Toni Cerkez: Events in Bosnia and Herzegovina and why should Estonia care

As the EU grapples with growing instability at its periphery, Estonia has strong reasons to pay closer attention to Bosnia and Herzegovina. Though the two countries may seem worlds apart, both face pressures from rising illiberalism and Russian influence — embodied in Republika Srpska's separatist leader Milorad Dodik, writes Toni Cerkez.
Why should Estonia care about what is going on in Bosnia and Herzegovina (B&H)? To many readers, this question might appear odd. The two countries (re)gained their independence at roughly the same time (Estonia in 1991 and B&H in 1992), but do not have much in common apart from that. Inspired by the looming visit of the EU's high representative for foreign and security policy and Estonia's former PM Kaja Kallas to Sarajevo (Kallas visited Sarajevo on April 8 — ed.), I argue in this essay that this is a misapprehension. The fact is, many Estonians do not know much about B&H and many B&H citizens do not know much about Estonia, but there are very strong reasons for us here in the northeast of Europe to care about this country in the southeast and to study and analyze what happens in it. I begin with a brief historical overview of B&H before presenting the arguments.
Historical context: From Ohio to Brussels
What most know about Bosnia and Herzegovina (B&H) is that there was a war. Lasting from 1992 to 1995, it followed the disintegration of Socialist Yugoslavia. The conflict in B&H was particularly complex due to its diverse population: Bosniaks (predominantly Muslim), Serbs (Orthodox), Croats (Catholic) and minorities such as Jews. No single group holds a clear majority and many are interconnected through historical and familial ties.
The war ended with the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) in December 1995, signed at the Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio by leaders of Serbia, Croatia and B&H. Among the most horrific events of the war was the Srebrenica Genocide, where Bosnian Serb paramilitary forces, supported by the Milošević regime, killed around 8,000 Bosniak civilians, mostly boys and men, July 11-15, 1995.
The DPA provided peace and stability. Today, B&H is largely peaceful, with low crime rates and safe cities. Annex IV of the DPA, which serves as the country's Constitution, established a highly complex system of governance. B&H has a central government (Council of Ministers) and a bicameral Parliament, but most authority lies with the two autonomous entities: the Federation of B&H (FB&H) and Republika Srpska (RS). Each has its own constitution, courts and parliament. Sarajevo is the capital.
RS is mainly Serb-populated due to wartime ethnic cleansing. FB&H, where Bosniaks and Croats share power, is further divided into 10 cantons to prevent centralization. Mostar serves as an administrative and financial hub for Croats, while Banja Luka is the capital of RS. The Brčko District is a self-governing condominium shared by both entities, born from a wartime stalemate. It is the last free city in Europe.
Despite a population of just 3.3 million, this intricate system creates both political crisis and unexpected stability, leading some to describe B&H as a "stabilocracy." Postwar liberal peacebuilding has seen success: GDP is growing, with a 2025 forecast of 3 percent and B&H is an EU candidate with 68 percent public support as of 2024. It also holds a Membership Action Plan (MAP) with NATO, though RS leaders, echoing Serbia's NATO skepticism, resist full membership.
A unique feature of peacekeeping in B&H is the Office of the High Representative (OHR), which oversees civilian implementation of the DPA. Endowed with sweeping Bonn powers, the OHR can dismiss officials and enact legislation. Current High Representative Christian Schmidt has stirred controversy by criminalizing Srebrenica Genocide denial, provoking strong reactions from RS leadership. This controversy has plunged the country into an unforeseen political crisis, threatening disintegration (which is not likely) and strengthening players such as Orban and Putin. This is where we should really start paying attention.
RS: Vying for visibility in a rightwing world
There are many issues that connect B&H, via RS, to the important topics of world politics that directly affect Estonia, and they are a strong reason for Kallas' visit. I describe them below, focusing especially on the international dimension of RS' recent moves.
RS, under its political leadership, especially the President of RS Milorad Dodik, is actively inching towards independence and potentially reunification with Serbia. For many years, everyone considered this to be an electoral ruse for his party, SNSD, to rally membership and support. However, this year, the Court of B&H has convicted Milorad Dodik of not complying with the decisions of the OHR, a criminal offense. As a result, SNSD has tried to suspend the Constitution of B&H and establish parallel structures, interfering with the national competencies in areas such as law and police. The Constitutional Court of B&H has suspended all these attempts. A further issue is Dodik's negation of the Srebrenica Genocide, a criminal offence in B&H as of July 2023.
For all this, the U.S., and recently Germany and Austria, have sanctioned the RS' political leadership. Despite Trump's revisionist policies, Dodik has been unsuccessful at lobbying the U.S. administration to change its sanctions policy. The Court of B&H has also issued an arrest warrant for Dodik and suspended him from performing political roles for five years. There is difficulty in enforcing this decision since large parts of the government are under Dodik's control, though there are many indications that this might happen soon.
Dodik refuses to comply with court orders. Instead, with the help of Putin and Orban, he is trying to lobby internationally for a change in U.S. sanctions policy and for more visibility: he styles himself as an anti-colonial freedom fighter for his take on OHR. An ardent supporter of Israel's genocide in Palestine (Gaza), Dodik has traveled to Israel for a right-wing conference, where he received a lukewarm welcome, followed by a scandalous revelation by Haaretz, an Israeli publication, that he had paid $800,000 to Marc Zell, an Israeli politician and lobbyist, to help him get off the American sanctions list. After Israel, Dodik has visited Moscow just this past week for talks with none other than his patron, Vladimir Putin. With Putin, he discussed changing the OHR roles, removing EUFOR presence in the country and much more. Furthermore, Dodik was interviewed by Rudy Giuliani in February, who visited him in Banja Luka to support his 'struggle.' Dodik invited Giuliani, with whom he recorded a podcast, in the hopes of tapping into the MAGA audience.
Why should Estonia care about all this?
B&H is an interesting litmus test for democracy internationally. The discourses that we see developing in the country are complex and often reflect different international tendencies. From socially liberal parties, who are by the nature of the B&H political system, forced to make coalitions with hardline conservatives, to pro-Russian actors who join forces with European and global right-wing, the country is a fascinating and dynamic political field.
The most interesting aspect to us in Estonia is of course Dodik's connection to Putin, which is, on face value, even stronger than the Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic's. As the second 'leader of the Serbs,' as he likes to style himself, Dodik has visited Putin 26 times in recent years and has also visited Lukashenka in Belarus. Unlike countries such as Georgia and Moldova, where Russia — or fear therefrom — has managed to instill satellite regimes, Dodik's regime does not function as Putin's satellite. The difference is that Dodik has no fear of Putin, nor does he depend on his support.
To Dodik, Putin is a useful sponsor, while for Putin, Dodik is a useful tool for sowing division in B&H and sabotaging the West. This is what makes Dodik particularly dangerous because he earnestly supports Russia's policies. Were RS to become independent, Russia would be actively controlling two hotspots in the wider southeast of Europe, Transnistria in Moldova and then B&H, in addition to supporting Serbia's efforts at reclaiming Kosovo.
Dodik's statements, and the statements of his cronies, such as Nenad Stevandic (the speaker of the National Assembly of RS), are taken directly from Moscow's playbook. He has also built strong bonds with Hungary's Viktor Orban, who is likely preparing to host him in Budapest in case he needs to escape B&H. Similarly, Orban is protecting Nikola Gruevski, a former authoritarian leader from North Macedonia, who was accused on multiple counts of corruption and embezzlement in 2018.
SNSD's political discourse staunchly follows Orban's 'illiberal democracy' line. In stark contrast to other actors in B&H, Dodik regularly visits Orban's Demographic Summits, where he has been seen with Vucic and other right-wing leaders, including former Czech PM Babiš and Slovenian PM Janša. Like Orban, Dodik is skeptical of EU's and NATO's support for Ukraine and considers the war to be a "great power conflict," styling himself as promoting "peace" by indulging Russia's demands.
Estonians should be informed on what is happening in B&H because it is not happening in isolation from other parts of Europe. The European right-wing — especially in Central and Western Europe — is increasingly pro-Russia, tired of the protracted conflict and its uncomfortable effects, including inflation. They want to abrogate EU's values and promote illiberal democratic governance, which is nothing else but an authoritarian rulership sprinkled with pragmatic transactionalism on issues such as human rights, values and indeed the rule of law. They intend to persecute their opponents and attempt to suck up to the Trump administration, whose views were most succinctly elaborated by JD Vance at a now infamous Munich Security Conference earlier this year. Dodik, and his SNSD, via their patrons — Vucic, Orban and Putin — increasingly sow discourse under the banner of emancipatory revisionism.
Ultimately, these actors threaten the very stability of the EU itself because their main enemy is "Brussels." But Brussels has been very slow to respond. Often playing up the handbook of "progress" and "civilization," the EU has unfortunately too often acted patronizingly towards B&H. EU's discourse on backwardness and progress has recently been criticized for its racist tendencies. When Kallas visits Sarajevo on Tuesday, she will likely issue the standard statements of support for stability and rule of law in the country. The time has come, however, for the EU to strengthen such speech with concrete measures against actors such as Dodik. The first step is to treat political elites in B&H not as "backward" ethnic chieftains but as international political actors who have agency. Kallas understands the situation in B&H well from her experience dealing with Russia. What is left is hope this will translate into real action.
--
Follow ERR News on Facebook and Twitter and never miss an update!
Editor: Marcus Turovski