interests. On the contrary, Russia has effectively received U.S. approval to continue destroying Ukraine's infrastructure.

The U.S. Treasury Department has already issued a sanctions exemption allowing transactions involving Russian diesel fuel until April 7, 2027. The exemption is not conditional on the promised deliveries actually taking place and contains no quantitative limit. This means Russia is already benefiting from sanctions relief, regardless of whether Putin can or even intends to deliver the 4.8 million metric tons of diesel promised to Trump.

Russia's contribution to the deal consists of a promise to sell its diesel fuel. Not to give it away, not to provide it as humanitarian aid, but to sell fuel on the global market that Russia itself has a vital interest in exporting. Putin has gained an opportunity to earn additional revenue and mitigate the impact of Ukrainian attacks on Russia's oil industry.

Russia has made no known reciprocal commitment to stop attacking Ukraine's energy infrastructure, scale back military operations or make concessions in peace negotiations. Instead, Trump has pressured, if not outright threatened, Ukraine to stop attacking Russian oil infrastructure.

The moral problem with the agreement is colossal. For years, Western countries have sought to restrict Russia's energy revenues in order to reduce its ability to wage its war of aggression against Ukraine — yes, sometimes hypocritically, but they have made the effort nonetheless.

Europe and the U.S. have largely been united on this issue. Now the U.S. president is opening up a new opportunity for the Russians to sell fuel and presenting it as a step that serves the interests of the global economy and American consumers. At the same time, he has previously threatened third countries that buy Russian petroleum products with sanctions — India, for example, as recently as a short while ago — and Congress has just passed the so-called Lindsey Graham bill, which would make it possible to impose effective sanctions on Russia.

Trump's deal stands in stark contradiction to all of this. The Russians are being rewarded for destroying Ukraine's infrastructure with an opportunity to earn additional revenue and portray themselves as the saviors of the global energy market.

For Putin, this is an important political and psychological victory in any case. He can demonstrate both to his domestic audience and internationally that the policy of isolating Russia is unsustainable and that even the U.S. needs Russia's help. What is more, Russia has achieved this outcome without making a single concession in Ukraine. I would call that a 4-0 victory for Putin...

For Ukraine, the message is particularly damaging. Ukraine has taken enormous risks to damage Russia's refining industry and thereby weaken the aggressor's economic and military capabilities. It is depressing to recall the damage Ukraine itself suffers every day in this context. And now our principal ally is helping to alleviate, at least in part, the economic consequences of precisely those attacks that have so far been one of Ukraine's main tools for putting pressure on the Russians. Meanwhile, the Russians continue attacking Ukraine's power plants, heating systems and energy infrastructure and murdering civilians.

You can bet that Russia will use the promised diesel deliveries as a tool of political pressure. If Trump starts linking lower American fuel prices to the operational capacity of Russian refineries, Putin will say Ukraine is to blame and that Trump should make the Ukrainians stop attacking them. Trump already seems to be following this logic — or, more accurately, this absurdity. The result is a situation in which the aggressor continues destroying Ukraine's energy infrastructure while Ukraine is pressured to abandon attacks on the aggressor's energy infrastructure.

The agreement also creates problems for relations between Europe and the U.S. The European Union has sought to reduce its dependence on Russian energy and restrict the revenues flowing into Russia's war economy. The U.S., and Trump in particular, has spent years lecturing Europe for continuing to buy Russian petroleum products. Now he is blatantly disregarding all of that.

The U.S. sanctions exemption does not, of course, invalidate European sanctions, but it makes maintaining a common sanctions policy more difficult. Operating Russia's shadow fleet will become cheaper, insurance companies may begin insuring tankers carrying Russian cargo again and so on. All of this has implications extending well beyond diesel.

European companies must continue complying with EU restrictions while the Americans allow the Russians back into the market. It is reasonable to expect European oil companies to start pressuring their governments to make similar concessions.

U.S. credibility has taken a serious blow in both Europe and Ukraine. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has already criticized the deal, understandably and as the only possible response. The only people in Europe who might be celebrating are Putinist right-wing forces such as the AfD.

Against this backdrop, the economic benefits of the agreement for the U.S. are uncertain, to put it mildly. Its impact on U.S. gasoline prices is even more indirect than its impact on diesel prices and is likely nonexistent. Russia, meanwhile, gains an opportunity to expand its customer base, reduce the discounts it offers, earn export revenue and ease storage problems at its refineries. Fortunately, this deal will not resolve Russia's own shortage of winter-grade diesel or restore production capacity damaged by Ukrainian attacks.

So there we have it. Trump gets to promise cheaper fuel, which will not actually help him, while Putin has already secured tangible sanctions relief.

There is probably a longer backstory to all of this. According to an October 10 report in the Financial Times, U.S. representatives Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner warned Ukrainian negotiators in Miami that Washington could restrict intelligence sharing if Ukraine did not stop attacking Russian oil infrastructure. The Ukrainian delegation cut its visit short. In other words, the U.S. is threatening to end the last significant form of assistance it still provides Ukraine while simultaneously providing direct assistance to the aggressor.

The agreement's economic impact will be modest at best and probably minimal. Its moral and political consequences could be far more lasting and extremely damaging to the U.S. in the long run. It undermines the credibility of sanctions, puts Ukraine under pressure and deepens divisions between Europe and the U.S.

Ultimately, this is another Sputnik-style spin operation. During the coronavirus pandemic, Putin marketed a vaccine around the world that did not work and that Russia was unable to produce in sufficient quantities, creating the impression that Russia was coming to the rescue of those in need. Now, in a single stroke, he has eased his export difficulties, demonstrated that Western sanctions do not hold up and dealt a blow to America's reputation.

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