Jüri Saar: Opposing theories behind the Russo-Ukrainian War

Donald Trump's willingness to accommodate Russia would amount to a temporary attempt to save the country from yet another smuta — a period of decline, chaos and disorder — that is bound to come sooner or later, as it is inherent in the trajectory of Russia as a totalitarian empire, writes Jüri Saar.
The war between Russia and Ukraine in Europe is in its fourth year, with no end in sight. This is somewhat logical because wars always conclude when one side acknowledges its defeat. Formally, wars end at the negotiation table, where peace treaties are signed along with their terms, usually involving a compromise since neither side fully achieves what it originally sought. Total capitulation is a different scenario, governed by the principle of woe to the vanquished (vae victis!).
To understand the nature of this war, we must first ask: who is fighting whom? The simplest answer is that Russia and Ukraine are at war, with Russia having attacked its neighboring country, whose sovereignty and territorial integrity it had previously recognized. Russia is currently fighting to expand its empire, which shrank significantly in 1991 along with what it called "the greatest geopolitical catastrophe." Empires, as we know, cannot remain within fixed borders; they either expand as long as they have the strength to do so or contract until they collapse. There is no third option.
Ukraine, on the other hand, is fighting against the expansion and restoration of the Russian empire, as well as for its own statehood and the survival of the Ukrainian people. In reality, this war has given birth to Ukrainians as a state-forming nation — a people who want nothing more than to live within their national borders and develop their own country. From Ukraine's perspective, this is essentially a war of independence, much like the one we fought against Bolshevik Russia between 1918 and 1920. Similarly to our historical situation, a Ukrainian defeat in this war would have fatal consequences.
From Russia's perspective, this war has another distinctive feature: it is a religious war. Not in the sense that Russians have collectively become devout Orthodox believers whose faith is under some terrible threat. No, before launching this war, Russia was not facing any existential danger. Rather, the Kremlin leadership concluded that it had accumulated sufficient resources to resume waging war once again.
The slogans put forth by Vladimir Putin, claiming that neither Ukraine nor Ukrainians exist, clearly reflect this approach. Particularly telling are the remarks made by one of the Kremlin's trusted figures, Vladislav Surkov, in a 2020 interview. His statements reflect an extreme — if not outright Russian fascist (Rashist) — contempt toward Ukraine and Ukrainians: "Ukraine does not exist. There is Ukrainianness, a peculiar brain dysfunction... A bloody provincial outlook. Darkness instead of a state. There is borscht, Bandera and the bandura, but there is no nation... The only proven effective method for dealing with Ukrainianness is forcing them into brotherly relations with Russians by means of coercion."
From the Kremlin's perspective, Ukrainians are traitors who have denied the fact that they are actually Russians, albeit with some minor variations. Ukrainians, however, are completely opposed to this imperial mindset, and by now, they have proven their stance both in words and actions.
According to the ideology of religious wars, a holy war ends only when the enemy is eradicated worldwide. This principle also applies to traitors — in this case, Ukrainians. The only thing that can interrupt an active holy war is the exhaustion of a state's capacity to fight, which may result in its complete collapse. In 1991, the then-Russia — meaning the Soviet Union — ran out of strength, which made it necessary to resort to a temporary phase of less active and less costly warfare methods.
Throughout its history, Russia has waged religious wars and has yet to transition to a new understanding of warfare, even in the early 21st century. The Western approach to warfare is based on Carl von Clausewitz's famous definition: war is the continuation of politics by other means. War is not an instinctive urge nor a divine duty imposed from above, as the Kremlin still seems to believe.
However, over the course of the 20th century, another fundamental principle of international law emerged: the prohibition of military intervention in the affairs of another country. This principle — the non-intervention rule — worked relatively well for several decades.
What is happening in Ukraine, therefore, is something far more global than just a stronger and larger country attacking a smaller and weaker one. This is a proxy war, in which two value systems, two civilizations, have clashed: the Western Christian world and the Russian Orthodox world. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio has also acknowledged this proxy war between America and Russia.
These two worlds differ entirely in their approach to warfare — from the underlying ideology (religious war vs. political warfare) to the rules of engagement (warfare follows rules and even one's own soldiers can be punished for war crimes vs. everything is permitted in war and only the defeated are punished).
As a result, what is at stake in this war is nothing less than the future of the world order. If Russia emerges victorious, the existing world order that has been in place since 1945 will cease to exist. Most likely, the world will revert to realpolitik, where events are determined by the interests of states — primarily those of the strongest and most powerful. In such a world, the powerful will do whatever they please, while the small and weak will do whatever they must to survive.
The hypothesis regarding the differences between American and European war theories, as formulated by Mikk Salu, concerns only the tactical level of warfare. In highlighting the distinctions between American and European approaches, the author failed to account for the perceptions of the most important and active participant in this war: Russia. If anyone in the White House in Washington seriously believes that Americans can strike a genuine deal with the Russians — one that benefits both sides — then they are making a profound and tragic mistake.
For Moscow, America has always been the Great Satan, the leader of the Western world, and it will remain so. This attitude is immutable, almost archetypal, and from Russia's perspective, the sin of the Western world — and America in particular — is simply its existence. As recently as 2004, one of the Kremlin's chief ideologists, Aleksandr Dugin, wrote without any pretense: "We hate America simply because we hate it. We want it not to exist. We want to hide it away, to remove it, to lock it in a distant box, sealed with bolts of two oceans. Anti-Americanism is a serious thing."
Any deal between Donald Trump and Putin that results in ending the war on terms favorable to Russia will benefit only Russia and, in every case, harm the United States. Consider how America helped Stalin's Soviet Union industrialize in the 1930s and later supported it with the Lend-Lease program during World War II. Yet, in the end, the two still clashed in the Cold War, because in Moscow's worldview, America was the leader of class enemies. All concessions and accommodations made to Stalin were seen as nothing more than "the enemy's secret machinations."
Trump's concessions to Russia would amount to an attempt to temporarily save Russia from yet another smuta — a period of decline, chaos and disorder — which, sooner or later, is inevitable. This trajectory is embedded in the very nature of Russia as a totalitarian empire. One should not be misled by the vast size of Russia's territory on a map. The Soviet Union appeared even larger on the map, yet it ultimately collapsed under its own weight. Similarly, Putin's Russia is internally much weaker than the fearsome image the Kremlin has tried to project, both to its domestic audience and to foreign observers.
As the course of the Russia-Ukraine war has already demonstrated, Putin's assessment of Russia's military and economic capabilities was overly optimistic. The blitzkrieg that was supposed to last only a few days and end with Ukraine returning to Russia's "friendly" embrace never materialized. The so-called second most powerful army in the world turned out to be a massive bluff and its actual capabilities have proven to be far below any reasonable expectations.
Looking at and evaluating the current situation in Russia, it is likely in the midst of its final, rather desperate attempt to turn the tide of this war. It is more than certain that in behind-the-scenes negotiations, the Kremlin is making all sorts of fantastical promises to Washington — its primary goal being to convince the United States to withdraw its support for Ukraine and end its direct assistance.
Even if assessed objectively, the situation would not be favorable for Russia, even if it were left alone to face Ukraine, which enjoys full economic and military backing from Europe. Russia could only achieve total victory in this war if the United States were to join Russia in fighting against Ukraine and Europe. But such an outcome is nothing more than the fevered dream of Kremlin elites — one with virtually no chance of ever coming true.
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Editor: Marcus Turovski