EDF chief: Everyone thought there was a pain threshold for Russia, no such hope now

Two years ago, when Russia started a full-scale war in Ukraine, everyone thought Russia had some sort of pain threshold. But now, it's pointless to even measure or hope for it, said Gen. Martin Herem, the commander of the Estonian Defense Forces, in an interview with ERR.
This war in its full-scale form has now lasted two years. How would you describe the situation we have reached? What does the situation at the front look like?
At the very start of the war or the escalation of the war, many thought that Kyiv would be lost immediately. Today, the situation is such that Ukraine has pushed Russia back from a large area to where it initially reached. And it has remained there. I don't think it's correct to call it a stalemate, but rather a positional war, where both sides are wearing each other down. Russia has chosen the path of putting up with major losses for modest advancement, and that's why the entire front is very intense there.
If we look at the map, it's actually quite similar to the map from a year ago. How should we describe it then? Could we say that Russia has been successful or rather Ukraine has been successful in keeping the front line stable?
Ukraine's capabilities are indeed in the minority. Russia has estimably invested three times more in the war than, for example, Western countries have in support for Ukraine. So, in that regard, Ukraine has indeed been successful because it is preventing Russia's advance.
And the capabilities that Ukraine needs it has very few or none at all. They are given piecemeal, and therefore it cannot focus on any larger offensive anywhere.
And at the same time, many Russian soldiers and their equipment have been destroyed in this offensive.
A lot. And this is one of the lessons or surprises of this war. We previously thought that the Russians are like us and that there would be a limit somewhere to the losses, but it seems that we definitely do not know this limit for Russia. They are willing to do much more than would be possible by our standards.
Yes, the numbers differ, but about 70,000 to 100,000 might be the number of Russian military personnel who have been killed, and several hundred thousand more wounded. Is this a correct estimate?
There's even talk of up to 400,000 losses, including the wounded. Nobody has counted them from this side, but these are very large losses, in total, hundreds of thousands who are either dead or wounded seriously enough never to return to their normal life. It's a lot. Russia has lost about 150 officers in February alone.
Ukrainians have about three times fewer losses. And this is a big problem because even three times smaller losses are much more painful for Ukrainians, both psychologically and in terms of the number of people simply.
One of the most significant recent retreats for the Ukrainians was Avdiivka. What does this retreat from Avdiivka tell you, and are we going to see more of these stories where you just have to retreat because there's no ammunition?
It could go that way. It's not the most likely scenario, but basically, Ukrainians, like us, for example, have no problem fighting face-to-face at short distances. But since the opponent, Russia, always has the next move from a kilometer or two away and you can't affect it in any way, then you keep reacting. And those shells are actually needed just for that, taking the fight into the enemy's depth. Without them, things become very difficult because the first opponent, who comes to you, somehow locks you down before the next one already takes the next step.
The good news this week was perhaps about the planes. Quite a few Russian planes were hit, including the A-50 early warning and control aircraft. Can we already say that Russia's air force, their capability, has actually started to decline?
Regarding their A-50 reconnaissance planes, it can indeed be said that it's a very serious loss. But when we talk about multi-role planes, attack planes, they still have quite a few of those. But success is definitely there, that they [the Ukrainians] are able to move their air defense in such a way, into ambush somewhere, making use of the Russians' established flight corridors, bring it out at the right moment, take their shot, then hide again, it must be admitted, is exemplary.
On the second anniversary of the war, several European leaders visited Kyiv, including U.S. Senator Chuck Schumer. Constantly at these international forums, it is said, we need to help more. But there's a gap between the real help and the words. How big do you think this gap is currently? And if the American aid package remains stalled, can Europeans and Ukrainians manage on their own?
The gap is so large that we see it today in Ukraine. A lot has been talked up over two years. It must be admitted that a lot more has also been done. We have done much more than we could have imagined in December 2021. And so have all Western countries. But of course, the talk is many times the deeds, including as concerns existing resources.
Today, in Europe, not only in America, there is money available to pay for the means, give them to Ukraine. But for various reasons, this is not done, and it is somewhat psychologically understandable. We also did not rush to do very much at the beginning, and I think that even today as the Estonian state, we could do more.
What, for example?
It's a matter of principle, to what extent we are willing to pull resources from other areas of life or even from Estonia's own defense capability and invest it in Ukraine's defense capability. It's our own decision. We really shouldn't look too much at what France or Germany are doing. We just have to decide where our values lie and whether we help Ukraine or not.
In Estonia, it is not necessary to explain to people why this needs to be done. Such efforts are perhaps more needed in other European countries. Recently, the European Council on Foreign Relations published a public opinion survey, and it turned out that across 12 European countries, only a tenth of people believe that Ukraine will win this war, and 20 percent believe that Russia will win, and 37 percent expect some sort of compromise. At the same time, when people were asked how Europe should support Ukraine, still about a third want to support Ukraine so they can take back their territories, but about 40 percent were such who find that we should put more emphasis on these negotiations. It seems as if politicians have somewhat failed in their explanatory work. What words could politicians in Europe use more to talk about the importance of this?
It's hard to say. More documentary footage from Ukraine should be shown, I think, to people. They often really do not understand what is happening there. But even then, with all due respect, Italy, Portugal, France, the U.K. – it's all very far from them. They do not understand the pain in Ukraine, and it does not reach them in any way. But over time, politicians probably have to make decisions regardless of what their people think. Because if we let Russia win today, it will continue winning in our direction too.
Interestingly, in Portugal, according to this survey, there was relatively strong support for Ukraine, unlike Italy. Portugal was really close to Sweden and Poland's levels. But military analysts talk everywhere about a war of attrition. How much reserve and backup do Ukraine and Western allies have, and how much can Russia withstand? Because it seems they've got their war machine working at full throttle?
Europe definitely has some left. During Covid, more than a trillion, I don't know, huge amounts of money were put into play. Today's support for Ukraine is nowhere near that decision or that step, so we still have the stamina. There's no question about it.
But Russia? How long can Russia sustain, what do you think? You mentioned at the beginning that it has been surprising what they have already put out.
What we might have hoped for, that the Russian population would somehow break, go in a completely different direction... People who get a couple hundred dollars or euros a month in salary find that it's much better to fight for €2,000 euros or dollars a month. People who have lost their jobs because of sanctions now go to work in the war industry and get paid. And somehow, they also feel that they are saving the world from some rotten Western culture and everything else. So, it works.
In addition, today six thousand wagons or sea containers of various goods come from North Korea each month. And if from there starts to come not only products but also, for example, means to produce, then Russia can withstand for a very long time. And the only thing that helps against this is one thing – this threat must be eliminated, certainly on Ukrainian territory.
How have Russia and Ukraine developed in terms of warfare and in terms of the technology and weaponry they can use during this war?
This war has also had different faces. If at the beginning Russia invaded and Ukraine delayed and defended and rather used ambushes, then now it has turned more into a positional war, and therefore different means are of different prices and different values.
It seems to me that the Russians have started to think differently about how to use existing technology for their benefit. Loitering munitions, whether it's simple drones with a grenade attached or a slightly more industrial version. Ukrainians have certainly been very inventive, but their motivation comes from the desire to defend their country.
Both sides have expended a lot of resources, but again – Russia has just buried many times more there.
Ukrainians have so far fought with professional soldiers and volunteers, and full mobilization has not been announced. If now they have to do it, does this allow them to fill the military with equally motivated and skilled personnel?
It definitely helps. Ukraine has not actually taken into the war, if you exclude volunteers, men under 27 years of age, and now they want to lower that age limit to 25 years. Because they want to save the next generation. If they conducted a mobilization and Western countries supported – whereas training is among the chief components making up a soldier's morale –, if Western countries support with training more than today, then I think, it's definitely a significant force.
But it's not just people who fight. Armed people fight. Ukraine needs means to reach far – 20 and 200 kilometers.
How has the recent change in the defense chief affected the course of the war?
It seems to me, not much. As much as I have heard, then soldiers, of course, shrug their shoulders. There's no mistrust against the new defense chief. And I think that the enemy captivates their attention much more than the change in leadership. I don't know exactly what Zaluzhny was accused of and why it was done, it hasn't been exactly stated, but in the long term, if such things happen very often, then it might start affecting matters. I think today that the threat and hatred against the aggressor are bigger, take up more attention than changes in leadership.
We are NATO members. What have we here, in Estonia, and NATO more broadly learned from this war so far, and how much have defense plans changed?
NATO as a whole has definitely understood that nothing is kept at bay with rhetoric alone and conventional war means and capabilities are important. Until recently there has been talk of all sorts of other deterrence, information operations and cyber operations, but this has actually been a very small part.
To deter Russia, you need conventional capability that could eliminate the threat, not just cause him pain. We all thought two years ago that Russia had some sort of pain threshold. I repeat, I think today there is no point to measure or hope for that at all.
The whole threat that comes to your territory, you must be able to eliminate it and as quickly as possible. And this means that we must develop conventional capability – artillery, air defense, infantry, anti-tank – with modern technology, and we need to invest in that. But in addition, so that we in Estonia don't end up with fathers being gone, we need to invest in that today too. Servicemen and reservists should see their children much less often, and, unfortunately, that is just where we are headed. There is nothing to do, we must conduct more exercises where reservists and active servicemen are away from their families so they would be able to see them at all.
Many people have been anxious from the recent talks. Excessive anxiety is not a good helper either. How do you recommend people cope with all this anxiety and fear of war?
Somehow, you might say, flourishing countries like Israel and South Korea, who have war at the border all the time, Israel even now has it, and people live in those countries, companies invest in those countries, the economy grows in those countries, and I think life is not bad at all. We should follow this example.
One thing that always helps to calm down is doing something about it. You already mentioned reservists, more training gatherings, more equipment purchases, all that. What could an ordinary person, who is not a reservist, do if they think they want to strengthen their country's defense?
The emergency services have issued various guidelines, the Defense League operates very well, and you can always ask for advice there. But the main thing – you also have to do your everyday thing as much as possible. Not everyone has to prepare for war. The country must continue to develop, and that's the basis of our existence. Let the specialists, reservists, active servicemen prepare for war. If ordinary citizens are told they need to be ready for something, then they prepare for it. But don't overthink it.
What is your forecast for this war at the current moment?
It's hard to say. Russia can continue moving forward at the cost of hundreds of meters, in some places a kilometer, but it pays a very heavy price, and I don't know how long it can withstand it. If Ukraine gets means for air defense and indirect fire systems – and I think it will get them in the first half of the year –, then we might see some change in the second half of the year. If it doesn't get those means, then there will be very active, but from a distance, looking at the map, quite stable battle activity.
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Editor: Merili Nael, Marcus Turovski