Ilmar Raag: The darker side of migration
Even when we recognize all the dangers of migration, the need for openness in the interests of economic development remains. The right policy sees the pros of controlled migration outweigh the risks. Therefore, we need to look for compromise, Ilmar Raag writes.
Migration makes for a difficult topic for Estonia because we want openness and closeness at the same time. We feel that we're jeopardizing the identity of our nation state by going down one path, while the other runs the risk of peripheralization and successful business giving us a wide berth, whereas this includes domestic talent that requires global openness for successful self-actualization.
Global developments are forcing us to take a frank look at this series of problems as simple solutions no longer work. The undersigned is a classical liberal who understands the importande of openness, but since the topic has been abused in the past, allow me to start from the opposite end. Do not be alarmed.
First, we'll talk about two potential sources of migration, then their potential effect and finally what should be done about it.
Irregular migration set to grow
The global population has exploded in the last 200 years. This has been simultaneous with the development of human rights and general prosperity. The large number of people has changed the effect of migration considerably, especially in the conditions of deepening global inequality. People move from where things are bad to where they're better. Logical.
The greatest effect in migration manifests in Africa's demographic explosion. The continent's population has grown many times over the last 20 years. If recent trends persist, Africa will have 2-2.5 billion inhabitants by 2050. At the same time, it is seeing rapid urbanization as a result of encroaching deserts and political instability.
A study by the Pew Research Center from 2017 found that nearly 40 percent of sub-Saharan Africa would like to emigrate. In 2018, 74 percent of migrants gave economic situation as their prime motivation for moving. Only 7.2 percent of migrants identified as refugees.
Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, just 10 percent of migrants want to come to Europe. The others mostly wish to move to neighboring countries that have work and better living conditions.
We can draw two conclusions from this. The first is that we should cool our Eurocentrism. The world does not revolve around Europe for most Africans. But, secondly, the scope of Africa's problems means that even that small share of European aspirants amounts to 60-100 million people over the coming decades. This is way more than the current trend where around one million people try to reach Europe irregularly over a decade's time.
Let it be said right away that they will not find it easy to enter Europe if recent policies are to continue, while the potential desire [to come to Europe] of this mass of people alone obligates us to phrase a clearer position.
The dynamics of the migration crisis/crises caused by Russia
The other potential source of problematic migration is instability in Russia and the near vicinity. In this case, we also need to take a frank look at the motivation of different types of migrants. Labor migrants are often willing to maximally adjust to local requirements because it can help land a better job.
War refugees, on the other hand, have no choice but to migrate and lack a comparable level of motivation for integrating. Paradoxically enough, this makes labor migrants more useful in terms of their contribution to their new society, while we also cannot ignore the imperative of compassion when helping war refugees.
A study carried out a few years before the [Ukraine-Russia] war found that around four million Ukrainians would come to the EU looking for a job the first chance they got. But Russia's full-scale war turned everyone who left Ukraine into war refugees, irrespective of their true motives.
At its peak, around eight million people had left Ukraine, while around half have by now returned as they no longer believe they are in danger there. This may change again.
Looking at the behavior of Ukrainians who have moved westward, we see two patterns. We see de facto economic migrants who are interested in finding a job and integrating into society. The war has helped them in a way. At the same time, there are traumatized people in Europe thinking about going back but who do not yet dare to.
This is where the limits of people's ability to adjust enter play. If we look at the stories of Balkans refugees from the 1990s, we can expect there will be those among Ukrainian refugees who will not be able to make it in the West but also won't want to return since they no longer have a home in Ukraine. Social frustration is fertile ground for antisocial behavior.
I say this as a friend of Ukraine as this would happen to any people that found itself in the same situation. Also, let us not lose sight of the fact that, as in every society, Ukrainian refugees include 2-3 percent of those who will seize opportunities offered by the criminal path. Let us recall if only Estonian criminals who tried their luck in the West in the 1990s, or the Russian mob's expansion attempt here around the same time.
And yet, recent migrant figures from Ukraine are but a taste of what might happen should the crisis spill over its current borders. Let us try and imagine a civil war in Russia, similar to how it was at the end of World War One. Urban warfare in St. Petersburg would quite understandably motivate people to move where there is no war – that is to say westward.
Looking at similar crises, this would send at least 10-20 million people knocking on Europe's door. Estonia would have nowhere near enough work or social benefits for so many people. It would be a situation far removed from the around one million Syrian refugees that reached Europe because of that country's civil war in 2015, and they also included people with different motivations.
Where there is a system, there are those looking to take advantage
The Syrian civil war pointed to another phenomenon created alongside migration – the misuse of compassion policy. It is a simple system of supply and demand where the supply of aid money will soon bring about those in need.
The vast majority of people who fled Syria found a safer place in one of its neighboring countries, such as Turkey or Lebanon. Those who came to Europe were, in additional to physical safety, looking for economic security. Not very surprisingly, the latter preferred states that could offer the best level of economic security: Germany, Sweden etc.
The misuse of the system began when economic security took precedence over physical safety. There have been cases of system misuse among Ukrainian refugees, which is regrettable mainly because it hurts those refugees who really need help.
Racism as a side-effect of migration
Migration is not the only catalyst of racism or ethnic hatred, while xenophobia goes up with every major migratory wave. An academic and objective look tells us that it is less a problem of ideology and more a biological self-defense reflex, which affects the attitudes of both the locals and the newcomers.
Both see a kind of mirrored dehumanization of the other side. The indigenous residents feel the migrants are taking their jobs and money, while second and third-generation migrants especially feel their community has been unfairly cut off from the indigenous population's prosperity.
The resulting angst can find release in whichever ideology. It has been found in France that while migrants used to vote for the communists in the 70s and 80s, since the fall of the Soviet Union, political Islam has gained ground in the same demographic group that contrasts with the political elite. And I'm sure a new suitable ideology will be found should Islam also fall out of favor.
We can clearly see Russians' contempt for Estonians and vice versa in the periphery of the political spectrum here. Both constitute a powder keg the fuses of which have not yet been lit.
Ethically, it is probably right to condemn xenophobia among the dominating social group, which is causing the weaker group to suffer, while realistically, such hostile attitudes only empower one another.
Let us take the U.S. example. Racism among white people undeniably exists. But the black population's reaction can also be split into Martin Luther King's message of peace and the equally influential black nationalism of Malcolm X. The latter does not preach a harmonious coexistence of white and black people but rather warns the latter from being assimilated into the former's world. The treatment of white people in this narrative is clearly racist.
The Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement pointed at the paradoxical phenomenon where despite at least 60 years of official condemnation of racism, we can still see relevant escalation.
The dynamics of support for BLM were even more significant. While most white people supported the messages of BLM at first, this support fell as violent protests rose. The reason lay in the aggressive messages of the more radical wing of BLM which made no attempt to involve the white population but tried instead to contrast to white society. Today, we can say that BLM did just as much to perpetuate racism as it did to combat it. Opposition sparks opposition and violence provokes more violence.
That is why large-scale and uncontrolled migration is guaranteed to boost xenophobia in both communities. Migrants find themselves going from the frying pan into the fire if migration cannot be kept under control. While we can condemn it morally, no one has succeeded in avoiding it. Our starting position should be practical and prioritize stability. Without stability, there is no hope of xenophobia growing less.
Our conditions for migration
Even when we recognize all the dangers of migration, the need for openness in the interests of economic development remains. The right policy sees the pros of controlled migration outweigh the risks. Therefore, we need to look for compromise.
The first political rule of migration-related topics is that we only accept those who we invite on conditions we set. Our first task is to make our citizens feel safe.
The keyword is moderation, which we measure in our ability to manage risks. We cannot accept people whose potential for self-realization we cannot ensure on par with the indigenous population. For example, we cannot ensure equal conditions for participating in social life in a situation where the universal Estonian language system isn't working yet but life in Estonia requires one to speak Estonian.
Language training is just one example of a series of measures every one of which takes time and resources. People who are not reflected in the state budget become a problem sooner or later. Cynical but true. If we look at migration-related unrest, the problem is not just that there are racists in Europe (which there are), but also subcultures of frustrated migrants, which contrast to democracy, secularity and the rule of law. In other words, we must avoid continued ghettoization.
We can already see European countries rethinking recent migration rules. The reasons differ. Let us recall how Iraqi refugees were taken advantage of by Belarus in 2021 and Russia used unfortunate refugees to put pressure on Finland.
The wider goal of these hybrid warfare operations was to overload European countries' administrative capacity. But we know that crisis management is based on the simple principle that you first don your own oxygen mask before helping others. To translate this into the language of compassion policies: we cannot help anyone if we cannot ensure our own security.
The idea of processing the applications of irregular migrants outside of Europe has been proposed here and there as a highly logical move. Even without migration by hybrid attack, there are enough reasons why this is a good idea.
For example, around 400,000 illegal migrants were ordered to leave Germany in 2020, while just 18 percent returned to their country of origin. Many European countries have experienced similar problems as countries that are the sources of migration can also be reluctant to welcome people back, leaving them in a kind of legal limbo.
While setting up application centers outside Europe might sound inhumane at first glance, if we proceed based on the logic that help should reach those who need it most, it could prove the most economically sustainable solution.
Allowances and other benefits for a few thousand asylum seekers in Europe would probably cost more than creating secure zones outside of the EU. The same logic also governs the realization that Ukraine swiftly overcoming Russian aggression is in our interests in order to avoid a new wave of refugees, which would be disastrous for Ukraine and a burden for Europe. We need to create for the Ukrainians a safe zone in Ukraine.
Humanitarian organizations should also make a choice. Whether they're willing to completely cover the costs of families that come as part of irregular migration or whether to concentrate on neighboring countries? The logic where humanitarian organizations contribute to irregular migration only to saddle the state budget with the cost is irresponsible.
Clearer establishment of our culture
We need to be clearer in how we phrase the rules of coexisting in Estonia. I accept being handed a hefty fine for littering in Singapore. Strict laws have not kept Singapore's economy from blossoming.
I understand that I cannot consume alcohol in Saudi Arabia. It hasn't stood in the way of that country's development either. I won't argue when several different religions forbid me entry to their temples in shorts. I respect all cultures, while I also expect respect in Estonia. Estonia could require both Estonians and all visitors to strictly adhere to a few rules.
This seems like trying to break down an open door because we have a constitution. However, practical experience tells us that law enforcement comes into contact with immigrants who have imported worldviews that discriminate against the rights of others.
Tolerance means not tolerating efforts to curtail basic human rights. Those coming to Estonia must accept from the start that Estonia is a secular and democratic country where men and women are equal, honor killings are not allowed, men and women are free to choose their partners, irrespective of what their parents think, that Estonia has rule of law.
Our ideal is free speech limited only by conditions provided by democracy (incitement of violence, protection of minors, copyright etc.). Estonian citizens must speak Estonian which is the language of the national education system. Take it or leave it. Open democracy also has principles that need protection.
In truth, more important than individual rules of living in Estonia is for those applying for Estonian citizenship to understand what it means to obtain a new citizenship – it is giving away one identity to assume another. It is not an easy decision, which is all the more reason for us to try and manage relevant expectations.
An amendment to take away the right of non-citizens to vote in local elections would constitute a part of such communication. The logic should be the opposite. If a local government feels it needs non-citizens, it will do everything in its power to attract them as it is.
In summary
This comment has mostly concentrated on irregular migration. All other forms of migration are part of the ensuing debate. For example, short-term, seasonal and controlled labor migration may prove mutually beneficial. A policy that restricts irregular migration is not at odds with Tallinn possibly becoming a balanced cosmopolitan city or the realization that there are people we want to come to Estonia.
If we want Tallinn or Tartu to be global cities, we cannot tell the next Google founder that the door is closed just because they weren't raised on kama. If 100,000 startup millionaires wanted to come to Estonia and follow all the rules without speaking Estonian, I'm sure we'd come to some sort of agreement. You say that strictness and openness do not mix? I say we have no other choice.
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Editor: Marcus Turovski