Is the fear that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu might attack Iran in the coming months realistic?

Probably not in the coming months. We've now seen a general de-escalation, and the various tensions, whether in Gaza or the broader Middle East, have started to subside fairly quickly. I think the tipping point for the Americans was Israel's decision to strike a target in Qatar. Although the target was members of Hamas, a Qatari officer was also killed. A strike like that, on the soil of a close U.S. ally, seems to have been the moment when not only the Trump administration but also the broader U.S. national security apparatus concluded that it was time to hit the brakes.

What does the future hold for Gaza? What would a technocratic government look like?

We're just beginning to find that out. We're entering the second phase of this large peace plan, which had 20 points, and there are certainly many elements whose outcomes are still unknown. We'll begin to see and hear more about this soon, but there are a few things that could happen.

The likelihood that the international community's role will grow and that people will return to Gaza — especially for the purpose of aid delivery — is quite high. As for other aspects, such as the presence of peacekeepers or an international military force in Gaza, I think that's very unlikely, even though it's being discussed. Israel does not want international military forces near its borders. To expect Israel to allow foreign troops into Gaza is highly unrealistic. Hamas feels the same way. They want to control the area under their authority themselves, not see peacekeepers loitering around.

The peace plan envisions Hamas being demilitarized and leaving the stage. Is that realistic?

The first signs — already acknowledged by the Americans — show that clashes between Palestinians in Gaza make it clear Hamas still has weapons. However, they're starting to rebrand themselves and the key phrase here isn't "military structure," but rather a focus on internal security or maintaining internal order. That's partly to avoid chaos, especially with people returning to their homes — or what remains of them.

This kind of policing role is what Hamas appears to be aiming for at first glance. It could become a point of balance — where they are no longer a military organization. But that doesn't mean they'll give up their weapons. I also think Hamas gains confidence from the fact that the U.S. has accepted the Taliban in Afghanistan and former al-Qaeda leaders in Syria. Based on that, Hamas likely sees itself as an equal partner to everyone, including the U.S. and Israel.

It could also be that Hamas's so-called approval rating in Gaza is close to zero, they refuse to disarm and internal conflicts like the ones already happening escalate. Maybe it's in Israel's interest to let them stew in their own juice?

That's actually one of the more likely scenarios right now. Even if the broader peace plan doesn't fully succeed, the current cease-fire in Gaza doesn't mean war won't return soon. Israel has allies among Palestinian armed groups in Gaza — groups they themselves have armed. That's well-documented and widely known.

So a kind of internal Palestinian chaos that doesn't directly threaten Israel is acceptable from Israel's perspective. It means they don't have to re-enter the war. They can keep promises made to Trump. The focus is likely to shift elsewhere — most probably to the West Bank.

What's likely to happen in the West Bank? On one side, Gaza is completely leveled. On the other, tensions are also high. Could Hamas relocate to the West Bank?

That hasn't happened so far. Hamas has been in power since 2006 and it hasn't happened before, nor is it happening now. At least, none of the observers on the ground are suggesting it will. The main issue in the West Bank is the expansion of the occupation — that is, the illegal Israeli settlements, which the Israeli government has decided to expand.

The growth of these settlements definitely fuels tensions, both among Palestinians and settlers and more broadly between the Israeli military and Palestinians.

Could it be that, under bad enough circumstances, some kind of resistance or political party emerges in the West Bank to fight against Israel?

Armed resistance as a last resort enjoys broad support among Palestinians — both in Gaza and in the West Bank. Everywhere. That support is there. But if we look at the resources available to Palestinians in the West Bank or to groups active there, they're much more limited. The channels that may have existed in the past are no longer available.

Other Arab states are not willing to support Palestinians who want to take up the fight. So, from that perspective, military conflict is unlikely.

Gaza is in ruins. When the war began, Gaza still looked like an urban area, but now not even a city skyline remains. Someone will have to physically rebuild it, despite the internal disputes and extreme insecurity. Who's going to do that?

That's something we'll start to see unfold. People are still in Gaza. They have a strong desire to rebuild their homes, their businesses and their living environment. So the issue is more about materials and resources. And money.

Clearly, the U.S. plan envisions that much of the funding will come from Gulf states — Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia are expected to contribute. That's the assumption the U.S. is currently operating under.

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