Meelis Oidsalu: Trump administration's 'scarecrows' meant to sow fear
Sooner or later, the peace process initiated by Donald Trump regarding Russia and Ukraine will encounter matters of ego that must be resolved in order to reach an agreement. Without addressing these, an agreement will not happen, if only because the United States may appear weak – a concern that would likely resonate with Trump, writes Meelis Oidsalu.
Donald Trump's fresh sweeping mandate – gained when Republicans secured not only the presidency but also majorities in both the House and Senate – will grant him considerably more power during his upcoming term compared to his first presidency.
Prior to Trump, presidents such as Barack Obama, George W. Bush and Bill Clinton have enjoyed a similar privilege of a full majority. This allowed them to push through significant initiatives that might not have succeeded without dominant control in both chambers of Congress.
Trump's personnel choices, in this context, have an even greater capacity to either reassure or unsettle the public.
For instance, the nomination of Marco Rubio as secretary of state candidate may have been perceived as a calming choice. In contrast, Trump's decision to name Tulsi Gabbard, who has long echoed Kremlin talking points, as the candidate for director of national intelligence – a position overseeing the CIA and 17 other U.S. intelligence agencies– and the nomination of Fox News host Pete Hegseth, who lacks relevant expertise, as secretary of defense, raised eyebrows. Gabbard has continued, even after her nomination, to advocate on social media for swift peace in Ukraine at the cost of ceding territories and declaring neutrality.
It is not beyond reason to think Trump's personnel decisions are guided not only by loyalty but also by their capacity to provoke. Outsider figures and "disruptors" play a role in the communication strategy of any political maverick. Trump needs figures who can stir the media pot, draw attention and keep the bureaucratic establishment on edge in order to maintain control of the narrative and stay in command of the information space.
A recent statement from an Estonian diplomat highlighted a widely held, but naive, hope in the United States that the situation in Ukraine could be resolved by conceding a portion of Ukrainian territory to Vladimir Putin, excluding Ukraine from NATO and declaring peace.
"But why would Russia settle for that?" the diplomat countered. Ukraine was a neutral state in 2022, far from NATO membership. Putin has not sacrificed nearly a million of his own citizens as casualties merely for places like Pokrovsk and other obscure towns. "He wants more, and both he and [Foreign Minister Sergey] Lavrov have said so openly," remarked the diplomat.
For Putin, the stakes are worthwhile if he can not only gain territory but also significantly improve his international standing. His strategy involves weakening or dismantling NATO and humiliating the United States, NATO's largest power.
Given the broader U.S. political and economic interests in ensuring a stable and prosperous Europe, as well as commitments such as the Budapest Memorandum and the extensive support already provided to Ukraine during the war, a ceasefire on Putin's terms would be interpreted globally as a defeat for Western allies. "It would be like the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, but on steroids," the diplomat referenced, alluding to the chaotic end of the Afghanistan mission in the summer of 2021.
Sooner or later, the Russia-Ukraine peace process spearheaded by Trump is bound to encounter ego-driven hurdles that must be resolved; failing to do so could make the United States appear weak – an issue likely to resonate deeply with Donald Trump.
Interactions between Putin and Trump have already seen some bumps on the Ukraine issue. Donald Trump promised to appoint a special envoy to address the Ukraine situation, while the Kremlin indicated that Putin himself is handling the war, implying that no such envoy would be appointed. The egos of both leaders may increasingly influence their relationship and, consequently, Ukraine's future.
Reactions among Estonia's security elite to the exceptional assertiveness of the next U.S. president have been mixed. Some, like Marko Mihkelson, chairman of the Riigikogu Foreign Affairs Committee, have issued alarmist warnings, growing more outspoken over the past year. Meanwhile, another influential defense diplomat has expressed deep concerns less publicly. Estonia's mainstream diplomacy has maintained a pragmatic stance, as diplomats often do. Leading analysts, such as Indrek Kannik, note that Joe Biden did not deliver decisive aid to Ukraine and thus, by extension, to Europe – hence, they believe it is worth trying Trump.
Defeated Democrats would likely prefer that NATO allies sound the alarm about how Trump is destroying NATO. However, such warnings have largely not materialized, partly because Trump's previous administration, despite its dismissive rhetoric, worked behind the scenes to revitalize NATO.
The United States took the lead on what was called the NATO Readiness Initiative, urging allies to develop additional military capabilities and units necessary for collective defense scenarios. At some point, it became evident to Americans that even their political and military strength was insufficient to overcome the inertia that had previously paralyzed NATO's military readiness before 2022.
The Americans' NATO Readiness Initiative largely became another political declaration with little meaningful change due to the inertia of allies. Then came the COVID-19 pandemic, the migration crisis and the full-scale war in Ukraine. "In my view, everything before the current NATO Baltic defense plan was all about grand announcements and promises, but not about spending and actual implementation," commented a retired Estonian military officer about that period.
A specific example demonstrates that Trump's threats and actions do not always align perfectly with reality; the underlying dynamics of this NATO initiative tell a different story. It would be easy to blame the inertia on NATO's 6,000 salaried civilian employees, but the real issue lay primarily with member states – including Estonia – that did not take the Trump-led U.S. initiative seriously at the time.
Since the approval of the NATO Baltic defense plan at the Vilnius Summit in 2023, the situation has improved considerably. Still, one-third of NATO member states have not met the agreed-upon minimum spending target of 2 percent of GDP this year. Presently, North Korea alone is capable of supplying more artillery shells to Russia than the entire European Union [is to Ukraine].
To be frank, Estonia itself needed a rhetorical push from outgoing top officials – the departing [Ministry of Defense] permanent secretary and the commander of the defense forces – to secure additional ammunition purchases. Europe has long lived in a "post-truth" era, where its security rhetoric often fails to match its actions. Many have shifted the responsibility for defense to NATO in name only, forgetting that NATO has no standing forces of its own – it depends entirely on the contributions of member states, including Estonia.
Without a sufficient increase in defense spending, the rhetoric surrounding revitalizing Europe's defense industry has remained hollow. Industrial growth is driven by orders, which have not substantially increased. The prevailing public perception is that without the United States, effective aid to Ukraine would be impossible. Yet, considering the European Union's GDP, a Ukrainian victory is resource-wise achievable solely with European support.
Leaders of Ukraine, Estonia and a few other countries have begun deliberately adopting a mirroring approach to engage with the Trump administration, using Trump's own slogans and attempting to appeal to his ego by comparing him to Winston Churchill.
Mirroring a conversation partner is a known social strategy used to create a favorable impression. For instance, if a conversation partner leans forward, you may subtly do the same. The same applies to speech patterns: to persuade a partner, you might adapt your tone, pace and word choice to match theirs.
Alongside reflecting or critiquing the policies of a potential Trump administration, Europe must also prioritize initiating real changes within itself.
There has been ample discussion about funding and arms, but how decisively has the European Union confronted the "Putinization" tendencies among its own member states' leaders? Olaf Scholz, who reportedly finds Trump's anticipated Ukraine policy more agreeable than Joe Biden's, once asked Viktor Orbán to leave the room during a European Council vote so that consensus could be reached. There has also been some economic pressure within the Union that has slightly restrained Orbánist Hungary. Nevertheless, efforts to halt the internal Putinization of Europe have clearly been insufficient.
Beyond increasing defense spending, Europe must confront its own value conflicts with more serious intent and creativity. Without this, we risk projecting onto Trump's administration our own shortcomings on fundamental security issues, casting our internal challenges onto external "scarecrows."
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Editor: Marcus Turovski