The report covers Russia, China, hybrid attacks, threats posed by inequality, cybersecurity, terrorism and the main events in Estonia over the past year. ERR News summarizes the report below and the original can be read here or at the bottom of this article.

"Russia and its imperialist ambitions" remain the biggest threat to Estonia, wrote Margo Palloson, director general of the ISS (also known as KAPO) in the report's introduction. "The coming years are likely to bring new challenges and instability."

He said the ISS has one goal: "Our objective is simple – Estonia is and must continue to be as challenging an operational terrain as possible for Russian and other hostile foreign intelligence services."

Palloson justified the decision to continue to publish the yearbook by saying it works to deter others and keeps the public informed.

Russia

The ISS said Russia will "likely continue its efforts" to stoke tensions by using hybrid attacks in neighboring countries in the coming years. It will use "any measures that stop short of triggering NATO's [Article 5] collective defense clause," the agency believes.

One of the most recent examples is the detention of several people who carried out attacks on monuments commemorating the Estonian War of Independence as well as Minister of Interior Lauri Läänemets' car and a Russian journalist. They aimed to sow "confusion and instill fear" in Estonian society, the ISS said.

It also shows the evolution of Russia's tactics. "Although people's health and safety were not directly threatened, such activities illustrate a more violent and robust modus operandi than has been typical of Russia in the past," the agency said.

Last year, dozens of spam email bomb threats across the Baltics also aimed "to create psychological and emotional tension by targeting the most vulnerable [children]."

In December, as Finland faced a hybrid attack on its borders, a similar scenario occurred on Estonia's eastern border when dozens of migrants arrived at the Narva border crossing without documents. The Estonian border guard witnessed the Russian border guard orchestrating and filming the events and a week later the video was posted online. "Unlike in the past, Russian border guards no longer hide their activities; they appear in uniform while producing propaganda materials," the ISS said.

Over the last year, several incidents and pressure have been felt along the Estonian-Russian border, ISS wrote.

Since 2022, Russia has regarded Ukrainians crossing the border as "potential enemies" and subjected them to "harassment". At the Kunichina Gora and Shumilkino checkpoints along the southeastern Estonian border, Ukrainians were profiled in interviews, forced to fill out questionnaires, and had their communication devices and data seized.

"Incidents of physical violence also occurred to extract specific and desired responses," the ISS said. Some were forced to undress for inspection and were then photographed, briefly detained, or asked to take polygraph tests.

In the last few months of 2023, Russian border guards also began "increasingly harassing" Estonian and EU travelers.

The report also highlighted that attention needs to be paid to inequality in Estonia's border areas, as living conditions there "have provided a favorable environment for Russia's efforts."

Residents earn 27 percent less than the Estonian average and only a third of working-age people are employed, the ISS said. Many are unhappy with state infrastructure in these regions, such as education, public transport, and healthcare.

"This can cause frustration and disappointment among residents, making them more susceptible to manipulation by foreign states or other entities acting in their own interests or advocating specific economic, ideological, religious or other group interests," the report states.

One example, in Võru County, South Estonia was the spreading of false information about NATO soldiers raping girls in the area and the police taking no action. The rumors were spread by "serial conspiracy theorists," the ISS said.

The report also mentioned Narva, Estonia's border city with Russia, which has a large Russian-speaking population.

It said Russia has introduced new tactics to influence the population after public commemorations were banned during the coronavirus pandemic and after the start of Russia's full-scale war.

One example, is the propaganda concert held in Ivangorod across the river on May 9. While around 2,000 watched the event in 2023, the ISS said many people were in the audience out of "curiosity" and this does not imply everyone shares Russia's views.

There has also been little reaction from residents to changing street names or the removal of the T-34 tank monument, the ISS said: "Their primary concerns relate to factors affecting their daily lives, such as the price of heating, the state of the job market and the overall economic situation."

The yearbook said Russian and Chinese intelligence and security services continue to pose the "primary intelligence threat" to Estonia.

Russia has changed its tactics after EU countries stopped issuing visas to Russian citizens and closing their borders, but the intelligence and security services have become "significantly more aggressive." The ISS said "they operate more crudely in some respects" but also use covert methods and are "highly adaptable." "They view war-time conditions as prime learning opportunities /.../ – they pose a serious threat."

Historically, Russia's intelligence and security services prefer to use diplomatic cover for their agents, but while almost 700 Russian diplomats have been expelled from Europe since February 2022, a "significant portion" has been replaced with new intelligence officers, the agency reports. This is also the case at the Russian embassy in Tallinn.

There is still interest in "human intelligence" and Russia is looking to recruit people where it can. Dual citizens and Ukrainians can be easy targets.

China

China's activities also deserve attention, ISS writes. Compared with Russia, Chinese intelligence's efforts are "more broad-based and more intensive."

ISS said the embassy in Tallinn is "China's primary instrument for exerting soft power" in Estonia and in 2023 it started operating "without restrictions" for the first time since the coronavirus pandemic: "It has restored previous contacts and actively forged new ones."

"The embassy strongly opposes dissenting views, such as the proposal to establish a Taiwanese representation in Estonia, and actively works to counteract such suggestions," the ISS said. It is also "highly sensitive" to any official contacts other countries may have with Taiwan.

Last year, Estonian citizen Gerli Mutso was also sentenced to eight years and six months in prison for engaging in intelligence activities against the Republic of Estonia and supporting such activities. She was arrested alongside marine scientist Tarmo Kõuts in 2022.

Chinese intelligence services sought access to NATO secrets and research data and used an Estonian citizen as an agent, the ISS said. "The court case vividly demonstrates that even small countries are of interest to Chinese intelligence, as they have the same access to international organizations as larger countries." the report states.

Offers from China that seem "too good to be true" may not be genuine, and such instances should be reported to ISS.

Cybersecurity

ISS warned against employing Russian and Belarusian citizens in the ICT sector, saying they can have links to the security services of their home countries. They could also be used to carry out cyber sabotage against Estonia.

In 2023, the main threat to Estonian cybersecurity was the failure to perform necessary updates or delaying them, the agency said.

One attack saw Iranian hackers gain access to the heating and water supply control systems of three Estonian utility operators at the end of the year. This was part of a series of global attacks.

Russian special services use hackers who are indirectly related to them and appear to operate independently using ransomware attacks or hacktivists' service denial attacks intended to disrupt daily life. It hopes for expansive media coverage to project the image of wide support and cyber competence. However, the key to successful attacks often lies in the target's lack of cybersecurity awareness, the ISS said.

Estonia is also learning from Russia's cyber activities against Ukraine and how to block them. Attacks against Estonia have "not had the significant impact and scope that ISS had anticipated."

Extremism

"The terrorism threat level in Europe has risen, signaling a potential shift towards heightened threats related to terrorism and Islamist extremism in Estonia as well," the ISS said. It said al-Qaeda and Daesh (the Islamic State), along with their affiliated groups, have not become significantly stronger, but they are expanding their influence in Africa and Central Asia.

The report also discussed the Estonian Muslim community. ISS says it is expanding and "becoming more ethnically diverse and nuanced." While the community is considered peaceful, it says "concerning trends are emerging." It highlights a "lack of adaptation among new immigrants" and a "reluctance" to integrate into Estonian customs and learn the language. "This causes community segregation and presents challenges to security and public order," the ISS said.

It also says conflicts among religious leaders within the Muslim community are "driving a reorganization of the community."

It is estimated that the Estonian Muslim community has grown to over 10,000 members, and ISS said it is vital to integrate children into Estonian secular society.

The ISS highlighted how tensions rose after the Hamas-Israel conflict. It said there are signs of "radicalization" as "Islamist organizations' propaganda" has started to spread on social media, although those spreading it may have little understanding of its origins. A "significant proportion" of these people were not on the ISS' radar before. "There were also cases where asylum seekers in Estonia accused the Estonian state of supporting genocide," it wrote. The public response – such as protests – has been peaceful.

The report also touched on young people involved in right-wing ideology and the ISS said it has observed an increase in the number of in-person gatherings this year in Estonia and neighboring counties. The topic has been mentioned in ISS reports since 2021. The agency recommends engaging in dialogue as "youths teetering on the edge of radicalization are suffering from a lack of attention and recognition."

There are no left-wing extremist groups present in Estonia, the ISS says.

The report also covered economic security, Russian war crimes in Ukraine and gave an overview of the public evidence of the Balticconnector gas pipeline case.

The Internal Security Service's Annual Review 2023-2024 follows in full and can also be read here in English.

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