Kristian Pärt: Most high-risk security threats Estonia faces non-military

Defense spending has been set to rise to at least 5 percent of the country's GDP. This is a necessary step for military deterrence and for repelling armed aggression. However, it is a mistake to assume that military capability alone equals national security, writes Kristian Pärt.
Russia's armed forces have the potential to pose a military threat to us in the future, but the Kremlin has been actively employing extensive non-military and hybrid methods against Estonia and our allies yesterday, is doing it today and will continue to do so tomorrow.
The majority of high-risk security threats are non-military, and without adequate mitigation measures, they would continuously and increasingly harm our country and society. It is essential to maintain and sufficiently develop the capabilities that ensure internal security. The allocation of resources for mitigating security threats must correspond to the actual threat landscape.
History — both Estonia's and that of many other countries — shows that the Kremlin's efforts to undermine other states in pursuit of its strategic interests typically begin with non-military means.
In recent years, this topic has received significant international attention. One of the most up-to-date official reviews is a report published this year by the Ukrainian Parliament's commissioner for human rights, which, among other things, describes the methods used by Russia to weaken Ukraine through non-military means long before the events of 2014.
The report outlines how, in a country gradually weakened through non-military methods over a long period, it became possible — with "external assistance" — to instigate and direct separatism and, at the right moment, to seize territory through hybrid operations.
Now, based on numerous public reports and analyses, it is known that the primary role in establishing the preconditions for such operations was played by Russian intelligence services, collaborating influence agents, Ukraine's high level of corruption and Russian organizations and media that operated freely within the country. For Russia, the principles of weakening and dividing other countries are universal, but the methods are tailored to each specific nation. What worked in Ukraine may not work in every other country.
What is universal is Russia's effort to exploit vulnerabilities that can be found in every democratic society — in domestic politics, the economy or other domains. Moldova, Montenegro, Georgia and Romania are recent examples of other countries where the Kremlin regime has attempted to orchestrate political shifts without military intervention. This list of countries is not exhaustive.
According to the latest yearbook from the Estonian Internal Security Service (ISS), readers can gain insight into the challenges Estonia faces in maintaining internal security and what it must be prepared for in the future.
Preparing for war is not enough
National security, as a condition, is a whole. It encompasses the continued existence and functioning of the state in the manner defined by our Constitution. The most vital components of a state's continuity are Estonia's independence and sovereignty, territorial integrity and constitutional order. Through the enforcement of constitutional order, the foundations of Estonia's value system and democratic rule of law are also upheld. Hostile states seek to undermine these core elements of security in pursuit of their strategic interests — even in peacetime.
If we neglect the groundwork that allows for escalation and focus all national and societal effort solely on mitigating the most severe threats of war, we risk suffering irreversible damage to our security before we even reach the threshold of military resistance. Ensuring national security requires more than just preparing for war.
To deny hostile actors the opportunity to covertly establish positions, sabotage state and societal functioning and erode our stability, we must maintain a high level of internal security capabilities. Estonia's legal framework and institutional resources must align with both the level and nature of threats directed at the state.
Estonia's territory, including its information and cyber domains, must be an inhospitable environment for hostile actors — where achieving success is difficult, costly and yields little benefit. Estonia's first line of defense against such security threats is the Police and Border Guard Board (PPA) and the Internal Security Service (ISS).
The government's budgetary decisions in 2023 and 2024 to provide additional support for internal security through the broad-based national defense investment plan have significantly helped to close capability gaps in our agencies' readiness to fulfill national defense tasks. Thanks to these investments, we are now better prepared to handle serious crises.
However, maintaining internal security requires simultaneously managing existing threats and preparing for potential escalation. It is crucial to emphasize that the primary focus of both the ISS and the PPA must remain the prevention of security crises and the preemption of threats. This can be achieved through the effective fulfillment of their core day-to-day responsibilities.
Just as the commander of the Estonian Defense Forces provides military advice, the heads of agencies under the Ministry of the Interior have presented and justified their needs for non-military capabilities. Some examples of internal security capabilities include the resources needed to monitor Estonia's eastern border 24/7, detect and prevent hostile intelligence and influence operations, counter violent extremism, investigate anti-state offenses and ensure that police rapid-response units are prepared to apprehend armed individuals and respond to other high-risk incidents anywhere in the country.
The personnel of our institutions are an inseparable part of these capabilities. High-quality training, the development of competencies and maintaining strong motivation among service members are of key importance in the long term.
A vital part of preserving security is sustained counteraction against threats. Just like military defense, it is essential to ensure consistent funding and stable development of non-military security capabilities. The objective remains the same: to deter adversaries, repel threats and keep Estonia secure.
--
Follow ERR News on Facebook and Twitter and never miss an update!
Editor: Marcus Turovski