1) Russia continues to mobilize resources and rebuild its mass army. Should the war in Ukraine end favorably for Russia, or if hostilities are frozen, it is almost certain that Russian military units will be permanently stationed along Estonia's borders in greater numbers than before February 24, 2022. Russia is committed to advancing drone technology and integrating drones extensively into its armed forces. This increases the threat to Estonia and NATO. Drone production in Russia remains dependent on Western components. Read more in Chapter 1.

2) Russia is highly unlikely to use nuclear weapons in its war against Ukraine and instead seeks to maximise its fear factor to sway Western decision-making. Russia's nuclear threats have not yielded the desired results, and this is causing frustration among the country's leadership. Read more in Chapter 1.

3) Russia's ruling elite maintains domestic control through increasingly forceful repression. With the ongoing war, development in sectors outside the defence industry has stalled, and domestic tensions are rising. Russia's "war economy boom" is likely to come to an end in 2025. As Russia's focus is on its war in Ukraine, its ability to prevent Islamist extremism and thwart terrorist attacks at home is limited. Read more in Chapter 2.

4) Russia's leadership cynically perpetuates the claim on the international stage that the war in Ukraine could have ended as early as 2022. Russia assumes that the international community either lacks knowledge of or has forgotten the state of negotiations when they collapsed in 2022. Russia's disinformation campaigns are gaining ground among countries in the Global South. The Belarusian regime's dependence on the Kremlin is deepening. Read more in Chapter 3.

5) With Russia's official contacts with the West impeded, Russian academics have taken on a larger role in back-channel diplomacy, serving as discreet conduits for communication with Western diplomats and think tank representatives. Read more in Chapter 3.

6) Russia seeks to restore Moscow's control over most of the South Caucasus to gain access to strategic infrastructure in the region. One of the keys to achieving this is the subjugation of Georgia. Read more in Chapter 3.

7) The UAE has become a hub for Russian economic activity, offering opportunities for business and sanctions evasion, alongside relatively frequent political, military and intelligence interactions. Read more in Chapter 3.

8) Russia has launched a sabotage campaign against the West to undermine support for Ukraine. Russian propagandists are also aiming to reignite fears of a "nuclear winter" – a theory widely explored in the 1980s – among Americans in 2025. Read more in Chapter 4.

9) The FSB is responsible for the security of Russia's armed forces and other militarized institutions through its military counterintelligence branch, the VKR, which recruits informants from both Russian and foreign nationals. Read more in Chapter 5.

10) China views Ukraine as part of Russia's sphere of influence but only provides selective support to Russia in the information war, guided by its own strategic interests. For China, Russia's defeat in the war against Ukraine would represent a victory for its main rival, the United States. The Chinese Communist Party uses scientific collaboration as a tool to acquire Western technology and strengthen its capabilities. Read more in Chapter 6.

You can read the full report, in English, here. 

What is the Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service?

The main function of EFIS is to collect intelligence and to protect classified information.

The agency collects, analyses and delivers information on Estonia's external security threats. The information gathered by EFIS has a significant influence on Estonia's national defense and security policy making. EFIS is in the front line of national defense, as intelligence ensures early warning for events that pose a threat to us.

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