Tõnis Saarts: The era of democratic foreign policy

Donald Trump in the U.S., Viktor Orbán in Hungary and Robert Fico in Slovakia believe they are conducting truly democratic foreign policy, based on the definition of democracy as "rule by the people," notes Tõnis Saarts in his daily commentary for Vikerraadio.
When Donald Trump promises to end the war in Ukraine within 24 hours and repeatedly asserts that the United States must stop funding this costly war at the expense of American taxpayers, it would be a mistake to assume that he is merely expressing his personal opinion. No, he is representing the interests and worldview of his voters. This remains true regardless of how narrow-minded that perspective may seem to us.
Trump in America, Viktor Orbán in Hungary and Robert Fico in Slovakia believe they are conducting truly democratic foreign policy, based on the definition of democracy itself — "rule by the people." In other words, it is foreign policy that prioritizes the immediate expectations and desires of the people, disregarding all other strategic and value-based considerations.
It is important to understand who, in the eyes of these politicians, constitutes "the people." These are specifically their nationalist-conservative voters. In their view, the opposition, democrats and liberals have no legitimate right to participate in governing the country and, consequently, no say in shaping foreign policy.
This so-called democratic foreign policy is meant to contrast with the existing "elitist foreign policy," which is crafted behind closed doors by a small circle of experts and diplomats — where public opinion is often ignored if it does not align with long-term national strategic calculations or other political considerations.
Both foreign policy styles have their strengths and weaknesses. Since regaining independence, Estonia has firmly adhered to elitist foreign policy, a model that its diplomats have practiced for the past 35 years.
Elitist foreign policy does not follow fluctuating public opinion and seeks to separate policymaking from it as much as possible. Its greatest strength is that it can be values-based, relatively predictable, respectful of international agreements and obligations and capable of strategic long-term planning.
Democratic foreign policy, on the other hand, is the complete opposite. When shifting public opinion, voter apathy and a lack of awareness about international affairs become the ultimate guidelines for politicians, there can no longer be any talk of values-based policies, international commitments or long-term vision. The average voter is not concerned with these matters; they simply want their leaders to resolve foreign affairs in a way that benefits their country as much as possible before turning their attention to more immediate concerns, such as the price of bread, stricter immigration policies or unemployment.
At the same time, elitist foreign policy should not be idealized. Let us recall the Iraq War in the early 21st century, which European public opinion — including in Estonia — was strongly against. Yet, politicians committed to elitist foreign policy chose to participate in the adventure regardless. Today, there are few who would defend that decision in hindsight.
On the other hand, if during the early 2000s, the expansion of the European Union and NATO had been guided by the principles of democratic foreign policy, the countries of Eastern Europe — especially the Baltic states, precariously positioned on Russia's border — would never have gained entry into these alliances.
In other words, if Western European countries had held referendums on EU and NATO expansion or if politicians at the time had relied strictly on public opinion polls, Estonia and its Eastern European neighbors would still be stuck in a geopolitical gray zone, left to the whims of Vladimir Putin's ambitions whenever the Kremlin desired.
Trump and Putin's proposed peace deal, imposed over the heads of Ukraine and Europe, has often been compared to a so-called "Munich 2.0" agreement — an allusion to British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain's decision in the 1930s to hand over Czechoslovakia to Adolf Hitler in the hope of preventing a larger war. As we now know in hindsight, Chamberlain ultimately got "both disgrace and war." However, it is often forgotten that at the time, British and French public opinion strongly supported this policy of appeasement, aimed at avoiding war at any cost.
Thus, Chamberlain was, in fact, practicing a very democratic form of foreign policy. Winston Churchill, a staunch advocate of elitist foreign policy, found himself largely isolated in his warnings.
For Estonia and the other Baltic states, the fundamental question is whether we can survive this current era of democratic foreign policy long enough to witness the return of a Churchillian era.
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Editor: Marcus Turovski