Germany is a federal state, split into 16 states that each have a state parliament and elections. On September 22, the state of Brandenburg held an election to vote for a new parliament. The AfD (Alternative for Germany) garnered 29.2 percent of the votes and barely lost the election to the well-established yet weakening SPD (Social Democratic Party), which ended up with 30.9 percent. Furthermore noteworthy, a party only founded in January, BSW (Coalition Sahra Wagenknecht), came in third place with 13.5 percent. We will get to them in a moment.

This election outcome confirmed the sobering development in German politics – a normalization of the far-right AfD and its firm arrival in the middle of society. This observation is based on the previous two state elections in Thuringia and Saxony on September 2, where the AfD received 32.8 percent and 30.6 percent of the votes, respectively – in Thuringia, it even became the strongest party. We can also see that BSW came in third in these states.

Many regional groups of the AfD, especially in former East German states, have been under investigation by the Federal Office of the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) for being anti-constitutional, and two groups in Saxony-Anhalt and Thuringia have been explicitly categorized as far-right extremist groups. The agency concluded the AfD seeks to create a "homogenous ethnocultural national population", "do away with parliamentary democracy in its current form", and "take away the rights of entire social groups and subject them to despotism".

Even though other regional groups have yet to be marked as such, similar ideologies and worldviews are likely present across the ranks. For example, after the Brandenburg election, party leader Hans-Christoph Berndt, who is also listed as a right-wing extremist by the BfV, declared, "The National Front of Germany is erected", referring to the three latest state election results and their power in the opposition. At the election night party, party members were seen celebrating with the slogan "We will deport millions", suggesting that all Germans with a migrant background are at risk for deportation.

This harsh rhetoric is also shared by Thuringia's regional leader and also the national face of the AfD, Björn Höcke, who had to appear numerous times in front of a court for using Nazi slogans in public appearances. He was stripped of the immunity state parliamentarians usually enjoy in the process.

I want to stress explicitly that this shift to the right is not only a phenomenon that is present in former East Germany, as the AfD also received 2nd and 3rd finishes in the last state elections in Hesse and Bavaria and is, according to recent polls, the 2nd most popular party among young voters. That said, it made particularly good use of the weaker institutional structures and lack of democratic education to quickly establish itself as the leading vote-getter in former East Germany.

This also explains some of the success of the BSW in these elections. The party, named after her initiator Sahra Wagenknecht, a former leader of The Left (party), stands in for leftist domestic positions not too dissimilar from the Left and Green party; however, her foreign policy interventions are much more problematic and match these of the AfD – "Russia's best friends in Germany."

Sahra Wagenknecht and, therefore, her party do not only stand out with an anti-US and anti-NATO position but with pro-Putin/Russia statements. Wagenknecht has been calling since February 2022 for the stop of weapon deliveries to Ukraine and the focus on peace talks. She completely negates that Russia is the power unwilling to negotiate and suggests that Ukraine should concede territories to buy peace.

The BSW and the AfD are very similar; they take complex matters and deliver simple solutions. This is a classical take from the populist playbook. Their downplaying of Russia's role in the War in Ukraine also shows their admiration for authoritarian leaders and gives an insight into their desires. Historian Ilko-Sascha Kowalczuk warns against this:

"What the AfD and BSW want to copy from Putin are, so to speak, these ideas of how to keep society in check and under control — which is a tradition in Russia — and his way of implementing this through his authoritarian state model". This, in turn, speaks to the people in the new German states which, according to Kowalczuk are longing for "Authoritarian systems" they "provide a very clear framework for how you have to act" and take away the perceived insecurity that stems from an "open society".

Positively, all other parties have made it clear that they will not enter into a coalition with the AfD, calling them anti-democratic and anti-constitutional. However, this creates very weak prospects for stable governments in these states where the opposition holds that much voting power. It also further cements the disappointment of the current center-left federal government that has yet to live up to its promises and potential.

It is also clear now that it is particularly the nationalistic, racist and violent discourse that leads the people to the ballot box. It is also no longer a societal taboo to voice these thoughts and ideas, and people feel assured in their position. Therefore, the times of calling the party a "protest party" in which voters showed their displeasure about ruling governments are long over.

This societal acceptance of nationalist and racist positions can be located in the increase in the number of extremist violent attacks or in the fact that many mainstream parties have taken over some of the rigorous migration policies usually only pushed for by the AfD. Mainstream parties have taken on positions of the far-right, especially on migration, to get voters back, but this only legitimizes the positions of the AfD. The strategy seems clear but is also proven not to work, as pointed out by political scientist Werner Krause:

"The more present the topic of migration is in the media, the better it is for the AfD. They can now put it over any other societal topic, such as lack of housing, dwindling education, or fewer chances on the job market."

This does not mean that mainstream parties should not talk about migration and engage with the problem, but they cannot follow suit with the AfD and call it the solution to many fundamental societal issues, which it is often not.

The current federal government reacted to this public tension by introducing temporary stricter border controls to manage irregular migration. The decision came in the aftermath of a knife attack by a Syrian national that killed three people in Solingen and before the state election in Brandenburg. Instead of dealing with the symptoms of the attack, such as lack of integration and insufficient law enforcement, the federal government acts like it is a matter of migration policies.

This supports Professor Krause's thesis as it is a great example of how far-right ideology already impacts policy-making. Therefore, when the Estonian Minister of Interior Lauri Läänemets (SDE) states that the closing of the German borders is justified, he supports a result of the festering of extreme right-wing ideas in German mainstream politics.

The success of both parties, but especially of the AfD, is a clear security risk for Germany, Estonia, and Europe. As the party gains popularity, its anti-democratic and anti-constitutional ideology penetrates mainstream politics and weakens the German democracy and state. It further destabilizes and polarises the population, which splits into ideological and regional groups that despise each other. Furthermore, the safety of many minorities, racial, sexual, and religious, is acutely at risk.

AfD and BSW are also no friends of the European project and have made it clear that "Brussels" influence needs to be weakened. They lament the technocratic oversight but do not highlight any positive sides. The influence is already felt in the temporary tightening of Europe's internal borders, which threatens the open society and way of life we Europeans cherish. This could be taken much further when these parties are actually in power, and they might follow through with their calls for the EU's dissolution or Germany's exit from the Union. None of this can be in the interest of Estonia.

However, even worse and more tangible are the policies directed at Russia and its War in Ukraine. A federal coalition with either party would mean the stopping of any support for Ukraine – which the German government already struggles mightily with – and would invite Putin's presence into European discourses. Estonians and many other Central and Eastern European actors have finally managed to be heard as true experts on the matters of security of Europe – this development would be swiftly turned around by a German state that starts to tune in again to Russian propaganda.

The growing political right-ward shift across Europe should be a worry to all of us. It is also important to realize how intertwined our political actions, our security and our freedom are and that we need to support and work on it across state borders.

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