We'll be talking about Russian emigration today, with emphasis on the opposition, supposedly representing the healthier and more democratic part of Russian society, which is also largely critical of the ongoing aggression against Ukraine. I have tried to keep an eye on what the opposition outside Russia has been saying and planning. Over time, a measure of skepticism has set in.

As we know, emigration from Russia exploded after the country launched a full-scale war against Ukraine. Things went into overdrive following the mobilization in September 2022, which saw a lot of young men leave the country.

This recent wave of emigration has been compared to the exodus of people with ties to the Whites during the October Revolution and the civil war. But looking at the figures, it is less extensive now. According to the International Red Cross, around two million people left Russia by 1920. There is talk of approximately one million people now.

It is believed that new Russian refugees can be found in around a hundred countries. Political emigration started in 2012, after opposition protests following repressions, and gained momentum when Crimea was annexed in 2014 and even more after Alexei Navalny's arrest in 2021.

The largest wave came after the all-out war started. Turkey, Georgia, Armenia, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Serbia, Montenegro, United Arab Emirates and several European countries have been the most popular destinations. Israel, Mongolia, Argentina and the U.S. also deserve mention.

There have been attempts to study the situation and attitudes of emigrants, for example, by Margarita Zavadskaja from the Finnish Foreign Policy Institute and the OutRush project of the European University Institute.

It is mentioned that Russian emigrants have not formed a diaspora. Highlighted as problems are fears in several countries that Moscow might attempt to plant agents disguised as refugees. These attitudes are apparently especially strong in states bordering Russia, such as Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The latter are seen to exhibit unfriendly attitudes toward Russian political activists, the OutRush study finds. The authors conclude that historical trauma plays a role in those countries.

The Russian emigration is uniform neither in terms of makeup nor attitudes. It is reported that there are around 40 percent of those who do not believe Russia has any democratic outlook and who have said goodbye to their homeland in their hearts. But around a quarter of those who have left Russia wish to continue speaking in the name of the Russian opposition and civil society.

Studies also show that 25 percent of emigrants already speak the local language or are in the process of learning it, while another quarter tries to learn the language from time to time. Only 5 percent of people say they don't plan to, while it's quite likely the rest do not pay language questions any mind. It probably depends on the country of residence as people fully expect to get by with Russian in Georgia, Armenia or Central Asia. The same trend can be observed in the Baltic countries.

Characteristic of this wave of migration is strong solidarity among refugees as well as their political fragmentation. As people's financial situation improves, participation in protests and the signing of petitions falls. Emigrants have opened Russian private schools, kindergartens and cafes alongside other parallel structures in their new countries.

This brings us to an interesting trend. Garry Kasparov, co-founder of the Russian Anti-War Committee, has proposed the idea of a "virtual Russian Taiwan." The point is for emigrants to join on the basis of renouncing the Russian regime. They should publicly say that the war is criminal, the regime is illegal and Crimea belongs to Ukraine.

Such statements are meant to foster trust in receiving states, which should support emigrants on relevant grounds and help them get a new ID. This would not be a stateless person's or a so-called Nansen passport, but a concrete document signifying the person belongs to Western society.

Kasparov also proposes the creation of a coalition of states to help those leaving Russia. Such a Russian Taiwan would lay the foundation for a society that would follow the collapse of Vladimir Putin's regime and form the new Russian elite.

Mikhail Khodorkovsky has largely endorsed the idea and believes that Russian emigrants could use a special jurisdiction. Developments of the latter idea have gone as far as creating a separate living area. For example, the EU could propose to a third country developing such a Russian area in case of one million or more refugees. Naturally, it would be funded by the collective West.

And this is where things start to get a little weird. There is basically talk of a Russian enclave of some sort. Where a new Russian elite could be shaped to take over the homeland once the regime changes.

Meetings of Russian emigrants seem to have largely concentrated on what to do once power is seized in Russia, whereas there seems to be less talk about how to achieve that. There is just one group that supports armed resistance against the Putin regime and whose representatives are fighting in voluntary Russian units on the Ukrainian side, while the majority of Russia's political emigration sees them as radicals.

Emigrants are also increasingly voicing criticism that Russians are not respected enough, that the Russian language and culture are snubbed etc. Julia Latynina, who moved to Italy, recently accused Ukraine of its resistance to the Russian language and culture amounting to the same thing as Russian propaganda aimed against Ukraine.

If we were to try and sum up the views of a part of the opposition in exile, the Russian language, culture and refugees must be respected, they should be received with open arms and supported both financially and politically, while the regime in Moscow needs to be toppled for them to ride to the Kremlin on a white steed and take over ruling the empire – more democratically than currently, of course, while still considering present realities. For example, that some territories won by shedding Russian blood could be kept, or that there would be no reparations because it would get in the way or developing democracy? Or what?

Further reading

• Неожиданный расцвет: российское гражданское общество в эмиграции оказалось очень сильным - Русская служба The Moscow Times
• The Ukraine war and the Russians who left home • European University Institute (eui.eu)
• "Свободная Россия" в изгнании: возможно ли создание сообщества эмигрантов? (golosameriki.com)
• The war-induced exodus from Russia: A security problem or a convenient political bogey? (fiia.fi)
• Новые российские эмигранты. Кто они, сколько их и куда уехали? - BBC News Русская служба
• How to Make the Exiled Russian Opposition a Force for Change - The Moscow Times
• Russian opposition in exile leans towards supporting armed resistance against Putin (yahoo.com)
• What Can Russia's Opposition Do in 2024? - The Moscow Times
• after-putin-the-deluge.pdf (clingendael.org)
• Форум российской оппозиции: Ни у кого нет плана по России – DW – 24.02.2024

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