What can international maritime law and NATO do for Baltic Sea security?
The tanker that damaged the EstLink 2 undersea cable remains under investigation in Finland. ERR's foreign affairs program "Välisilm" looked into how international maritime law can address the situation and what kind of support can be expected from NATO.
NATO's Standing Naval Maritime Group 1 (SNMG1) is a fleet of warships prepared to respond to any threat around the clock. While the group primarily operates in the North Sea and Baltic Sea, it will be seen more frequently in the Baltic in the future — particularly due to incidents like the recent damage to the EstLink 2 cable.
"If the Russians see that we are present there, the likelihood of such sabotage acts immediately decreases, because saboteurs can be caught in the act, and once caught, it's much easier to deal with them," said Arjen Warnaar, the commander of SNMG1.
However, more frequent NATO naval patrols alone are not enough to deter saboteurs. According to Jukka Kopra, chairman of Finland's parliamentary defense committee, preventing similar incidents in the future requires changes to international legal norms.
"This is still a relatively new phenomenon and international maritime law doesn't adequately address it or offer tools for intervention. We need to develop methods, procedures and necessary amendments to maritime law to tackle this issue," Kopra said.
Maritime logistics expert and professor at Tallinn University of Technology, Ulla Tapaninen, was not particularly optimistic about the prospects of changing maritime law when interviewed by ERR's "Välisilm."
"International maritime law is a very old treaty, originating from the 17th century. Back then, it was agreed that anyone could move freely in international waters and coastal states could not interfere with that movement," Tapaninen explained.
Changing maritime law is a lengthy and complex process, requiring consensus from the world's major maritime nations — a consensus that is unlikely to be achieved. However, this doesn't mean that ships can drag their anchors across the Baltic Sea with impunity, let alone that Russia's shadow fleet can operate freely.
Most vessels in the shadow fleet are old and do not meet modern safety or regulatory standards. Moreover, they often transport Russian oil products, which are subject to international sanctions. This means that sanctions can be imposed directly on the ships themselves.
"Currently, there are 80 vessels on the blacklist, meaning that countries participating in the sanctions do not provide services to them. This means the ships cannot dock at ports in those countries or obtain water, fuel or other supplies. This has had a significant impact. Those 80 ships are now unable to transport oil in the Baltic," Tapaninen said.
Another way to rein in the shadow fleet is to check whether the ships have valid insurance policies. Currently, reporting insurance status in the Baltic Sea is voluntary. According to Tapaninen, making this mandatory would be a sensible step, but implementing it globally would require approval from the International Maritime Organization (IMO) — something that may not be easy to obtain. However, Tapaninen believes local agreements between Baltic Sea states could be more achievable.
In the case of the tanker Eagle S, Tapaninen believes Finland has handled the situation correctly.
"The Eagle S wasn't stopped in international waters but was instead directed into Finnish territorial waters, where it was detained. The detention is justified for two reasons. First, it is a standard port state control procedure, where coastal states can check whether a vessel entering their waters meets proper standards. Second, the ship is being investigated for potential sabotage, which is why it was seized," Tapaninen said.
The Eagle S can be held until the trial concludes or until it is determined whether the vessel is seaworthy at all. For the past 15 years, the Gulf of Finland has had a ship reporting system in place, known as GOFREP. Under this system, every ship entering the Gulf must report its destination and their movements are closely monitored. If a vessel deviates from its route, it may be stopped.
Surveillance of the Gulf of Finland is so thorough that even if a ship switches off all its identification systems, it will still appear on radar. Authorities pay special attention to ships that attempt to navigate "blind," without transmitting identification signals.
"GOFREP has prevented about 15 accidents each year over the past 15 years. It has been exceptionally effective," Tapaninen noted.
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Editor: Aleksander Krjukov, Marcus Turovski