I'll start with a quote from Lenin. He said that there are decades where nothing happens and then there are weeks where decades happen. Are we currently in those weeks where decades happen?

Lenin was wrong about many things, and he was wrong about this as well. We may assess these weeks differently when we look back in the future, but in the context of the Russia-Ukraine war, nothing has changed — the war continues. The goals of both sides, Russia and Ukraine, remain the same. You were probably referring to a particular meeting and several rather emotional statements, especially in Washington, but on the battlefield, nothing has changed.

But the declared position of the Americans regarding both Ukraine and Russia has clearly changed.

We'll see how this plays out in practice. If you listened to what was said after the meeting in Saudi Arabia, the main focus was on U.S.-Russia bilateral relations. That's one aspect.

Secondly, I would still come back to what's happening on the battlefield, and I would also point out that U.S. aid to Ukraine continues.

There have been rhetorical statements that are far from pleasant and some that indicate there is still a lack of real understanding of what this war means for Ukrainians. When you observe it from a distance, it may seem like something else, but for Ukrainians, this is an existential struggle for their very survival.

When you're fighting for your survival, for your right to exist, intellectual calculations about where a ceasefire line could be drawn or under what conditions peacekeeping forces might eventually be deployed become secondary concerns. The most important thing is to hold the line on the battlefield — what happens there every day is what truly matters.

It could be said that with the new administration, the Americans see things differently, but there is no indication that they will start seeing things the way Ukraine does. Trump's worldview is based on a zero-sum game, where one side's victory automatically means the other side's loss. Looking at how things are unfolding, it seems that the United States is withdrawing its support for Ukraine.

Let's see how this unfolds. A few years ago, I had the opportunity to speak in Kyiv with Mike Pompeo, the secretary of state during Trump's first administration. He told me that as a candidate, Trump tweeted 57 times about withdrawing troops from Afghanistan. But then, once he took office, he didn't actually follow through. So, these things can still change.

Rather than speculating about what a particular president had in mind when sending out a specific tweet, I think we can quite confidently say that the Americans don't yet have a clear plan.

What about the will?

Trump has said many times that he wants to end the war and be a part of ending it — he seems to have will enough for that. I have not yet seen a plan.

But high-ranking U.S. officials have made statements suggesting that Ukraine should start paying for the aid it has already received — by giving up rare earth metals or mining rights, among other things.

This is certainly part of Donald Trump's worldview as a great dealmaker and businessman — it's how he operates. At the same time, it's important to remember that President Zelenskyy actually proposed this himself. When he presented his victory plan last fall, one of its elements was that Ukraine's mineral resources could be managed jointly. It was quite clearly an attempt to attract American attention. Now he has that attention, and as I understand it, negotiations are underway.

The main problem with what the Americans offered was that it did not come with solid security guarantees for Ukraine.

There were other components in the victory plan. I am absolutely certain that it needs to be viewed as a broader whole.

Speaking of the broader picture, what is Trump's plan regarding Russia and Putin? Is Trump trying to make Russia an ally of the United States?

I don't believe that. It's rather unproductive for us to sit here in the Vikerraadio studio on a Friday afternoon and speculate about what Trump is thinking at any given moment and what his plan is — if there even is one. What Trump has been consistent about is his desire to see the war end.

In Saudi Arabia, discussions focused on restoring the level of bilateral relations. Fair enough. But it's also important to remember that every U.S. president over the past 25 years has, at some point, attempted a reset with Putin. It has never succeeded.

Maybe Trump thinks he will succeed this time?

Yes, one must always believe and convince oneself that while no one else has succeeded before, and even I didn't succeed last time, this time it will work.

But technically, Russia is in a somewhat different situation than before: it is isolated and its military power has diminished. Could it be that Russia is now more willing to make some deals?

It's possible. But if that's the case, we certainly don't see it reflected in the statements coming from the Russian leadership. Maybe it's just a negotiation tactic — I don't know. However, if we look at what has been said over the past few weeks and months, nothing has really changed.

Their objectives in this war — or, as they call it, a "special military operation" — remain the same: Ukrainian neutrality, the annexation of four additional Ukrainian regions along with Crimea and demands directed at NATO and Europe regarding the broader European security architecture. These demands are essentially the same as those they put forward in December 2021.

From this perspective, it seems to me that Russia's leadership still believes they can afford to continue this war.

What about Ukraine?

Ukraine can also afford to continue. The financial stability of the Ukrainian state and its budget are secured. During the years of full-scale war, Ukraine's state budget has had a 50 percent deficit, which has been covered by foreign funding. This funding is guaranteed for this year and, almost certainly, beyond. The European Union has shouldered the lion's share of this support.

Military aid continues to arrive. Ukraine's own defense industry has grown tremendously — it has significant industrial potential.

Domestically, support for Zelenskyy is no longer at 90 percent, as it was in March 2022, but it remains between 50 and 60 percent. It's worth remembering that before the full-scale war, Zelenskyy was already the country's most popular politician, but at that time, his approval rating was only around 20 percent.

Of course, the Ukrainian people are growing weary of the war. However, public opinion in Ukraine is not willing to accept territorial concessions. All of Russia's neighboring nations, and especially Ukrainians, understand very well that if a ceasefire were established now, if the guns fell silent, then for the Russians, everything where their soldiers stand would be considered theirs — while the rest could then be subject to negotiation.

Zelenskyy likely fears that if a ceasefire is reached, those territories would be, at least in practice if not legally, lost.

So, in a strange way — though it sounds terrible because people are dying every day — Ukraine, economically, militarily and even politically, can afford to continue the war.

So, no matter what the Americans agree on with Russia and Putin, the outcome will be that Ukraine will not accept it?

That is entirely possible. The current task of the European Union and European countries, under the leadership of foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas, is to provide Ukraine with the kind of support that enables it to say no to any potentially unfavorable deal that might be forced upon it. That is a rather sensible goal.

What kind of deal could emerge at this moment? What might the Americans put on the table?

Let's not speculate. No detailed negotiations or in-depth discussions have taken place. Trump has already been heavily criticized by his former team members for giving things away to the Russians in advance. However, even those instances are just statements from the president — nothing has been written down and no agreements have been made. So, there's no point in speculating.

If we look at what's happening in Russian media, the general sentiment there seems to be quite positive.

Yes, that may be the case. Let's see how things develop. Nothing has been written down and nothing has been agreed upon.

The Americans have defined China as their main rival. For them — and this isn't even just about Trump — China is the one they will have to deal with in the future, the one they must confront, contain and compete with. In that context, Russia actually seems like a very logical partner for isolating China.

In what way?

Russia is capable of disrupting China, whether by restricting oil or other energy supplies.

It seems to me that the relationship between Russia and China — at least since 2014, when the European Union and the United States started imposing the first sanctions on Russia's energy sector — has largely been dictated by China's terms. There isn't much Russia can do in this dynamic. That's how I see it.

For the Americans, China is the primary concern. The idea of closing other fronts — so to speak — by reducing tensions and ending Russia's war against Ukraine might seem tempting. However, there is at least one major issue with that approach. If Russia is allowed to seize parts of Ukraine by military force, it sends a message to China, America's main rival, that they too can attempt to take territory by force — and Taiwan would be the first target. I don't believe it's in the interest of U.S. leadership to give China the impression that this is an acceptable path.

On the other hand, if U.S. leadership believes that making some kind of deal with Russia could help better isolate China, then at least as a thought exercise, this idea might be worth considering.

When talking about isolating China and its role, we're not primarily discussing the military aspect. China's strength lies in its economic potential and its position as the world's top exporter. If someone wants to contain China in any way, it must be done economically — by cutting off or restricting Chinese exports. Doing this in partnership with Russia would be quite difficult, given Russia's relatively small economy.

The United States is clearly looking for every possible way to suppress China.

We still don't know Trump's plan on this matter either.

Chinese diplomats have been actively traveling around Europe to participate in the Ukraine peace process. Does this mean that the Chinese are somewhat marginalized?

China has put itself in this position because it has not wanted to take a more active stance or role in this war. Standing next to Vladimir Putin, the Chinese leader has declared a "friendship without limits."

At the same time, China has not supplied weapons to Russia to the extent that would help it achieve success or dominance. Chinese diplomacy has not been particularly active.

European Union diplomats — both from member states and my colleagues in the EU's External Action Service — are constantly traveling and engaging with countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America, explaining why we must support Ukraine and urging them to vote with us in the United Nations. But Chinese diplomacy has not taken on an active role. So, it's no surprise that they are not present at every negotiation table.

But the Americans have also said that Europeans have no business at the peace negotiation table.

I was afraid you would draw that parallel, and it's not entirely inappropriate. However, there are significant differences here.

First of all, the war is taking place on the European continent, in our neighborhood, and it directly affects Europe — both EU member states and non-members like the United Kingdom, Norway and the Balkan countries. It has a direct impact on our security. We have much more at stake.

We have provided Ukraine with far more support — both politically and economically. Over the three years of full-scale war, the European Union and its member states have given Ukraine €135 billion. Of that, €45 billion — roughly $50 billion — has been military aid, which is entirely comparable to U.S. assistance. The American figure stands at around $60 billion.

We have also opened our doors to Ukrainians, allowing four million Ukrainian refugees to come to us. We have given Ukraine a perspective that, for us, is the most valuable and significant of all — that they can become a member of the EU.

We are far more invested in Ukraine, both in terms of interest and involvement, than China — and even more deeply than the United States. We have much more at stake, and we have much more to bring to any future, theoretical negotiation table.

But the question here is, who exactly are "we"? Who do you call if you want to talk to Europe?

If you want to talk about EU sanctions, proposals from the European Commission and the EU's External Action Service, these have been adopted by consensus among all 27 member states. That is something we can bring to the table.

Do you see the peace process as one where all 27 EU member states and the European Commission negotiate with Ukraine, Russia and the United States?

It's almost certain that Europe or the European Union will be represented by fewer people than all 27 member states plus institutional representatives. That much is clear. But we're not at that stage yet — this is not a question for today or tomorrow.

Right now, we know very precisely who is responsible for what. European Council President António Costa ensures consensus among member states. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen leads on sanctions, financial support and enlargement. High Representative for Foreign Affairs Kaja Kallas is managing negotiations with the Americans and overseeing Ukraine's current military assistance.

Indeed, some things are moving very quickly these weeks. There has been an urgent effort to plan how the European Union can help Ukraine in ensuring that it can reject any bad deal that might be forced upon it. Everyone has their role to play.

Looking at how European leaders have reacted after the U.S. signaled or spoke about its plans, one might even call it panic at times.

There have been intense meetings, negotiations and planning sessions. There's nothing inherently bad about that.

I've worked in and with the European Union for nearly twenty years, and you can always ask, "Where were you earlier? Did you really not see this coming?"

I'll leave those questions to journalists and historians. I'm a practitioner and focus on what needs to be done in the present moment. Right now, there are intense discussions and strategic planning on how we can support Ukraine even better and more effectively in the near future. And there are definitely opportunities to do so.

These opportunities ultimately depend on whether national leaders are willing to act. Looking at Monday's meeting in Paris with representatives from selected countries, no concrete results seemed to come out of it.

I wasn't there, but at the leaders' meeting held in Paris two days later, which also included Estonia...

A consolation meeting?

No, the discussions there were much more constructive, and in the meantime, the position of the meeting's initiator, French President Macron, had become much clearer. One outcome of this is that next week, Macron and UK Prime Minister Starmer will travel to Washington to meet with President Trump to discuss these matters.

I acknowledge that the optics of Monday's meeting were not ideal, but things have since developed in a much more positive direction.

So they'll go to Washington and achieve what exactly?

Let's see — that is now in the hands of these major world leaders.

Could the meeting with Trump lead to something positive or a complete 180-degree shift in position?

You can never go into a meeting assuming that nothing will change. I believe that a leader of such a large and important country, like the President of France, would not attend a meeting if it were already clear that nothing would come of it. Certainly not on his own initiative.

In Europe, we still have concerns that we are not making significant defense investments. Perhaps here in the East, we have increased spending in recent years, but in the West, particularly in Germany, not so much. As a result, we don't have a great deal of military strength.

Fortunately, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, who comes from Western Europe, has stated that spending below 3 percent is simply not feasible and that defense expenditures are also increasing in the more western countries.

When you ask whether we are capable of something or suggest that we might not be, it's important to remember that the majority of European Union member states are also NATO members. According to NATO's strategic plans, there is a division of labor. This has been the case for more than seventy-five years, ever since the North Atlantic Alliance was established. There is a clear distribution of responsibilities regarding who does what, and indeed, there are several areas and key elements where the presence of the Americans remains indispensable — at least for now. Changing that would require significant investments and a great deal of time.

However, there is currently no reason to talk about the United States leaving NATO or completely withdrawing its support. There is no need to fear such a scenario.

But why is there no reason to fear that?

Because, first of all, there are binding treaty obligations. Secondly, the transatlantic relationship — the connection between Europe and North America — is the world's largest trade and investment partnership. Our economies are so deeply intertwined and our jobs depend on each other to such an extent that cutting those ties would not only be unwise but, in reality, also impossible.

Similar arguments were made before the outbreak of World War I — that Europe's economies were so interconnected that war was impossible.

Let's not delve into history, if that's alright with you. Every situation is always different. The strongest economic relationship before World War I was the French banks lending to Russia and investing in the Russian economy. Those two countries remained allies in a stable and peaceful manner.

Clearly, the current U.S. administration wants to dial back trade relations. At the very least, Trump has declared his goal of bringing industry back to America and his perhaps perplexing fondness for tariffs is hardly a surprise.

By the way, it's not incomprehensible. One may agree or disagree with it, and the better someone understands economics, the less they tend to support tariffs. Donald Trump has now been studied and analyzed from many different angles, and it has been pointed out that his views have varied widely on almost every issue. However, one thing he has consistently focused on since the 1980s is America's negative trade balance.

Notably, he looks at trade in goods rather than services, where the U.S. actually has a strong surplus. But the way the issue of the trade deficit has entered Western political discourse is significant — and entirely logical.

Globalization, which started gaining momentum in the 1970s and really took off in the 1980s, has drastically reduced poverty worldwide. It has significantly decreased inequality between countries on a global scale and within developing nations. However, it has also increased inequality within developed countries. That's something we have to acknowledge and it matters a great deal to American voters. Alongside certain cultural issues, this is one of the main reasons Trump gets elected — it's the foundation of his support base.

Can globalization be reversed through tariffs? I am quite certain that it cannot, but that doesn't mean a democratically elected U.S. president doesn't have the right to try.

In reality, this anti-globalization stance and the plan to impose tariffs will only have negative effects on the very same voters.

Yes, everyone with an education in economics would say so.

Speaking about Europe as a whole, support for Ukraine should be increased and investments or spending on defense equipment are rising — we are buying more ammunition and weapons. At the same time, if the United States truly moves toward imposing tariffs, our economic growth will either slow down or start declining across Europe. We are facing quite difficult times ahead, not to mention the question of a possible peace with Russia and what Russia's next steps might be. Or do you see it differently?

The main challenges facing the European Union's economy do not stem from external factors but rather from a lack of integration within the internal market. The barriers that still exist within the single market remain a significant issue. This has been clearly outlined in last year's reports by two former Italian prime ministers, Mario Draghi and Enrico Letta.

The greatest potential for the EU economy lies in strengthening and deepening the internal market. In fact, countries like Estonia — geographically somewhat more distant and with a slightly lower income level — stand to gain significantly from this process.

But that depends on the continued harmonization of the internal market. If we also consider the statements made by those close to Trump, who support various political forces in Europe — some of whom oppose EU membership — there is no guarantee that things will continue in this direction.

Not even that they will continue as they are because the internal market hasn't been fully completed — not because it's impossible, but simply because not all member states have been eager to finalize it. That's the simple reason.

I remember in 2012, when the European Banking Union was being established as part of the response to the euro crisis, a very experienced British colleague of mine, who had worked in the finance ministry, said that creating a banking union was absolutely the right decision — but it would take twenty years. I laughed at the time. But as it turns out, he was right. Two major elements of the banking union have been implemented, but the third — a unified deposit insurance scheme — has not been realized because two major and wealthy member states don't support it.

This has been the case throughout the history of European integration: truly significant changes tend to happen only when there is no other option. When the banking union was initiated, the euro crisis gradually faded, the sense of urgency diminished and, as a result, the banking union has not been fully completed.

In the near future, Europe isn't exactly looking at a bright and prosperous outlook, is it?

Economically speaking?

Economically speaking.

Well, the reference base is very high.

At the same time, if we look at the United States, whose starting point has been higher than ours, they have grown significantly faster than Europe over the years, regardless of the time period.

Cutting back on regulation is certainly one approach, and Ursula von der Leyen has promised to do so in her second term as Commission president. We'll see how that unfolds.

Strengthening the internal market, boosting foreign trade, the Mercosur agreement with Latin American countries and the trade deal with Mexico — these are all steps in that direction. People who have worked in trade for decades say that it is nothing short of a miracle that anyone is still able to conclude trade agreements these days, given how politically negative and unfavorable the climate has become. We'll see. Efforts are being made on multiple fronts.

High energy prices are undoubtedly part of the challenge as well. However, the foundation of the European Union's practical functioning is the internal market — the largest in the world. It hasn't been fully completed, but it's not functioning poorly either. In fact, it works especially well for more remote and less wealthy countries like Estonia.

You mentioned high energy prices, which are among the changes Trump has pushed — at least rhetorically — alongside identity politics, by focusing more on the use of fossil fuels. Europe is now the only region in the world that, at least in principle, claims it plans to transition entirely to renewable energy in the near future. Should this position be reconsidered?

I cannot say. The advantage of being first to major innovation is being able to reap the fruits those who come after you won't be able to reach.

But that innovation is happening in China.

It is largely happening in China, even though China is not cutting greenhouse gas emissions as decisively as the European Union.

Are they cutting them at all?

Yes, that is what I was trying to suggest in a diplomatic manner. But I really cannot say. I believe that the goal of ending fossil fuel use or reducing and hopefully getting rid of emissions is the right thing to do. A lot of very principled decisions were taken, while that is when the Ukraine war started, in which, luckily, almost everyone realized they needed to drop Russian energy. Unfortunately, the alternative is not switching to green alternatives overnight. The alternative is Norwegian and U.S. natural gas, which, I'm sure, we're willing to buy more of.

Europe is still buying Russian gas. There is still trade with Russia.

Less and less of it. From 45 percent in 2021, we've gone to under 10 percent in terms of gas of Russian origin in the EU.

Some Russian fossil fuels are also laundered.

Yes, a never-ending game of cops and robbers. One side tries a new set of tricks to which the other has to adjust. Efforts are ongoing to execute and perfect our sanctions, but things could be much better. We should definitely do better.

But the decision — whether we like it nor not — to end all trade with Russia has not been made. Neither in the U.S. nor the European Union.

If you say that rather the Trump administration's peace talks will not come to fruition, that Ukraine will continue the fight, that Europe will increase its contribution and the Americans will perhaps end up pulling out of Ukraine, how long can it all last?

Every war lasts until one side can no longer afford to fight it, and I'm convinced that time is not working in Russia's favor, looking at the Russian economy, where the central bank's base interest rate is north of 20 percent. What kind of an economy can sustain that over a longer period in a situation where there is acute unemployment and where selling the one thing they can produce — oil and gas — is increasingly difficult? Time is not working in Russia's favor.

How long can they last?

I dare not make predictions, but signs of Russia's weakening are there for everyone to see. At the same time, Ukraine's budget is guaranteed along with its financial stability.

That said, Ukraine's pool of potential additional recruits is much shallower than Russia's.

Looking at the front line, Russia's losses are much greater. It also boils down to how you fight a war. Ukraine can manage with the men it has in the near perspective. While it is a problem for them, they can manage. Western partners can help Ukraine by supplying more weapons and removing restrictions (on the use of weapons systems — ed.). Russia has no such help or partners on the horizon.

But for how long? Will there still be war in Ukraine in January of next year?

Possibly. World War I lasted four years, World War II six years. The Hundred Years War...

I cannot say how long the war will last for as long as we're still in the middle of it. It will last until one side can no longer afford it.

What kind of a peace would satisfy Ukraine?

That's up to them to say. If when the war started, over 90 percent of Ukrainians said that there can be no territorial concessions, even temporarily, it has come down by quite a lot by now. But it is up to Ukraine's democratically elected and democratically ruling — despite some differences of opinion in this matter — President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and the country's political leadership to say where their pain threshold lies.

Until the successful counterattacks in the Kharkiv area in September and Kherson area in November of 2022, Ukraine's leaders could have said among themselves that if the Russians pulled back to February 2022 lines, which is still a considerable part of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, and they still hold Crimea, there would be something to talk about.

I have also seen one such suggestion more recently, but it's pure speculation at this point. Much will depend on where either side will have booths on the ground when the time comes.

If you say that a peace where there are no security guarantees and Russia gets to keep everything it currently holds cannot be sold to the Ukrainian people today, what might they be willing to accept?

I believe that for Volodymyr Zelenskyy to be able to sell or explain anything to the Ukrainian people, because he is the only one who can sell them anything, the first and most important question is that of guarantees — so as not to end up with a situation where there is merely a ceasefire or pause in the fighting for Russia to gather its strength and attack again. Zelenskyy has been very clear of the need for security guarantees, ideally membership in NATO.

There are NATO members who do not wish to see Ukraine there.

If that is impossible, they need strong, mutual certainty — whereas the U.S. needs to be involved — that if Russia tries again, Ukraine will be helped in a different and much greater capacity, including by force of arms.

And if the U.S. refuses to pledge any of it?

We'll see. Let us not speculate at this time. Right now, we're still in scenario A where the war continues. The process that perhaps started last week is scenario B. But scenario A is that the war will continue.

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