The Finnish electricity grid operator Fingrid estimates the repair costs of the EstLink 2 electricity cable at "tens of millions of euros." According to calculations by the Bank of Estonia, an additional €100 million will be borne by end users due to the resulting rise in electricity prices. On top of that, millions more will be required to repair four data communication cables damaged in the same attack.

This sum must now be sourced from national reserves or through additional budget cuts, and we lacked these funds even before the painful state budget debates. This money is critically needed for building and maintaining our naval capabilities, as well as for personnel training and operational support.

The decision to invest in maritime capability development is difficult but essential. To avoid the costs of future hybrid attacks, conscious choices must be made. For the same amount we are spending on damage control, Estonia could have acquired two new high-tech multifunctional patrol vessels based on the Euroguard platform, which would significantly bolster our maritime defense.

Including the damages from the 2023 Balticconnector gas pipeline attack, we could have already had a fleet capable of fulfilling daily deterrence roles across critical infrastructure.

Thus, the issue isn't about whether the money exists – we are paying it out anyway, either as defense investments or as compensation for damages. The difference lies in the outcome: with investments, we gain real defensive capabilities; with damage compensation, we are left with nothing of lasting value.

Unfortunately, there are no simple or cheap solutions. Surface drones cannot operate in meters-high waves or icy conditions and sensor data alone cannot stop or contain culprits. Comprehensive situational analysis cannot be conducted from dozens of kilometers inland.

A strategy to protect seabed infrastructure and the associated investment needs can be divided into three stages: deterrence and power projection, surveillance and counteraction and emergency response and restoration.

The primary goal is to do everything possible to reduce the adversary's interest in initiating a conflict. If this fails, any attack must be detected as quickly and effectively as possible to ensure an immediate and robust response.

In the first stage, the navy plays the most significant role: warships, personnel and technological capabilities ensure our presence and protect our interests wherever necessary. This requires increased investments in fleet expansion, training and equipment, along with close cooperation with allies.

In the second stage – surveillance and counteraction – new technologies must be developed. These include underwater sensor systems, autonomous platforms and drones capable of rapidly detecting and responding to potential threats. Building such a system is neither simple nor cheap, but it is essential for ensuring continuous and reliable monitoring of our territorial waters.

In the third stage – emergency response – smooth and effective cooperation between all national and international partners is crucial. All stakeholders must be ready to act swiftly to minimize damage and ensure the rapid restoration of systems.

Ensuring Estonia's security at sea means more than simply maintaining a navy; it requires a comprehensive system that integrates modern technologies, precise monitoring, international cooperation and constant readiness.

There is a silver lining in past decisions. A foundational base has already been established for building this system. Without merging the fleets of the Police and Border Guard Board and the Navy under the Defense Forces, as well as creating an agency responsible for maritime situational awareness, we would lack the foundation to develop such capabilities. The Euroguard platform also originated from the Ministry of Defense's vision to create a future defense capability, specifically based on Estonia's expertise.

Now, we must ensure that the funds we are already spending are not wasted. Caution has been practiced enough – it is time to invest in the development of a multifaceted maritime defense capability to prevent similar attacks and safeguard Estonia's sovereignty.

--

Follow ERR News on Facebook and Twitter and never miss an update!