Last week, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy removed popular Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov (35) from his position, which triggered street protests across the country.

Rumours suggesting that Fedorov had lost his job due to a conflict between him and army commander-in-chief Oleksandr Syrskyi (60) were later confirmed.

However, on Tuesday, Zelenskyy dismissed Syrskyi (60), replacing him with Gen. Mykhailo Drapatyi (43).

ERR: How do the decisions made by President Volodymyr Zelenskyy appear to you? He has dismissed both Defense Minister [Mykhailo] Fedorov and Commander-in-Chief [Oleksandr] Syrskyi. What should we conclude from all of this?

Saks: At the moment, looking at it from the outside, without having been present at the discussions President Zelenskyy has been holding over the past six days, it seems that the government reshuffle was primarily motivated by a desire to resolve the conflict that had arisen between the commander-in-chief of the armed forces and defense minister Fedorov.

It appears that the president initially chose to replace the minister while keeping the commander-in-chief in office. That was the arrangement he tried to implement, but it has now become clear that, for political reasons, it was not feasible. The president's intention triggered very serious protests and a concealed opposition that may not be visible publicly.

The president now realized that he also had to dismiss the commander-in-chief. Although at the very beginning, when he decided not to appoint Minister Fedorov to the new government, he did say once that both of them should actually be replaced. The president either did not realize this or, for some very serious reason, did not wish to do so.

He has now nevertheless reached the point where the commander-in-chief also had to be replaced.

I think this is a process in which the president genuinely set out to resolve the situation because he realized that it was no longer possible to keep Ukraine's difficult situation under control in its existing form if the minister and the commander-in-chief were unable to resolve their disagreements themselves. He may have made a somewhat hasty and political decision that ultimately did not withstand criticism from Ukrainian society.

Was the problem more a difference between generations or a difference in technological approach? Fedorov wanted to introduce more new technologies. What caused this disagreement?

I think the disagreements were more about details than about any broad strategic vision. To claim that Fedorov was in favor of innovation while Syrskyi was against it would be entirely inappropriate.

When General Syrskyi became commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian armed forces in the summer of 2023, he said from the very beginning that to succeed on the battlefield, Ukraine had to surpass Russia technologically. That is the only way to actually defeat the Russian army. It is not possible to create a mass army to counter the Russian army like the one Russia uses or has used up to now.

I would point out that technological innovation is also taking place in the Russian army to some extent. The use of many traditional categories of weapons has almost been abandoned or reduced to a minimum. Instead, entirely new weapon systems are being used, predominantly unmanned systems.

The Ukrainian army cannot wage war in some old-fashioned way, as Syrskyi has been accused of doing, and in my opinion General Syrskyi has not really tried to do so either. I think the issue is perhaps more about style, methods and certain minor issues that gradually accumulated.

Of course, this is not just about disagreements between General Syrskyi and the minister. There were probably also disagreements within the Ministry of Defense itself. Minister Fedorov faced opposition for various reasons. It is noticeable that the procurement processes he initiated departed more from established routine.

Fedorov certainly had many ambitious and innovative ideas that neither the armed forces nor the Ministry of Defense were always able to keep up with. Undoubtedly, this does, in a sense, reflect a generational conflict: some wanted to continue doing things the old way and were not particularly willing to reform themselves, while others came to lead the Ministry of Defense and wanted to change things very quickly. That is how conflicts like these can arise.

I do not think the issue is so much one of strategic vision as the fact that Minister Fedorov wanted to direct almost all available resources toward the use of new technologies and accelerate that process even further.

Perhaps General Syrskyi believed that it was simply not possible to achieve proper results with the army in that way.

Who knows? There may be many more details behind it. Some of these kinds of problems certainly arose even before Fedorov was appointed defense minister.

I think personal character traits or psychological factors may also have amplified all of this. It seems that both Minister Fedorov and General Syrskyi are rather stubborn people. In this case, that may have worked in favor of the conflict.

When we talk about the state of the war and the situation on the battlefield, the Ukrainians actually have very good momentum at the moment. But now that both the commander-in-chief of the armed forces and the defense minister have been replaced, what could this mean for the situation on the battlefield?

It should not have a very direct impact on the situation on the battlefield. Command processes are much more complex and are not so dependent on the day-to-day decisions of two individuals, but primarily on strategic decisions.

If this process had dragged on, it would undoubtedly have had a negative impact on the combat capability of the Ukrainian forces. People would inevitably have become involved in other activities, and commanders in particular would have been drawn into the process in one way or another.

It appears that the choice of the new commander-in-chief should appeal to and suit Ukrainians, at least emotionally. There is no reason to doubt that he is a capable general. In that respect, I would be quite calm, and I do not think the Ukrainian army will suffer any major setbacks simply because of the change in leadership.

It must be said that, in the shorter term, the commander-in-chief is certainly a more important figure than the defense minister. But if the wrong person becomes defense minister, problems stemming from that person's wrong decisions will begin to emerge after some time. That is the potential negative impact if that happens, but if the person appointed is capable of handling the job very well, there should be no problems.

What do you think? Will Zelenskyy give in to public anger and bring Fedorov back after all? I read that he has already been offered new positions, but he has refused them because he believes he could best implement his vision as head of the Ministry of Defense.

Fedorov has sent that signal. He has not said it quite so openly himself, but the former minister should understand that the president of Ukraine cannot appoint him to the position again. Doing so would turn the entire process into a farce and make the president appear completely incompetent as a leader.

I nevertheless think there must have been more substantial reasons why President Zelenskyy initially considered it more sensible to replace Minister Fedorov, who is a very important person to him, while keeping General Syrskyi in office, who is also a very important person to him. Otherwise, the president might have tried to resolve the situation differently.

I think that, from Minister Fedorov's point of view, it is very difficult to imagine that he would now obediently go off like a sheep to become a presidential adviser or take on some other symbolic role. He seems to be a much bigger and stronger personality than has been apparent so far. He is certainly still young and not as experienced in political life.

Nor does President Zelenskyy have any need to push him aside. Looking to the future, he will certainly still need Fedorov. How he will now be able to motivate Fedorov remains a big question.

It is unlikely that Fedorov will start building a separate opposition to the president or anything of that sort. Under wartime conditions, that is not an issue at the moment, but after the war it could prove to be a decision that affects not so much President Zelenskyy personally as his party's chances of succeeding in future elections.

Can you tell us anything about the new commander-in-chief, Mykhailo Drapatyi? He achieved the status of a national hero back in 2014, but after that he also suffered some setbacks. He even resigned himself after one incident.

It is very difficult to wage a perfect war. I would not want to start criticizing him here, but he seems to be a very proactive and decisive, relatively young officer.

He certainly became a general only because of the war with Russia, and his courage in making decisions and his effectiveness as a field commander, as well as a commander of larger formations, became apparent very quickly.

He seems to be very popular because in 2014 it was the actions of his 72nd Brigade that gave Ukrainians hope that, alongside the volunteer units, the Ukrainian army was also capable of carrying out more serious military operations.

One of the criticisms directed at General Syrskyi as commander-in-chief was that he became too deeply involved in the details of specific operations on different fronts. We also saw that General Syrskyi visited frontline areas very frequently and travelled to different sectors.

This illustrates the dilemma: on the one hand, if you do not do that, people start accusing you of not taking an interest in what is happening on the ground. But if you do go there, talk to people and give them guidance, you are accused of interfering.

Strategic leadership is inherently very difficult. I think that over the next six months to a year we will see whether the new commander-in-chief, General Drapatyi, also has that ability or whether it will somehow remain less visible. It is extraordinarily difficult to predict, but at least the army will probably welcome him warmly. He has all the prerequisites to accomplish something together by bringing other commanders into the effort.

What is quite interesting is that when General Syrskyi took office, he had hardly communicated with the public beforehand. General Drapatyi seems to be the same type of person – he apparently does not like speaking publicly at length and in detail about his plans and activities, but now he will be forced to start doing so, just as General Syrskyi increasingly had to speak publicly to explain the army's plans and objectives.

Perhaps the biggest challenge will be how he carries out that role as commander-in-chief and whether he can involve someone else alongside him in public communications.

Recruitment into the armed forces remains the Ukrainian military's weakest point and its biggest challenge. The formation of new units is another issue – Ukraine has struggled more with that than with technological innovation or other aspects.

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