Aimar Ventsel: No such thing as a united Russian opposition

There is no unified Russian opposition, either within the country or in exile. As a result, various individuals and groups compete for the right to represent a new and idealized Russia, often clashing and undermining one another in the process, writes Aimar Ventsel in his Vikerraadio commentary.
In 2017, Aleksei Navalny, then the most prominent opposition figure in Russia, is said to have coined the phrase "a just future Russia" (spravedlivaya Rossiya budushevo). Or at least, that's the claim.
The phrase lingered in minor speeches and statements for a while until it reemerged with gusto in 2022 or 2023 when the exiled Russian opposition began organizing itself and needed catchy, simple slogans. But that doesn't mean these slogans have to be comprehensible. That applies to "a just future Russia" as well.
As usual, no one knows exactly what it means — but Russian opposition figures are very clear about what it doesn't mean. First and foremost, a just future Russia, to them, absolutely does not entail the breakup of the Russian Federation — regardless of the manner or the resulting geographic units. Though perhaps there is one thing the Russian opposition is genuinely certain of: a just future Russia can only be realized if they are the ones leading it and directing the changes.
The problem is, there is no unified Russian opposition, neither inside Russia nor in exile. That's why various individuals and groups are fighting for the right to represent this new and wondrous Russia. And of course, we must mention that they are often at odds with one another, trying to sabotage each other's efforts and flood the space with kompromat.
At this point, a trio has emerged as the de facto spokespersons for the Russian opposition: Yulia Navalnaya, Vladimir Kara-Murza and Ilya Yashin. All three have been closely linked to Aleksei Navalny and his initiatives. In a certain sense, their rise is logical and directly tied to the West.
Among Western politicians — here I include both Eastern and Western Europe — there are only a handful of people who can, want to or have the patience to navigate the fragmented terrain of the Russian opposition. It's easier for everyone when there are clear spokespersons: people with whom to build dialogue, invite to speak, whose messages are simple and understandable — and, not insignificantly, to whom grants and other forms of aid can be given in the hope of turning Russia into that same just future Russia.
It must also be said that Yulia Navalnaya, Vladimir Kara-Murza and Ilya Yashin have taken every opportunity to position themselves as the face of this hypothetical just future Russia. As politicians tend to do, they're constantly trying to stay visible, using every available channel to make sure their faces and words reach everyone — both those who want to see and hear them and those who don't.
The so-called official representation of the Russian opposition typically delivers very simple messages: if they are supported, then sooner rather than later, this mystical democratic just future Russia will come to be. The full-scale war in Ukraine and Russia's aggression, they argue, are not the responsibility of Russia or its people, but rather a personal adventure orchestrated by Vladimir Putin and his inner circle — no one else should be blamed.
According to this logic, sanctions on Russia should be lifted, as they primarily hurt the average Russian citizen, who, as is well known, bears no blame.
Now, these figures have pulled off a rather slick sleight of hand: they have managed to secure a fairly high level of recognition as the voice and representatives of the Russian opposition. On October 1, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, following a meeting with a so-called delegation of Russia's democratic forces, passed a resolution establishing a so-called dialogue platform.
Igor Gretski, a researcher at the International Center for Defense and Security (ICDS), has written several insightful summaries of the initiative, which I highly recommend. Gretski has long studied the Russian opposition movement and is one of Estonia's most knowledgeable voices on the topic.
What Gretski particularly urges us to consider is, first, the legitimacy of the delegation that stood before the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe — it's hard to say who they represent and on what basis. Second, although the delegation and the dialogue platform are purportedly meant to "unite" opposition forces, in reality, they are causing fragmentation, as the delegation members are clearly aligned with one faction. Excluded were those who are in conflict with the aforementioned triumvirate.
The delegation has drawn protests and negative responses from both the more anti-imperialist wing of the Russian opposition and exiled activists from Russia's minority nations. Of course, the key members of the delegation were Kara-Murza, Navalnaya and Yashin, plus Kara-Murza's wife. But there were other curious members as well. For instance, Elena Lukyanova, daughter of Anatoly Lukyanov — once a Politburo member and one of the leaders of the anti-Gorbachev coup, a hardline Soviet loyalist if ever there was one.
Granted, the sins of the father shouldn't be visited upon the daughter. But the daughter herself has hardly stood out for anything particularly oppositional or anti-Putin. She was a member of Russia's Communist Party and the State Duma. The fact that she now lives in Riga looks more like fleeing a sinking ship. Lukyanova believes Ukraine is to blame for Russia's aggression.
Another strange member of the delegation is Kirill Martynov, former leader of the pro-Kremlin patriotic youth organization Nashi, who in 2022 rapidly reinvented himself as one of the "good Russians." Also included was Gennady Gudkov, a figure with a murky past and alleged ties to the FSB.
What alarmed non-Russians was the so-called representative of Russia's minority nations in the delegation. There were two Buryats, who have family ties to both Soviet-era and present-day Russian institutions, play no meaningful role in the current Buryat exile opposition and are generally little known. They appear to be there as quota fillers.
So now we have the official, institutionalized representatives of the Russian opposition in Europe. I don't know what hopes people are placing on this group, but I agree with Igor Gretski — there's little reason for optimism.
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Editor: Marcus Turovski









