The Ukraine-focused summit in London last weekend was significant because, until then, the public perception had been that Vladimir Putin's plan for partitioning Ukraine was the only "peace plan" presented to Donald Trump. This was despite the fact that Volodymyr Zelenskyy had previously introduced his own plan to Trump.

Looking at Trump's statements and actions, the plan negotiated with Putin appears to include not only ceding Ukrainian territories and halting military aid but also changing the Ukrainian government (U.S. intelligence coordinator Tulsi Gabbard is running a TikTok campaign portraying Zelenskyy as a dictator no better than Putin, while Elon Musk is doing the same on X) and subordinating Ukraine economically (a mineral resources agreement without security guarantees).

Framing Zelenskyy as a problematic figure has been somewhat successful as a joint effort between the White House and the Kremlin. Due to what has happened in the Oval Office, attention has largely focused on Trump and Zelenskyy's relationship, while Trump's alliance with Putin has remained in the shadows. Trump has admitted to journalists that he has spoken with Putin after February 12, but the content of those discussions remains undisclosed. Prisoner exchanges have taken place and there are promises of normalized economic and other cooperation.

Until the London meeting, Europe's role had been reduced to merely cushioning the Putin-Trump plan. While Zelenskyy had previously presented his own plan to Trump, Europe had no peace plan of its own.

Understandably, Russia would not favor the deployment of European peacekeeping forces to Ukraine, and perhaps that is why Estonia has supported the idea, even though, as Defense Minister Hanno Pevkur (Reform) has pointed out, there is no peace to keep. Russia has instead intensified its drone warfare (the interruption of U.S. military aid has significantly impacted air defense) and undertaken other actions to escalate its aggression.

Among Russia's western neighbors, differences of opinion have emerged regarding the implementation of hypothetical peacekeeping. Lithuania and Estonia have expressed support, while Poland ruled out such involvement even before the Munich Conference. Finnish President Alexander Stubb stated after returning from London that NATO countries bordering Russia should contribute in a more indirect way, for example, through drones.

In the event of an armed confrontation in Ukraine between, for instance, Finnish and Russian soldiers, there would be significant cognitive difficulties in distinguishing that battle from the broader notion that Finland and Russia (or Poland and Russia) are at war. Just as North Korea is, in practice, at war with Ukraine. It is worth recalling that Estonia and other allies had military instructors in Ukraine until the end of 2021, who were quietly withdrawn before the full-scale invasion.

Prominent analysts Mike Kofman and Jack Watling recently published an article on the War On The Rocks portal outlining what a European peacekeeping force might look like. They envisioned the deployment of a ground force contingent equivalent in size to an Estonian division — three combat brigades plus logistics and deep-fire support — amounting to 15,000-20,000 personnel. Air support could be provided from NATO airbases.

The standard Western practice is to rotate mission units every six months: one unit is on the mission, another is preparing and recruiting soldiers and a third has just returned and is in recovery or being disbanded. According to Watling and Kofman's calculations, this would require a total of 45,000-60,000 troops.

One surprising aspect of the analysts' assessment was their take on the military deterrence effect of European forces if Russia were to break a ceasefire. In such a case, European troops would not move to the front lines but would assist and strengthen operations in the rear.

This understanding of peacekeeping appears to be shared by France as well, based on Emmanuel Macron's statements. However, deploying 45,000-60,000 troops would be a massive and costly operation, likely affecting the commitment of British and French forces to the Baltics. Both France and the United Kingdom contribute significantly to Estonia's permanent NATO pre-positioned battlegroup and reinforcement forces (a British brigade plus a French battalion within it).

This could create a potential gap in Baltic collective defense, which would need to be filled by the United States — or else accepted as a vulnerability. In any case, such an operation would require not only a clear and reasonable objective but also a thorough understanding of worst-case scenarios and adequate resource commitments. The UK's recent decision to increase defense spending by 0.2 percent of GDP for the year after next does not quite meet that standard (the increase comes at the expense of soft power, i.e., foreign aid funds), especially considering the previous deep budget cuts this increase is merely patching.

Even the UK has not spoken of purely European peacekeeping in Ukraine. British Prime Minister Keir Starmer has stated that any deployment of European forces to Ukraine would require some level of support from the United States. During the Munich Security Conference, the U.S. distributed questionnaires to allies, including Estonia, to assess what military resources they would be willing to contribute to securing peace in Ukraine and what support they would expect from the United States.

Given the time that has passed, Estonia has likely already provided some response. Any military involvement, however, would only be possible if real peace negotiations were underway (not merely a maneuver to force Ukraine into a corner), if the deployment of ground forces made military sense and if it genuinely deterred Russia.

There is no pressing military need for brigades to be stationed in western Ukraine; Ukraine's needs have long been clear: deep-strike capabilities, artillery and air defense. Western units also suffer from a lack of combat experience and significant gaps in drone warfare expertise and capability — gaps that could be mitigated by their presence in Ukraine.

One could endlessly debate whether Putin managed to get ahead of the European-Ukrainian peace initiative with his Ukraine partition plan — although Zelenskyy had previously introduced his own ideas to Trump — or whether normalizing relations with Putin was always Trump's preferred course of action.

It is not out of the question that Trump, regardless of continued Russian aggression, might normalize economic relations with Moscow — especially since a scapegoat for the failure of peace negotiations has now been identified, and it is neither Trump nor Putin. This would provide Russian aggression with yet another powerful sponsor, further strengthening the headwinds against Ukraine and Europe.

In response, London pledged to strengthen Ukraine, with Keir Starmer announcing a £3.8 billion aid package, more than half of which will be covered by revenue from frozen Russian assets. Whether the European Union will step up remains to be seen at the extraordinary European Council meeting on March 6, where Ursula von der Leyen has promised to seek support for an €800 billion European rearmament plan.

The main question now is not the friction between Donald Trump and Volodymyr Zelenskyy, which, given their differing interests, may have been inevitable. Rather, it is the unexpectedly close brotherhood between Vladimir Putin and Trump — and the potential consequences it may bring.

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