I am drawing from the book "Interesting Russia. 228 Answers" ("Занимательная Россия. 228 ответов," 2024) by Russian analyst Sergei Šelin. In 2022, Šelin moved from St. Petersburg to Finland, where he currently resides. In his book, he compiled 228 questions, using their answers to characterize the essence of Russia. I have selected a few of these responses.

Can Putin be compared to Stalin? Šelin believes that Putin imitates Stalin, but not the real historical figure — rather, the television image of him. Stalin, after all, was a statesman, whereas Putin is not. Putin operates in categories of resentment, envy and self-expression.

Stalin shaped the Soviet regime to fit his vision and defended it. Putin, on the other hand, despises state structures and has managed to dismantle them. He sees Russia as a tool for his personal interests. All of his emotions and ambitions are centered on himself. That is why there are no limits to his state-driven adventurism. He is accountable to no one — not even in his own imagination. This does not mean that Stalin was better than Putin. They are simply different.

Is Russia similar to Fascist Italy or Nazi Germany? In many ways, they are comparable. However, Germany and Italy had alternative institutions and structures — from the Catholic and Lutheran churches to deeply rooted concepts of local governance, judicial independence and tax administration. When their dictatorships collapsed, people had something to fall back on.

Russia, by contrast, has no historical memory of independent courts or local self-government. The head of the church is essentially a member of the president's administration, rendering the church incapable of offering support to the people. There are no pre-Putin politicians left who could ensure continuity of power in the event of a regime change. In terms of structural resemblance, Russia is more akin to Muammar Gaddafi's Libya or the Central African Empire.

Why did democracy fail in Russia? The reason is that no true civic nation ever emerged. Boris Yeltsin and other founders of modern Russia attempted to build it as a nation-state with political citizenship and civil governance, modeling it after the Baltic states and Eastern Europe. However, this initial democratic patriotism quickly faded and the Russian democracy project failed.

Can Russia become normal? Since the 15th century, Russia has not only been an autocracy but also a state in a constant state of delirium. At times, this madness has been interrupted, but only temporarily. What sets Russia apart from other countries is an almost perpetual atmosphere of state paranoia.

Elsewhere, nations sometimes lose their way, but not for centuries at a time. Russia's "special path" consists of grandiose delusions and persecution mania, which function as a religious doctrine under every Russian regime. Russia's uniqueness lies in its powerful mechanisms that inevitably steer it back onto this path whenever it begins to stray. Another distinctive feature is the remarkable global competitiveness of this model. As a result, there is little domestic inclination to change anything.

For now, Vladimir Putin still fits the traditional image of a Russian ruler as perceived by officials and the public. To his subordinates, he does not appear to be an infantile old man driven by selfish passions but rather a secretive high priest of an ancient state religion, seemingly devoid of personal attributes. The public's deep approval of his wars of conquest has demonstrated that Russia has entered the next phase of expansion. To Russians, the idea of empire-building and the fight against the eternal Western enemy seems entirely natural, even if somewhat burdensome. Under Putin, Russia feels completely in its element.

When Putin leaves, a policy shift will be inevitable and his successor will seek to ease relations with the West. However, establishing a democratic order will remain impossible. Such a regime would have no foundation in contemporary Russia. The intelligentsia has disappeared and all other social classes have been dissolved within Putin's system. They lack the desire, will or authority to become part of any alternative system. In the long run, the problem is that Russia, left to its own devices, will never remain stable for long. After a brief respite from its traditional madness, it always returns to it.

In the long term, the dissolution of Russia is not out of the question. The secession of some ethnic autonomous regions is possible; the first serious crisis at the imperial center would be enough to trigger it.

Even the fragmentation of the imperial core itself cannot be entirely ruled out. What unites the country is not language but the power vertical — its administrative, security and propaganda machinery. If this vertical collapses in a crisis, Russia will automatically disintegrate. But what comes next is uncertain. The residents of Russian oblasts are neither prepared to become citizens of independent states nor ready for democracy. If the central authority revives, there will be no one locally to prevent it from reassembling the country. Thus, a prolonged breakup of Russia does not seem realistic.

Can anything change in Russia? For change to occur, four conditions must align. First, social groups with real common interests must emerge and be willing to act upon them. Second, the Russian intelligentsia must be reborn. Third, emigrants must have the opportunity to return and reclaim their lost positions.

Fourth, personal rights and freedoms must once again become valued ideals in the world. Russia has never ignored global trends; it has simply exaggerated and adapted them to its own form. However, Russia has never turned toward freedom unless the rest of the world — or at least a significant part of it, namely the West — did so first.

In summary, the alignment of circumstances necessary to bring Russia toward normalization would be nothing short of a miracle. Until then, the situation remains unchanged: the Russian ruler is always an autocrat or someone on the path to becoming one. And such a ruler typically does not cobble together coalitions of subordinates to support their power, as their authority is already divine. Moreover, any independent associations among subordinates are strictly prohibited, so the ruler has no reason to fear the people uniting. There is always the reliable fact that participation in state power and state-driven paranoia overrides even the basic instinct for self-preservation among Russians.

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