I once read an anecdote: an auditor tells a doctor, "Doctor, I can't sleep at night." "Try counting sheep," the doctor replies. The auditor sighs: "I tried. There was a one‑sheep discrepancy, and then I spent three hours looking for the cause."

I'm glad the National Audit Office's auditors took a thorough look at the assets, inventories and spending within the Ministry of Defense's area of governance. Perhaps it cost them a few sleepless nights, but without their work we likely wouldn't know about the problems that surfaced. And if issues aren't brought to light, solutions won't be found.

It would certainly be easier for auditors to avoid conflict and leave the discovery of mistakes to someone else. That would spare them the frustration of those being audited and reduce the workload of follow‑up actions.

But what's happening in the defense sector reminds us again how vital independent oversight of state spending and civilian control over defense structures is. Public trust depends on knowing that our money — and the assets and supplies purchased with it — are managed responsibly.

In 1994, the Organization for Security and Co‑operation in Europe (OSCE) approved a security code emphasizing that democratic political control over the armed forces is an essential part of security and stability. Defense spending requires parliamentary approval. States must ensure transparency. Civilian oversight must cover both decisions on the use of force and the budget, legality and accountability. Military experts must be able to give professional advice, but decisions made on behalf of society must be the responsibility of democratically mandated institutions — parliament and government.

The OSCE was one of the first international organizations Estonia joined, just a month after restoring independence. And our constitution also establishes that defense governance is based on the principle that the armed forces are subordinate to democratically accountable civilian authority, with real oversight — including parliamentary oversight — required.

In 2011, the constitution was amended to clarify defense and security governance and further strengthen civilian control. The Defense Forces became a government agency, and the commander of the Defense Forces became the head of that agency, not an independent constitutional institution.

The minister of defense has the right to conduct administrative oversight of both the commander of the Defense Forces and the head of the Defense Investment Center. Perhaps this authority should have been used more forcefully after the first critical audit findings. Administrative oversight allows assessment of legality and expediency, identification of the causes of shortcomings, and the requirement that they be corrected. Disciplinary proceedings are provided for determining personal responsibility.

The past week's news also reminded us how important it is to avoid conflicts of interest — including the appearance of conflict — especially where large sums of money or significant power are involved.

Events in the defense sector give parliament reason to close gaps in the law that fail to adequately address the risk of conflicts of interest when moving between public‑sector and private‑sector roles. I'm again talking about cooling‑off periods for positions that decide on state spending or shape rules affecting businesses.

Claims circulating publicly that such cooling‑off periods must be paid for by the state are misleading. They do not have to be. Restrictions without compensation already exist in law, but their wording is weak and enforcement mechanisms are missing. To protect public interests and other constitutional values, the law may restrict a person's right to freely choose their occupation or workplace.

I've repeatedly explained that many countries have such restrictions, often without compensation. The more specific the restriction, the more likely it is uncompensated. And we must not forget that in stable democracies with high governance standards, the public sector is not a revolving door where people in key positions change so frequently that one can't even remember all their names.

Defense capability begins with trust, and citizens must know that the money, weapons and decision‑making authority entrusted to the state serve Estonia's defense in the best possible way. That trust is maintained through oversight that can ask uncomfortable questions and demand evidence‑based answers.

If we fail to establish proper civilian oversight and prevent conflicts of interest, things will continue as in another anecdote — where the audited entity tells the auditor that the use of state money is completely transparent, because no one sees it.

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