The basis of the discussion is the book in English by Russian journalist and political observer Andrei Kolesnikov "The Closing of the Russian Mind: How Putin's Ideology Took the Nation Hostage", 2026. 

I have used Kolesnikov's writings before as well, he appears in the West, he is a former analyst at the Carnegie Endowment's Moscow Center and currently a contributor to Novaya Gazeta. What is interesting in Kolesnikov's case is that he continues to publish his thoughts while living in Russia. He himself notes in the book that there are few like him, but they do not feel at all isolated, they organize discussion circles in someone's apartment or in a café and continue living their lives. 

The idea for the book is said to have been born while sitting with his family in a café in Paris. So he can travel freely. All this seems surprising, considering that the current Russian authorities send people behind bars for years already for some old post. So far Kolesnikov has earned from the authorities only the title of foreign agent, but this does not prevent the publication of writings critical of Vladimir Putin's regime. 

It leaves the impression that he is kept precisely as an example of the existence of media freedom in Russia, but one cannot reproach a person for having been very lucky. Also in Soviet times there were, among the intelligentsia, those who could go abroad and thereby demonstrate the regime's liberalism. 

But now to the book, in which Kolesnikov calls Putin's regime a personalistic autocracy, but the term is perhaps not important, more weighty is the description of the regime, and that is in many ways familiar. By the way, the main value of the book is precisely its publication in English. For people who constantly follow Russia there may not be very much new in it, but for a Western reader it should be useful reading. I do not agree with everything, but that is another matter. 

Kolesnikov affirms that, according to Putin's guiding thought, Russia has its own, special path, and Russian citizens must submit to his rules as he steers the country toward this unique destiny. For Putin, the symbol of Russian identity is territory, which, similarly to Stalin, is one of his fixed values. 

With Stalin's era as well as with earlier tsarist Russia, Putin's regime has much in common. As through the centuries, so in Russia even now a simple logic applies, that for the sake of the size of the state one may sacrifice hundreds of thousands and, if necessary, also millions of human lives. According to this ideology, human life is worth nothing, and for a higher goal it can always be given up. 

In some respects, the model Putin is building resembles the Soviet state, but internally it is completely different. The Soviet legacy is a hierarchical administrative system, state-centeredness and the sacralization of the state. The nomenklatura is also in place, as is the corporativeness of the system. 

Putin thinks more in terms of imperial Russia; the Soviet state is for him only one form of expression of the Russian idea or imperial dream. After the start of the war in Ukraine, Putin tried to fill the void of uncertainty that had arisen in mass consciousness with a new ideology, which was put together from old Russian and Soviet ideological currents. Putin's regime has developed from controlled democracy through authoritarianism into neo-totalitarian or hybrid-totalitarian, combining the silence of the majority and the making of the people complicit in the regime's crimes. 

One of the most important observations of the book is how learned indifference and passive conformism became the main behavioral pattern of the average Russian. On the ideology market there is only one product that is allowed by the authorities, and it becomes a kind of mass commodity, because everyone carries it. It is the mainstream, but one could say that it is also the fashion in today's Russia. 

Since Russia did not manage to catch up with the West in modernization, it was decided to embark on de-modernization, that is, moving back in history. In seeking the future in the past, Putinism has lost its goal. The only future aim is the struggle with the West, although it is not possible to formulate victory in this. 

In Kolesnikov's opinion, the primary condition for normalizing the state is the abandonment of the Russian imperial idea and also of the neo-totalitarian model of a parasitic oil state. But normalization must be preceded by a thorough moral and ideological rethinking of the place of the Russian people. Kolesnikov calls this the reopening of Russian consciousness, although it would probably be more correct to say simply opening, since this consciousness has never been open. 

Kolesnikov also thinks that in the war in Ukraine peace is possible only if Putin decides that the empire has been restored and the world has once again been divided between great powers, and he adds that it is unlikely that Putin would then strive further west. In my opinion, one cannot be at all sure of that… 

As for the Russian person, he is used to living in conditions of brutal armed conflict. A large part has accepted that in the current circumstances one must live for a long time yet, and therefore it is necessary to adapt. The majority of the population may not identify themselves with the regime, but they rally around the Kremlin, which in their eyes fights against the West that is trying to destroy the state. In this sense, the processing of mass consciousness in Russia has been successful. 

Putin's regime is kept afloat precisely by the population's indifference, opportunism and readiness to adapt. It is indeed possible to live in an Orwellian dystopia, especially if the market economy with goods and services still functions. The situation could perhaps be shaken only by the declaration of general mobilization. 

All of Russia's attempts at reform so far have run into the sand because of political compromises, lack of political will and inability to overcome ideological stereotypes, and behind this has been the leaders' and the elite's fear of losing power. 

At the end of the last century there was an attempt, but it ran into the sand. Socially, the biggest problem at that time was that the market economy in Russia produced, in Western terms, a standard consumer type, but it did not produce a citizen. That is, the market economy produced consumers, yet the state remained without citizens. The consumer did not see a connection between the free market and political democracy. And does not see it to this day. Without democracy, modernization unfortunately does not take place, especially in an empire. 

It is said that in Russia one must live for a long time to see the restoration of freedom. And if you live even longer, then you may also get to see the arrival of a new, successive despotism.

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