How would you characterize the current period for Estonia and Europe from a security perspective?

These are turbulent times, and from a security perspective, the primary focus remains on the war in Ukraine. The course and possible outcome of this war will largely determine what the European security architecture will look like in the future.

Looking at the broader perspective, the turbulence in Europe, particularly since January 20 with Donald Trump's inauguration, has, in many ways, also empowered Europe. Recent statements from European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, including the willingness to revise budgetary rules and take on a joint loan of up to €800 billion to enhance Europe's defense capabilities, are a clear sign that European countries are taking serious steps to strengthen their security. These are positive developments that will help us all feel safer in the future.

At the same time, weakened allied relations have empowered Vladimir Putin.

I would separate this into two different axes. One is what is happening in Ukraine and around the war there — that is a separate issue. The other axis concerns what is happening among the allies.

From NATO's perspective, the United States has made it clear that the alliance is important to them — critically important, in fact, to use the words of U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth. This means that relations between allies are moving in the right direction. Overall, NATO defense spending is increasing, and at the Hague summit, we can likely expect an agreement on a new defense spending threshold or so-called minimum level.

Another important aspect is that the more capable Europe becomes in ensuring its own security, the more we will be able to provide security guarantees to Ukraine and support it.

The current situation is causing a lot of confusion among ordinary people. Several respected security experts have expressed concern that the U.S. might abandon Ukraine. What is the actual situation, and what would you say to people whose anxiety has significantly increased in recent times? How can this be alleviated?

There is certainly a lot to do, but I want to reassure people that we are making significant efforts to strengthen Estonia's national defense. Our allies are investing even more — as I mentioned earlier, the European Commission has launched several initiatives and other countries have also taken important steps. For example, Denmark recently announced a €7 billion increase in defense spending, the Netherlands has boosted its defense budget and the United Kingdom has assigned a dedicated brigade to us, which means we will receive new equipment and ammunition.

These actions to strengthen Estonia's defense capabilities, together with our allies, should provide people with a sense of security. It is true that transatlantic relations have become more complex, especially after Trump introduced a new dimension where diplomacy has taken a backseat and direct bilateral negotiations based on economic interests have come to the forefront. These dynamics will have an increasing impact on us. It is important to be clear and, when necessary, to state things as they are.

Is it clear to the government and the Ministry of Defense what the Trump administration's stance is on NATO membership and European defense issues?

NATO is important to the United States, and they have repeatedly reaffirmed this at every meeting. There is no doubt about that. However, if we consider the words of Defense Secretary Hegseth, he acknowledged that the United States is focusing more on Asia, particularly on China. As a result, we must be — and in fact, already are — prepared to say that Europe needs to take on a greater role in its own defense.

We are doing this; each country is contributing its share, and collectively, we are all doing more. That's why I would say that relations remain strong and should continue to be developed. However, we can also see that Trump's focus is primarily on domestic politics. His messages are largely directed at his voter base, and if we look at his most recent speech, it placed a strong emphasis on domestic policy rather than foreign diplomacy or international security.

After the infamous and controversial meeting between Zelenskyy and Trump in the Oval Office, there has been a strong impression that transatlantic relations have suffered serious damage. Have these relations improved by now, or do we still see indications that they are coming to an end? Has the domestic political element, as seen in the Oval Office meeting, continued to strongly influence these relations?

This evening's speech confirmed the opposite — Trump referred to Zelenskyy and said it is good that Zelenskyy is willing to talk. This creates an opportunity for Ukraine and the United States to once again sit at the table and discuss matters in a normal way, which is exactly how it should be. If there are concerns, the right thing to do is to sit down and talk, whether bilaterally or multilaterally.

Emmanuel Macron visited the White House, as did Keir Starmer. Relations between Europe and the United States have been clearly discussed. These discussions will certainly continue — the next meeting is set between London and Paris. As I said, there's no need to view this situation too pessimistically. Of course, there are challenges, but they are understandable. We see that the Trump administration prefers to speak directly.

It is important to state things plainly, without embellishment or diplomatic pleasantries — just say things as they are. Likewise, expectations on both sides need to be made clear. For example, if we look at defense spending in the Baltic states and Poland, it is currently higher than that of the United States. This gives us the opportunity to say directly that we are fulfilling our commitments and doing our part.

News is coming in every minute, every hour. Yesterday morning, we heard that the U.S. was ending or pausing military aid to Ukraine, but this morning, we're already hearing that Vice President Vance is discussing the conditions under which military aid could continue. There are also reports that Starmer, Macron and Zelenskyy might soon fly to Washington again to reach an agreement. What can we take away from all these messages?

I don't want to put myself in the spotlight, but I recommend reading the comment I recently wrote about Trump and the White House meeting. The key message there is that we need to look at the broader global interests of the United States. One aspect is securing the economy, the second is security and the third major objective is Trump's promise to end the war in Ukraine.

And, of course, there's everything related to China and global relations. In this context, it makes sense that the Trump administration is pursuing a specific course of action. At the same time, as I mentioned in that article, nothing is actually certain — which is exactly why we see new messages every morning in the international media, which we then analyze and discuss, just as we are doing now.

That's why it's essential to take a longer-term, more strategic perspective to understand the relationships between Europe and the United States, as well as between Estonia and the United States. Everyone understands that the war in Ukraine will have to end one day, and for that to happen, Ukraine must be given a strong enough position to negotiate with Russia.

So far, the U.S.-Ukraine natural resources agreement has been delayed because Ukraine believes that the U.S. has not provided sufficient security guarantees. In your opinion, could this agreement itself and the creation of U.S. interests in Ukraine serve as a security guarantee?

A security guarantee for Ukraine must mean that Ukraine's independence remains intact and that it can make its own decisions freely. It must also ensure that any peace agreement reached in Ukraine is lasting and just. These are the fundamental pillars that cannot be compromised.

Europe's position has been very clear: if we take on greater responsibility for Ukraine's security guarantees, then the United States must absolutely be involved, because it is impossible to reach a comprehensive agreement without them. However, this does not necessarily have to be a NATO guarantee.

I mean immediate NATO membership for Ukraine, which the United States has ruled out. But I believe it could take the form of a coalition of allies acting in good faith. At the same time, I am certain that we cannot allow Ukraine to be deprived of the opportunity to join NATO in the future. That possibility must remain open to Ukraine. We have always supported this and have consistently stated that we will never recognize borders changed by force.

The Americans are likely also actively talking to the Russians. When you consider how a peace agreement could move forward, how likely do you think it is that at some point the U.S. might lift sanctions — such as those on high-level military technology — that help Russia develop advanced weaponry?

I don't want to speculate on the potential consequences of one decision or another. However, I am convinced that the United States does not approach decisions related to Russia simply as a single move on the chessboard. In reality, the U.S. considers a much broader range of issues in its dealings with Russia.

I believe that Ukraine is not the only topic being discussed. From the very first meetings, it has become clear that U.S.-Russia bilateral talks are not solely focused on Ukraine but include a wide array of other subjects as well.

That is why the question of peace in Ukraine is one where Europe, the United States and Ukraine must stand together. Ultimately, a common peace agreement must be reached — one where Europe plays a role in ensuring stability in Ukraine, while the U.S., considering its global interests, approaches negotiations with Russia from a much broader strategic perspective.

In your opinion, does the U.S. administration know exactly what it is doing right now? For example, security expert Rainer Saks has said that they clearly do not have a plan. What do you think about this?

Looking at the messages coming from the White House, it is clear that their overarching plan is quite straightforward: the war must end. Secondly, the U.S. intends to secure economic benefits from the situation — whether through a natural resources agreement or other matters related to European allies. On Tuesday night, there was even mention of Greenland, and tariffs have also been repeatedly discussed. The White House's message has been fairly clear, but its interpretation — whether in the Pentagon or the State Department — has sometimes been confusing, leaving gaps where more clarity is needed before executive decisions are made.

However, these issues will certainly be ironed out, and the positions taken into negotiations — whether at the European or NATO table or in discussions with Ukraine or Russia — will ultimately be very clear.

Now, let's move on to a topic that directly concerns Estonia and European security. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen recently announced that €800 billion will be allocated to the defense sector. What exactly does this mean, what does it include and how will it help strengthen Estonia's defense capabilities?

Yes, this allocation is roughly divided into two parts. The first part involves easing budgetary rules, meaning that defense spending would no longer be subject to the Maastricht excessive deficit criteria. The second part is that the European Commission could establish central financial instruments for defense, such as a defense loan fund, which could amount to approximately €150 billion, while individual countries would contribute an additional €650 billion. In total, this would provide €800 billion over four to five years for defense expenditures, allowing countries to invest without being constrained by budget deficit limits.

For Estonia, this means that we can make the necessary investments to strengthen our defense capabilities much more quickly. It also provides reassurance that we will have greater flexibility in budget planning, as budgetary rules have often been a limiting factor when it comes to increasing defense spending. Now, those restrictions are being lifted.

Can you give some examples of the types of investments that could be made more quickly and what entirely new purchases could be made with this funding?

We have a clear plan consisting of three parts.

First, there are investments and developments aligned with NATO's capability targets. These projects are directly related to strengthening our defense forces, but at this stage, we cannot provide specific details, as they will be finalized by all allies at the NATO defense ministers' meeting in June.

The second part concerns the development of our national defense forces, which is not directly tied to NATO capability targets but is essential for our own security. For example, this includes the rapid construction of new naval vessels and other critical defense developments.

The third part involves investments in cooperation projects with our allies, ensuring their continued presence in Estonia.

So, our plans are structured around three pillars: NATO capability-related developments, national defense force improvements and allied cooperation.

These are the three key areas I will present to the government in the coming weeks, with precise calculations that will eventually bring our defense spending close to 5 percent of GDP.

For example, Riigikogu member Leo Kunnas has stated that under the current plan, the number of [self-propelled] howitzers is too low — 48 is not enough; 72 would be needed. Is there a plan to purchase additional howitzers?

I am prepared to comment on these issues in more detail once NATO's capability targets have been fully agreed upon and we have clarity on how much can be discussed publicly. However, in terms of general direction, deep-fire and long-range fire capabilities are areas we recognize as priorities in our development plans. It is also no surprise that we need to procure more ammunition. While Estonia is in a relatively good position compared to other European countries in terms of stockpiles, we still need to build up additional reserves.

Indeed, we need more of the ammunition we currently have in Estonia. This is why we also have real estate investments, such as constructing additional ammunition depots. When considering the procurement of additional howitzers or the development of new military capabilities, we must also account for other essential systems like intelligence and air defense. For instance, acquiring medium-range air defense systems requires an investment of hundreds of millions of euros.

If we were to discuss developing ballistic missile defense capabilities, the costs would run into the billions.

The medium-range capability that Estonia is acquiring will cover only a relatively small part of the country.

When discussing medium-range air defense, we need to consider its primary objectives. The main purpose is initial air defense, ensuring that the defense forces can rapidly mobilize in a crisis situation and that units can reach their designated positions. Additionally, it is crucial that the development of medium-range air defense continues and further systems must be procured.

In connection with this, we reached an agreement with our allies in Vilnius on a rotational air defense model. The goal is that when allies deploy fighter jets for air policing, they must also bring ground-based air defense systems with them. These efforts are actively being pursued.

Indeed, these are very expensive developments, costing hundreds of millions of euros, and as I mentioned earlier, ballistic missile defense investments could reach into the billions. To put this into perspective, our current defense budget is approximately €1.34 billion, expected to rise to around €1.4 billion, and in the coming years, it could increase to €1.6-1.8 billion. However, a Patriot air defense system alone costs about €2 billion. That would mean a sharp increase in defense spending, pushing it to an entirely new level — beyond even 5 percent of GDP.

But then there is also the question of protecting the civilian population with air defense.

Yes, of course, but as I mentioned, we already have established plans for air defense. We are developing a layered air defense system, and in addition to that, our allies are supporting its enhancement, including the capability of air defense from fighter jets.

The system we have planned together with our allies is designed to ensure, first and foremost, that our military units can effectively operate in a conflict scenario. Secondly, it must guarantee that critical locations across Estonia are adequately protected.

Will the European Commission's €800 billion decision motivate other EU member states to invest more in defense? How can we ensure that the relaxation of budget rules is not misused to fund other domestic sectors instead of defense, leaving defense sidelined and underfunded?

No, I don't believe that will happen. The goal is still to direct more funding toward defense. Another key objective is to significantly increase the production capacity of the defense industry, which we haven't talked much about yet. That's why we are establishing an explosives plant and a munitions factory in Estonia. We are also exploring opportunities for manufacturing large-caliber heavy equipment or other defense systems, as there is clear interest in Estonia as a production hub.

Now, our task is to assess and discuss within the government whether we can make rapid decisions to accelerate the development of the defense industry in Estonia even further. This decision also sends a strong message to other countries, particularly Italy, Spain and France. For them, the ability to exclude defense spending from budget deficit rules is crucial, as it gives them greater financial flexibility. Italy's defense minister, for example, has repeatedly stated that strict budgetary regulations have been a major obstacle to increasing their defense spending.

In the context of NATO defense, the Baltic states are treated as a unified operational area. Have you been in contact with your colleagues? Are these countries acting as quickly and investing as much as Estonia? Or have some areas been handled even more effectively? We know that Latvia has so far been the weakest link among the Baltic states, as they lack a larger reserve army and conscription.

Latvia has made many important and correct decisions in recent years. First, they have decided to reinstate conscription. Second, they have increased their defense spending to approximately 3.5 percent of GDP this year and are moving decisively toward surpassing the 4 percent threshold. Lithuania is doing the same, and in reality, the entire Baltic region has set a goal of reaching 5 percent.

If we also consider Poland, where defense spending has already exceeded 4 percent and is moving toward 5 percent or even higher, the Baltic states and Poland are setting a clear example for the entire NATO alliance. In this regard, I must commend our southern neighbors — they have made very good and necessary decisions in recent years.

Should Estonia also prepare for the worst-case scenario regarding U.S. support? If it were to happen that U.S. support diminishes — for example, if Estonia is no longer sold American weapons or if restrictions are placed on the use of systems like HIMARS — would it be wise to diversify our arsenal by purchasing more weapons from different countries?

We are discussing this very intensively with the commander of the Defense Forces. When considering potential new long-range fire systems, including HIMARS — which has received the most media attention — there are actually alternative options on the table. We have precise knowledge of the costs of these various alternatives. Of course, every system has its advantages and disadvantages. Acquiring a new system means establishing a supply chain for spare parts, ensuring maintenance capabilities and conducting training for personnel.

If we choose HIMARS, we need to be certain that the system can be fully operational and that the necessary ammunition will be available. For every system, we have already evaluated the pros and cons. When I have presented capability development plans to the government, final decisions will be made regarding which additional systems to procure.

What does the threat landscape look like for Estonia in the coming months and possibly the next few years?

It is difficult to give a definitive assessment of the situation in the coming years, but we continuously monitor and evaluate the threat landscape in the coming weeks and months. At present, I can confirm that there is no immediate military threat to Estonia.

According to assessments from the [EDF] Intelligence Center and the Foreign Intelligence Service (EFIS), we can be confident that the security situation for Estonia has not changed in recent months. Russia has not taken any significantly more active steps near our borders. Their military training is being conducted at their bases, and their forces are being directed to the front lines in Ukraine. The situation remains stable, but we remain vigilant.

On Monday, it was revealed that the prime minister, interior minister and defense minister are on vacation at the same time. What risks does this pose?

I can assure you that a government member is a government member 24/7. Even if I or another minister, including the prime minister, is on vacation, we always have our phones with us — 24 hours a day, seven days a week.

Even when I was on vacation, I was still working every day, at least in a substantive sense. Looking at my work schedule over the past two months, the reality is that I've worked hundreds of hours per week and have had virtually no free weekends. So yes, ministers are human too, but all government members keep their phones on, and I remained in constant communication as well.

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