The sea is a cornerstone of the Estonian economy and security. More than half of the goods essential for Estonia's supply move by sea. Through shipping and maritime logistics, shipbuilding and ports, fishing and aquaculture as well as maritime rescue, the sea is integrated into our everyday lives.

Although we heavily rely on sea connections in daily life, they become critically important in times of crisis, when ensuring the population's access to essential supplies and the smooth functioning of society is vital.

Threats from the sea and hybrid warfare

Despite incidents of damage to the Baltic Sea's energy infrastructure (such as Nord Stream and Balticconnector), broader scenarios of maritime-based threats have not received sufficient attention in public discussions.

These threats don't necessarily have to be direct military attacks. Hybrid operations, which may involve a combination of economic pressure, disinformation, cyberattacks and sabotage, can be just as, if not more, effective than outright military strikes. Blockades that disrupt trade and travel, along with amphibious operations, are also potential threats.

Underwater infrastructure is particularly vulnerable. For instance, if someone were to sever communication links between Finland and Sweden using sophisticated and hard-to-detect methods, such an act could cause widespread confusion and economic damage. This is just one example of how hybrid operations can inflict significant harm without the attacker's identity being definitively confirmed. The concept of plausible deniability allows the perpetrator to conceal their involvement.

If all connections to Finland and Sweden were severed, the consequences would be severe. Since we rely on neighboring countries for energy, raw materials and food – most of which are transported via sea routes – Estonia as a nation and society would face a crisis far worse than the COVID-19 pandemic. Trade and transportation would come to a standstill, which in turn would affect industries and consumers. Such a situation could also lead to political instability and pose a threat to our security.

Therefore, it is crucial to develop effective and reassuring strategies and risk mitigation measures to protect our maritime infrastructure and respond to potential threats. This requires closer cooperation with our allies and investments in modern technologies and situational awareness, both in the civilian and defense sectors.

The Estonian Navy's preparedness

The Estonian Navy operates a total of eight vessels: three Sandown-class minehunters equipped with modern mine countermeasure systems, one Lindormen-class minelayer and four patrol boats.

For comparison, the Finnish Navy has around 250 vessels, with approximately 80 Coast Guard ships joining in a crisis situation. Finland is also working on two large warships, while Estonia has not secured funding for new projects, including replacements for patrol boats allocated to Ukraine for support.

These numbers clearly show that the Estonian Navy has been underfunded and underdeveloped within the Estonian Defense Forces (EDF). Maritime defense has long been seen as a burdensome sector with high fixed costs in Estonia. Both attention and budget have primarily been directed towards developing Land Forces. Even now, discussions surrounding the government's decision point out that €1.6 billion will be spent on acquiring ammunition. However, even if our warehouses are stocked full of ammunition, we won't be able to take effective defensive measures if we lack a clear understanding of the enemy's position or what targets to engage with that ammunition.

Leadership within the Estonian Defense Forces has become concentrated in the Land Forces, with both the EDF commander and the majority of EDF Headquarters members coming from land forces backgrounds. This has created a significant imbalance between the land forces and the Navy.

The Land Forces primarily focuses on exercises and planning that often have limited connection to real military operations. While a small contingent participates in foreign missions, this is not enough to gain the necessary experience for division-level planning.

In contrast, the Navy has to carry out daily tasks, such as ensuring maritime situational awareness, which requires continuous investment in both personnel and technology. The Navy's operations don't stop, even when the rest of the EDF are "playing war" in the forest during the Spring Storm exercise.

While allies may be able to provide logistical support and ammunition during wartime, the responsibility for maritime situational awareness falls squarely on Estonia's shoulders. Developing this requires investment and a deeper understanding of the Navy's role in national security.

In the event of conflict, it's not possible to suddenly develop situational awareness and other critical capabilities – they must already be in place and functional during peacetime. These are typical dual-use activities, valuable for civilian purposes but immediately applicable to military needs when the situation demands.

Maritime companies have learned from Ukraine's experience

The experience of the Estonian Maritime Cluster in contributing to Ukraine's UA Maritime Recovery Plan clearly demonstrates how vulnerable an economy can become when its vital waterways are under threat. Russia's aggression has severely damaged Ukraine's maritime sector, impacting both the country's economy and global food security. As a small maritime nation, Estonia must learn from Ukraine's lessons. We need to invest in our maritime defense capabilities to ensure the safety of our ports and shipping industry. Ukraine's experience serves as a reminder that a navy is not just a military force, but also a key element in economic stability and international cooperation.

Maritime security is not solely a military concept – it also encompasses economic stability, environmental protection and international relations. Estonian maritime industry companies have decades of experience in building patrol and other vessels for various countries, which could be repurposed for national defense in times of conflict.

In other countries, like Finland, it is common to prioritize products from domestic manufacturers in defense budget allocations. This creates a positive ripple effect: government orders strengthen the local industry, which in turn can develop its products and services, generate export revenue and create jobs. Simultaneously, the country increases its tax base and becomes less dependent on foreign suppliers.

Ukrainian example: Demand for Estonian goods in a crisis

Ukraine's maritime recovery plan is a clear example of the demand for Estonian products and services during a crisis. The Ukrainian government has requested Estonia's support for its navy with a €150 million aid package, which will be provided by Estonian manufacturers. This opportunity allows Estonian companies to offer their solutions, benefiting both Ukraine and Estonia's economy.

This shows that Estonian manufacturing is competitive and meets high standards. Working with local manufacturers ensures greater supply chain security and reduces logistics costs during a crisis. The chance to advance local technology development cannot be underestimated either.

If Estonian maritime companies are providing much-needed support to war-torn Ukraine, it is evident that we are more than capable of significantly boosting the capabilities of our own Navy. Estonia's maritime security is closely tied to the country's economic well-being.

By adopting local solutions, we are not only investing in our national security, but also creating jobs and strengthening Estonia's economy. Therefore, if we aspire to build a strong and independent Estonia, we must support local companies and ensure that the Estonian Navy is equipped with the best possible solutions.

While Estonian forces are deeply integrated into both the European Union and NATO structures, decisions on which branches to prioritize and how resources are allocated are made at the national level.

This ensures that the EDF can respond swiftly to evolving threat assessments and fulfill its obligations to allies. At the same time, close cooperation with allies allows us to share experiences, develop joint capabilities and ensure a unified defense posture in the region.

Both Navy and Land Forces on the costs side

Investments in national defense, including the procurement of ships and other equipment, as well as the ongoing operation of items such as ammunition and weapons systems, are indeed costly. However, they serve as an insurance policy for the future of our country.

We must strike a balance between expenditure and the benefits achieved. A modern and well-equipped defense force increases Estonia's appeal to investors and partners, which in turn enhances economic resilience.

Weak maritime surveillance and deterrence are two key factors that make our coastline and maritime areas vulnerable. The Balticconnector incident is a clear example of how limited awareness and response capabilities can lead to significant damage to critical infrastructure.

If we want to protect our energy systems and other vital services, we must invest in modern monitoring tools and develop more effective response plans. Strengthening maritime defense is an investment in both our energy independence and economic security.

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