Kaupo Rosin: Direct military attack on Estonia remains unlikely in 2025

A direct military attack on Estonia remains unlikely in 2025, writes Kaupo Rosin, director general of Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service, in the introduction of the agency's annual report. But he also hopes the free world can "overcome its self-imposed collective inertia" and "consign the drive for aggression to the ash heap of history."
Dear reader,
As I write these words, it remains uncertain whether the coming year will bring an end to the decade-long Russian aggression against Ukraine or what form that conclusion might take. Putin seems likely to view the evolving international situation as an opportunity for a temporary reprieve. Such a pause would be expedient for the war criminal to consolidate his gains, catch his breath and then resume Russia's colonialist mission.
To safeguard Ukraine's future and the security of the free world, it is essential that Russia does not dictate the terms for ending the conflict. There is no reason to believe that Putin has abandoned his maximalist ambitions, including the demand to roll NATO's military presence back to its 1997 boundaries, which makes it all the more vital that Russia leaves Ukraine with a painful lesson.
The threat of a direct military attack on Estonia remains unlikely in 2025, but Russia's policy towards us remains hostile, and its confrontation with the West continues. Despite suffering enormous losses, the Russian armed forces are growing, learning lessons from the war, and rapidly advancing technologies such as drones. This raises the threat level for NATO as well.
Russia may continue its sabotage campaign in Europe in 2025, attempting to undermine support for Ukraine. Acts of arson, vandalism and destruction may recur across the continent. However, the Kremlin fails to grasp that such acts, which potentially endanger lives, only reinforce its image as an aggressor and strengthen Western unity rather than achieving the opposite.
As its resources for escalation dwindle, leading to frustration behind closed doors among the siloviki (security forces – ed.), Moscow will persist in exploiting nuclear fear. While the Kremlin's rhetoric on nuclear weapons is forceful, its actions do not mirror these ominous threats. In our assessment, Russia is highly unlikely to use nuclear weapons in the war against Ukraine, but observing how the fear factor has restrained the West thus far, Russia is exploiting it to the fullest. The war in Ukraine could have potentially been ended some time ago had the West seen through Russia's bluff.
The Russian ruling elite maintains its grip on power through increasingly heavy-handed repression, reminiscent of the late Brezhnev era. The burden of war has stalled progress in many sectors, causing a rapid decline in quality of life and growing internal tensions. While there is no immediate threat to the regime, authoritarian systems often appear stronger than they actually are. Recently, we witnessed how the sudden collapse of the Syrian dictator's rule and his flight from the country shocked Putin's inner circle.
Sanctions have significantly weakened the Russian economy. The West's resolve to maintain sanctions directly hampers Russia's ability to sustain – let alone develop – its military machine; it limits Russia's capacity to continue the war in Ukraine and curtails its preparations for potential conflict with NATO.
China is aiding Russia in the game of drones by providing a route for Western components to reach the aggressor. China criticises international sanctions on Russia, tacitly endorsing its citizens and companies engaging in business with Russia. China's interest lies in preventing Russia from losing the war in Ukraine, as such an outcome would represent a victory for its main rival, the United States, and a setback for China's efforts to reshape the rules-based international order in favour of authoritarian regimes.
Seeking to demonstrate that it is not isolated, currying favour with China is not the only focus of Russian officials. BRICS presidency in 2024 and the numerous events held under its framework provided Russia with a valuable platform to spread its propaganda and justify its war of conquest. In 2025, the Russian foreign ministry has opportunities to extend its "peace narratives" from South America to Africa and Asia.
There have also been unusual incidents in the Baltic Sea. Ongoing investigations are expected to reveal the culprits, but the share of vessels with unclear backgrounds in regional maritime traffic is clearly increasing. Responsible coastal states must not be deterred but should instead explore joint solutions to mitigate the risks of such incidents more effectively.
I believe that the Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service's tenth annual report will help dispel the fog of uncertainty, provide context and sharpen the focus on issues critical to Estonia and NATO. Hopefully, the free world can overcome its self-imposed collective inertia, rise to the occasion with courage and resolve, and consign the drive for aggression to the ash heap of history.
******
Read the full report here.
What is the Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service (Välisluureamet)?
The main function of EFIS is to collect intelligence and to protect classified information.
The agency collects, analyses and delivers information on Estonia's external security threats. The information gathered by EFIS has a significant influence on Estonia's national defense and security policy making. EFIS is in the front line of national defense, as intelligence ensures early warning for events that pose a threat to us.
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Editor: Helen Wright