German Chancellor Olaf Scholz said that the swap was a very difficult but right decision. Indeed, rescuing one's citizens from persecution on fabricated charges by dictatorial regimes is a noble and obligatory duty of any democratic state. However, the exchange has already sparked a torrent of criticism in the participating countries. A German commentator labelled the exchange a fatal error, arguing that by accepting the Kremlin's blackmail, the West has exposed its own vulnerability. In Poland, the government is fending off questions about why it did not receive Andrzej Poczobut, a journalist for Gazeta Wyborcza imprisoned in Belarus, in exchange for GRU officer Pavel Rubtsov handed over to Russia. The Belarusian opposition in exile queries why only Russian opposition figures were included in the exchange, leaving out their Belarusian counterparts.

A closer examination of the exchange lists raises further questions. In fact, Russia traded its GRU and FSB officers for foreigners who fell prey to their own carelessness, adventurism and, at times, lack of professionalism. These individuals were an easy target for Russian special services. Additionally, anti-war Russian activists and politicians, who are relatively unknown to the average Russian but more prominent abroad, were included. Their participation in the "spy swap" has hardly boosted their popularity within Russia.

At the same time, the Western governments handed over Russian hitmen, hackers and spies, whose activities were directly aimed at inflicting maximum harm on the security of their own countries. To apprehend them, Western intelligence agencies had to conduct long and complex operations under strict constraints imposed by democratic procedures. Often, negotiations with other countries for their extradition were required, as was the case with GRU-linked Russian hacker Vladislav Klyushin.

Therefore, it is evident that, considering the resources expended to capture the detainees, this prisoner exchange is anything but equitable.

The most interested party in the swap was the White House. The release of American citizens Evan Gershkovich, Paul Whelan and Alsu Kurmasheva was needed primarily as a demonstration of the current administration's effectiveness ahead of crucial presidential elections. For the exchange with Russia to take place, Joe Biden had to reach an agreement with the European allies, as it was they who held the most valuable Russian agents. His main argument was likely that this swap would contribute to a victory in the presidential election for Kamala Harris, thereby avoiding the increased unpredictability in U.S. foreign policy that a Donald Trump administration would bring.

However, the key to the exchange was in Berlin, because the primary figure of interest to Putin, FSB officer and hitman Vadim Krasikov, was in German custody. Apparently, the German government sought to balance the exchange by demanding someone from Russia whose publicity and prominence could persuade the German public of the deal's merits. Initially, this figure could have been Alexei Navalny, but after his death in prison, the fate of the exchange hung in the balance. Other Russian political prisoners were proposed instead, and according to one of the exchanged Russian politicians, Ilya Yashin, the initiative in this matter came from the German side. Citing a German official who spoke with him, Yashin admitted that his name was not initially on the exchange list. It appeared later to "balance the value of this exchange," given the "complex ethical dilemma" for the German government.

Thus, it seems that for the initiators of the "historic exchange," its rationale and justification are directly tied to the outcome of the U.S. presidential election. However, such a practice carries significant implications. Exchanging hostages for spies sets a dangerous precedent, potentially encouraging Russia to intensify its active measures in the West, thereby increasing security risks for Western countries. Sending more of his intelligence officers to "countries unfriendly to Russia," Putin will be confident that he can constantly trade them for foreigners or Russian political activists. Since there is no formal travel ban to Russia, the Kremlin can always find potential candidates to replenish its exchange pool. In other words, every Western passport holder entering Russia becomes a potential hostage from the moment they cross the border. Another ingredient of the Kremlin's "hostage diplomacy" includes Western politicians who, for slightly better electoral prospects, are willing to make dubious compromises in national security. Vladimir Putin knows that to find them, he merely needs to wait for the start of the next election campaign.

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