In the wake of the migration crisis that has affected Europe, the outbreak of the global COVID-19 pandemic and Russia's aggression against Ukraine, concepts such as information warfare, information operations, hybrid warfare, asymmetric threats and non-state actors have become deeply embedded in public discourse. One term that has gained particular prominence, especially in connection with the war in Ukraine, is deterrence. In brief, deterrence can be defined as a combination of military, political and symbolic actions aimed at dissuading an adversary from considering an undesirable course of action against us by signaling our readiness and determination to respond decisively. This essay explores how scholars in the humanities and social sciences can contribute to security debates within the context of deterrence.

The role of the audience in deterrence

While traditional academic discourse has largely conceptualized deterrence within the framework of interstate conventional military conflict — for instance, viewing nuclear weapons primarily as a means of preventing large-scale war rather than as offensive instruments — contemporary perspectives on deterrence have significantly broadened. Today, deterrence encompasses not only state actors but also non-state entities and emerging areas of concern, such as terrorism, cyber and hybrid warfare and ethnic conflicts. In this expanded framework, deterrence is understood as a politically negotiable and strategically meaningful practice, reinforced and sustained through discursive practices. For example, Maria Mälksoo, a researcher at the University of Copenhagen, has examined deterrence in the context of memory politics, emphasizing that safeguarding a nation's historical narrative is crucial for maintaining a stable national identity and securing international recognition. From this perspective, the Kremlin's narrative, which denies the Soviet occupation of Estonia, poses a challenge to the continuity of Estonia's national story and, consequently, to its position within the international system.

As with the conceptualization of information warfare, contemporary deterrence theory has increasingly recognized the central role of the public, or audience, in deterrence efforts. Effective deterrence relies heavily on credibility — that is, the emotional conviction an audience holds regarding the deterrent's reliability and resolve. Several studies have demonstrated how public preferences can significantly influence the course of interstate negotiations, including within the context of deterrence. A risk-acceptant public, for instance, may pressure political leaders into initiating an escalatory military confrontation against a weaker adversary, even when such action is strategically unwise. Conversely, a risk-averse public may hinder state actors from constructing an adequate deterrence posture. The reasons for such public attitudes vary, ranging from domestic political struggles to historical legacies. One key factor often cited in explaining Germany's occasional reluctance to provide military aid to Ukraine is the enduring sense of guilt associated with World War II, particularly in relation to Russia.

The role of fear and culture in the security context

With the increasing prominence of the audience in both information warfare and deterrence, the issue of attribution — identifying who is behind a deterrent influence operation or whose objectives it serves — has become a major challenge. This is particularly problematic given that certain narratives often spread uncontrollably in digital communication space. Due to the imaginative speculation of social media users, some messages gain significant attention and circulation, exploiting the inherent ambiguity of issues and the contradictions that exist within the meaning-making space.

In times of crisis, fear further amplifies information manipulations, functioning as a key factor in shaping audience interpretations within the media. Fear is frequently employed as a tactic to draw public attention to an issue — through sensationalist headlines, graphic imagery or emotionally charged narratives — thereby encouraging individuals to take action.

One of the reasons for this phenomenon lies in culture. According to semiotician Juri Lotman, fear is most terrifying when the object of fear is not directly visible but only vaguely sensed. In such cases, the object of fear is often mystified and semiotically constructed. The object of fear — what we are afraid of — is a product of the semiotic codes through which a society interprets itself and the surrounding world. In summary, our fears are often shaped by and reflective of our cultural frameworks.

Fear, therefore, can be regarded as one of the most powerful mobilizing forces, capable of legitimizing various (political) decisions or delegitimizing those of opponents. Let us now place this discussion within the context of security. In security studies, the concept of strategic culture has gained traction. It can be described as a set of shared beliefs and assumptions derived from common experiences and widely accepted narratives (both oral and written), which shape collective identity and a social group's relationships with others. Strategic culture influences the goals and means chosen to achieve security. It provides a framework for understanding why different states respond to security threats in distinct ways.

We have entered an era characterized by a sustained confrontation with Russia. Several scholars have pointed out that at the core of Russia's strategic culture lies a perceived vulnerability to external attacks — most notably, a deep-seated uncertainty regarding the West — as well as an intrinsic linkage between internal and external threats. The roots of this strategic culture can also be observed in the 2014 foreign agents law enacted by the Kremlin, which reflected a fear of foreign — particularly Western — influences and the perceived threat of so-called "color revolutions" spreading within Russia.

Similar practices have also been observed in Estonia, which may be explained by the distinct characteristics of the country's strategic culture. For instance, in 2022, debates over the removal of symbols inciting hostility from public spaces were largely shaped by historical experiences and a deep-seated sense of insecurity regarding the eastern neighbor. A similar line of argumentation can be seen today in discussions surrounding the voting rights of stateless persons or so-called grey passport holders.

To mitigate the potential fear induced by deterrent threats, it is essential to analyze methods of deterrence within socio-cultural contexts, paying particular attention to both the actor issuing the threat and the target audience — whether those being deterred or those publicly promised protection. This represents a gap in security studies that scholars in the social sciences and humanities are well positioned to address. The effectiveness of any deterrence strategy based on fear largely depends on how it resonates with its audience and cultural background.

Understanding the audience and its cultural specificities has become an increasingly critical factor in contemporary security analysis. National defense is no longer solely about artillery and mines — the frontline now extends into our minds and hearts, where battles over perception and belief are actively fought. These battles are waged through words, images and narratives, which become powerful and intimidating when collectively accepted as truth.

Countering deterrence through psychological defense

Estonia's national defense strategy is based on a comprehensive approach to security, one key component of which is psychological defense. The primary objective of psychological defense is to prevent panic, counter hostile influence operations and misinformation and maintain public trust in the state and its defense efforts. Psychological defense can also be understood as a countermeasure to adversarial deterrence — an integral element of deterrence policy itself.

The role of fear and panic becomes particularly evident during periods of crisis and disaster, when individuals lose a clear sense of orientation in making sense of the world. The events referenced at the beginning of this article undoubtedly belong to those that generate uncertainty and fear within society. If fear is not merely a reaction to an already occurred event or encountered object but rather the interpretation of various anticipatory signals as threatening and dangerous, then an adversary's deterrence — or the act of issuing threats — becomes all the more effective the more it resonates with a broader audience of society. One of the key objectives of psychological defense, therefore, is to deconstruct the credibility of an adversary's deterrence and to raise awareness of potential vulnerabilities and strategic culture — specifically, the narratives embedded in our cultural memory that an adversary might seek to target, whether through words or actions, as part of their deterrence strategy.

It has become almost self-evident that the Kremlin seeks to influence the Western world through information manipulation — and that it is highly effective in doing so. While the first part of this assumption is certainly true, it is important to recognize that propaganda has been a constant feature of both Russia and its predecessor, the Soviet Union. However, whether such information influence efforts are always successful remains a matter of interpretation. The effectiveness of propaganda is difficult to measure and depends on numerous factors, such as the receptivity of the audience — particularly whether the message falls on fertile (i.e., discontented) ground.

Despite Russia's rhetoric about possessing "unparalleled weapons" — such as the Oreshnik missile or Armata tanks — these have not, in practice, enhanced the credibility of the Kremlin's military deterrence. Notably, the Oreshnik missile was merely a modification of an earlier model, while the Armata tanks notoriously malfunctioned during the Victory Day parade on Red Square. These incidents illustrate how fear of the Russian military, often referred to as the "second strongest army in the world," has been greatly magnified through symbolic narratives. That being said, the Kremlin's nuclear deterrence, as mentioned earlier, has thus far proven effective in influencing certain Western states.

In such a situation, psychological defense must focus on raising awareness of the potential target groups of manipulation — understanding the factors that make these groups susceptible to influence, including their socio-cultural background, motivations, fears, expectations and pre-existing interpretative frameworks. Additionally, institutions responsible for public communication must identify effective ways to reach these groups with appropriate narratives, ensuring that they do not succumb to intimidation through fear-based messaging. Achieving this requires collaboration between state actors (e.g., the defense forces), the private sector (e.g., the media) and academic experts (e.g., scholars in the social sciences and humanities).

Societal fragmentation as the primary objective of deterrence

Similarly, it is essential to critically examine the distinctive characteristics of Estonia's strategic culture. One of the cornerstones of Estonia's contemporary identity formation is the e-Estonia success story, which traces its origins to the Tiger Leap initiative. This self-narrative portrays Estonia as an innovative and technologically advanced nation, embodying the Jakob Hurt-inspired slogan of a people who may be small in number but are great in spirit.

The notion of being small in number also highlights one of Estonia's vulnerabilities, which may not always be sufficient to uphold another key national narrative — that of Estonians as a freedom-loving people — and which adversaries may seek to undermine through deterrence. Narratives portraying Estonia's political elite as subservient to the EU and NATO allies, or alleging the "theft of democracy" through e-voting, are examples of attempts to exploit strategic cultural vulnerabilities. Given that such narratives are likely to be amplified on social media during elections — particularly in the context of e-voting — it would be prudent to raise public awareness in advance about potential information influence operations. This could help mitigate societal tensions triggered by accusations of election fraud and manipulation. Notably, a debate over e-voting security, sparked by a news article in early February, already provoked intense reactions on social media. This illustrates that there was no need to wait for the actual elections to witness the explosive spread of polarizing narratives online.

It is crucial to recognize that social media manipulation tactics are becoming increasingly covert. It is a misconception to assume that the Kremlin's objective is to convert us into supporters of Putin. Rather, its primary aim is to deepen societal divisions by amplifying narratives that foster polarization — narratives that resonate within the audience and provoke engagement. These may include debates over e-voting security, the Nursipalu military training area or the controversy surrounding the Estonian Drama Theater's New Year's Eve identity show. In times of crisis, it is essential to be aware of the psychological mechanisms behind influence techniques — such as cognitive biases and confirmation tendencies — in order to mitigate uncritical acceptance driven by impulsivity, habitual thinking or emotional responses. Maintaining clear and critical thinking is key to resisting such manipulative efforts.

Narratives shaping societal cohesion

One of the primary objectives of psychological defense is to foster social cohesion and strengthen the will to defend the nation. Consequently, the likelihood of success increases if we can develop narratives that unite different societal groups. To better understand the function of such narratives, scholars in international relations and strategic communication widely employ the concept of strategic narrative. In essence, the purpose of a strategic narrative is to shape the meaning of events and conflicts in a way that influences audience behavior in the direction desired by the narrative's author. This can serve both the purpose of fostering cohesion and that of amplifying conflicts.

In the context of the war in Ukraine, we have observed that divisions within the Russian-speaking population often follow generational lines. This raises the question of whether the narratives directed at Estonia's Russian-speaking community effectively fulfill their integrative function. If these narratives continuously emphasize the historical role of Russians in Estonia's occupation and portray the contemporary Russian-speaking population as a monolithic fifth column, their potential to foster social cohesion becomes questionable.

It is well established that fear triggers associative thinking, in which causal relationships between objects of fear are loosely defined and where emotional associations and historical parallels overshadow the distinctiveness of individual phenomena. This type of rhetoric was evident in the debates surrounding the removal of Soviet-era monuments. Alongside policymakers' detailed explanations of how Russia could exploit these monuments to fuel ethnic tensions, there were also arguments that ascribed a form of agency to the monuments themselves. Discussions framed them as sources of moral trauma, which ostensibly triggered sudden emotional distress among Estonians. The emphasis on the so-called Russian card was a notable feature of this discourse. This raises a critical question: If these monuments did not evoke moral trauma during more than three decades of independence, why do they suddenly do so now — especially as the generations that directly suffered under Soviet rule continue to dwindle?

Appealing to emotions and identity is an effective political strategy, yet it inevitably leads to polarization — something a hostile adversary can exploit for its own interests. Danish scholar Georg Sørensen has described such fear-driven dynamics using the concept of the uncertainty dilemma, in which threat perception extends far beyond military capabilities. For instance, threats to values can be perceived as existential threats to security, leading to the securitization of emotions and memories — an approach also evident in Russia's memory politics. This is reflected in the Russian Federation's current national security strategy, which frames attempts to "reinterpret Russia's historical role" as a threat to the country's cultural security. A similar function is served by the 2020 constitutional amendments that regulate public discourse on World War II, explicitly prohibiting any portrayal that "diminishes the significance of the people's heroism." Under this legal framework, in February 2024, Russia's Ministry of Internal Affairs declared Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas and other high-ranking officials responsible for decisions to remove Soviet-era symbols from public spaces as persons of interest.

In a recent NATO Strategic Communications Center of Excellence (StratCom COE) report "Do(n't) Shoot the Messenger: Psychological Responses to Kremlin Narratives in Nordic-Baltic Audiences," published in late 2024, an analysis was conducted on the dissemination of apocalyptic narratives on social media and their impact in the Nordic countries and Estonia. These narratives, characterized by themes of fear, instability and catastrophe, depict scenarios of state or societal collapse, chaos and various threats. One of the study's findings indicated that within Estonia's Russian-speaking audience, exposure to these apocalyptic narratives led to a more significant decline in political trust toward state institutions compared to audiences in the Nordic countries. Additionally, higher levels of anger and fear were observed among this demographic. In contrast, the political trust of the Estonian-speaking audience remained largely unaffected by these narratives. This suggests that Estonia should continue to emphasize its historical narrative and national identity to counteract Kremlin-driven narratives. Simultaneously, it is imperative to develop specialized strategies aimed at engaging the Russian-speaking population to enhance their resilience and awareness of propaganda mechanisms, thereby fostering a shared understanding aligned with national narratives.

If we aim to minimize the impact of adversarial deterrence, our counter-deterrence efforts should be grounded in the key narrative touchpoints that we consistently reinforce. This approach enhances the credibility of counter-deterrence and fosters coherence in the eyes of the audience. In this light, strategies for social cohesion should be more forward-looking and focused on identifying cultural and social common ground — particularly with those audiences where such engagement is feasible. Just as it is nearly impossible to convince a deeply conspiracy-minded individual of the inaccuracy of their views, there will always be those who perceive Russia as an eternally peace-loving liberator state. However, it is uncertain whether this belief represents the majority sentiment among Estonia's non-Estonian-speaking population.

Conclusion

Identity narratives embedded in deep cultural memory are precisely the ones that, when challenged, render decision-making processes heavily dependent on emotions and affect. This, in turn, reduces complex socio-political issues to simplistic, black-and-white yes/no alternatives. Unfortunately, today's media ecology favors speed, brevity and conflict-driven messaging, often at the expense of contextual background information that is essential for deeper understanding. Since such background details frequently require greater cognitive effort from audiences, they are often overlooked. Therefore, incorporating education on meaning-making processes in a media-saturated world — as well as the psychological mechanisms underlying disinformation — should be an integral part of both formal education and lifelong learning.

Thus, the issue is not the discussion of fearful or threatening topics per se, but rather how we talk about them. Effective psychological defense begins with elucidating the meaning-making processes within a media-saturated world. This understanding can help minimize the deterrent power of certain messages while laying the foundation for the strategic development of societal cohesion narratives.

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