Tõnis Saarts: End of the liberal world order

Donald Trump's administration's recent statements regarding Ukraine, Russia and Europe leave little doubt that the liberal world order, at least in its old form, is fading, writes Tõnis Saarts.
Even if the United States elects a president in four years who respects international rules of engagement more than the current administration, the past will never return. Figuratively speaking, half of the building has already collapsed and it cannot be restored to its original form. After all, let us not forget that structures like these are held up by trust.
Although Estonia's nationalist conservative camp welcomes the acknowledgment of the liberal world order's demise with eager satisfaction, this is not good news for our national security. The old liberal world order was precisely the system in which small nations could feel the safest.
Why? Because this order was based, first and foremost, on clear rules and international law, and secondly, on security guarantees for nations that upheld liberal and democratic values. Simply put: in the liberal world order, the principle of "might makes right" was not acceptable, which meant that seizing and annexing foreign territories was not so easily tolerated.
If states adhered to the values and governance system of the hegemon of this order — the United States — namely, liberal democracy, they were extended either soft or hard security guarantees. The latter, of course, applied if they were also NATO members. Specifically, as long as we in Estonia upheld the principles of liberal democracy — freedom of speech and the press, human rights and minority rights, the rule of law and the separation of powers — we could be confident that the United States would not stand idly by if Russia were to invade the Baltic states.
In light of current events, it appears that these principles no longer apply. Instead, a world order based on pragmatic realpolitik is taking hold. This is a system of international relations driven by transactional dealings, the law of the strong and the personal sympathies and antipathies of charismatic leaders.
In this new world order, Estonia and the other Baltic states are protected only if they fit into the current security interests matrix of the United States and major European powers. To align with this matrix, small nations must behave like dutiful vassals, offering something in exchange for their security — such as natural resources, favorable contracts for American companies or political maneuvering to install governments that please the great powers — while largely financing their own defense.
The fact that these countries uphold the principles of liberal democracy no longer provides them with any security guarantees. U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance made this abundantly clear in his speech at the Munich Security Conference. He mentioned only one liberal democratic principle — freedom of speech and the press — and even that in a context suggesting it should be applied in a way that does not restrict forces that are less than enthusiastic about liberal democracy. Vance alluded to the Romanian presidential elections and the exclusion of the far-right AfD in Germany.
His speech made no mention of Hungary or Slovakia, the former of which has spent over a decade disregarding liberal democratic principles such as the separation of powers, judicial independence, minority rights protections and press freedom.
What should Estonia do in this situation? Increase its defense spending to 5 percent of GDP? Send a message to Washington that we have phosphorite and rare earth metals and are willing to hand them over to American companies in exchange for security? End the political cordon sanitaire around EKRE?
While the first step seems inevitable, the other two require careful consideration — how opportunistic and obsequious should we become?
The main priority should be to think more about our closest European allies. Although many of those responsible for our security might see this as sacrilege, perhaps it is time to start quietly preparing a Plan B behind the scenes. This could mean securing additional defense agreements with other Baltic and Eastern European nations, obtaining explicit security guarantees from major Western European powers, supporting the formation of a European joint army or something along those lines. Because if, at the critical moment, Trump declares that he will not start World War III over the "suburbs of St. Petersburg," we must ensure that there is someone else who will come to our aid with full certainty.
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Editor: Marcus Turovski