In an interview with ERR on Thursday, Pevkur outlined the compensatory measures implemented to mitigate the impact of wind farms and recalled that these issues have been on the agenda for at least ten years. However, he promised to discuss the matter with the EDF again if necessary.

The head of the Defense Forces Intelligence Center and the Navy chief claimed that wind farms are already obstructing intelligence equipment, and there are things they currently cannot see or hear. However, not long ago, it was mentioned that the planned wind farms would not cause any interference. What is the reason for this contradiction?

When there are various objects in the environment — whether artificial or natural— and information-gathering tools like radars or signal intelligence equipment are located near or behind these objects, there will naturally be an impact. Solar parks have an impact, wind turbines have an impact, and this is precisely why compensatory measures are in place.

We have specifically sought funding from the European Union for various compensatory measures and have reviewed international practices. For instance, the restrictions we have proposed for solar parks are twice as strict as those in Finland. Therefore, our task is to balance two priorities: first, ensuring the functioning of our intelligence and early warning systems, and second, safeguarding our energy security and meeting Estonia's green energy targets.

In this context, there are multiple balances to be struck — on one hand, between security and intelligence interests, and on the other, fulfilling our energy objectives. However, I want to emphasize one point: the construction of any wind farm must always be coordinated with the Ministry of Defense.

I understood from the statements of the Defense Forces personnel that they had previously presented their perspective, but that a wind farm has already been built in an area designated as a restricted zone...

If you are referring to the Aidu wind farm, there is a finalized court ruling on the matter, which grants the developer the right to install turbines there. To address this, a specific application was made to secure additional resources. These resources have been allocated, and two different compensation mechanisms have been implemented.

First, passive radars, which are expected to become operational in January based on current information. Second, an active radar, which is currently located in Kellavere and will be relocated to Ida-Viru County. This move will free up the areas west of the Iisaku-Jõhvi line for additional green energy installations.

But if the Navy chief says that he might not be able to launch his anti-ship missiles or would need to start considering placing them on ships or devising some other system, then I do not know who to believe. Does this mean there is now a conflict between the EDF and the ministry? 

No, I do not see any conflict here. If the Navy chief identifies certain risks, we are more than willing to address those risks.

At the same time, the acquisition of anti-ship missiles and the entire process surrounding it has been ongoing for years. The first discussions took place in 2016, and in 2019 — five years ago — the government amended the relevant legislation, after which these compensatory measures were agreed upon. These compensatory measures, including active and passive radars, are now either operational or under construction. For instance, we are also building a new radar site in Kõpu [on Hiiumaa], Western Estonia, along with various coastal radars, passive radars, and other systems.

This has been the comprehensive approach: on one hand, enabling more green energy to enter the Estonian market to phase out fossil fuels, and on the other hand, preserving Estonia's national security by ensuring the functionality of intelligence and early warning systems.

At the same time, Sweden has not approved its offshore wind farm plans, allowing only one out of many proposed projects to be built. What is the difference between us and Sweden? Sweden's early warning time is even longer than ours, considering where missiles and drones would be launched from. The EDF know exactly how many minutes it takes for a missile to reach its target. Isn't there a contradiction between Sweden's restrictions and our approvals?

We began planning our offshore wind farms and maritime spatial planning quite some time ago, and input from the Ministry of Defense has naturally been taken into account. For this reason, if you look at the areas where offshore wind farms are permitted, the vast majority are located either toward Latvia or in the southern parts of the Baltic Sea, rather than near our northern and western coasts.

This, again, is part of a process that has been ongoing for ten or more years. It has involved assessing the potential locations for both offshore and onshore wind farms. As a result, a line has been drawn on the map — the Jõhvi-Iisaku line — east of which no wind farms can be placed, while west of that line requires approval from the Ministry of Defense.

It's a pity that the Navy chief and the head of the Intelligence Center are not here now — this could have turned into an interesting debate. But if they come and point at a map, what will you say to them? Will you tell them, "Listen, gentlemen, this has been planned for 10 years — where were you before?"

No one has any desire to pick a fight or engage in major debates. If there are real concerns, it is, of course, our responsibility to address them, and we will do so. We would first wait for them to point out where these concerns lie, and then we will review them. Naturally, we will not compromise Estonia's security.

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