Tõnis Saarts: In search of the ideological middle ground in the XXI century

Many believe that the green-woke ideology has already demonstrated its inability to address major challenges in a way that resonates with the majority of voters and avoids provoking Trumpist and Orbanist backlash, writes Tõnis Saarts in a commentary originally published in Sirp magazine.
Politics in the 21st century needs a new ideological middle ground — a third way that is neither the current leftist green-woke ideology nor hardline right-wing populism or national conservatism.
Unfortunately, mainstream parties — social democrats, liberals and moderate conservatives — have failed to rise to the occasion. They lack ideas for how to address this century's major challenges (globalization, climate change, technological transition and the rapid growth of social inequality) in a balanced way or to create cohesive narratives that resonate with the masses.
New, more moderate ideologies will likely emerge, built upon reformed foundations of both right- and left-wing thinking, yet far less constrained by earlier ideological cliches. However, this will be a difficult process, likely involving several decades marked by major crises, setbacks and upheavals.
There is little new in this logic. We witnessed much the same in the 20th century. That century's character was not shaped by extremist ideologies — whether from the left or right (that is, communism and fascism/national socialism) — but by moderate worldviews that sought a new balance, such as social democracy and even Christian democracy.
At that time, too, the old-school liberalism and conservatism of the 19th century were unable to adapt to the new reality and had to reinvent themselves. By the 1970s, for example, liberalism had transformed into market-centered neoliberalism, while conservatism in many European countries evolved into a much more centrist and less nationalist form of Christian democracy.
The story of 20th-century ideological transformation also contains dark chapters. For moderate worldviews to gain a foothold in the second half of the century, the shock of World War II was required. This is a grim prospect for our own century: unfortunately, without serious crises, upheavals and perhaps even wars, neither politicians nor their voters are likely to come to their senses and seek more moderate alternatives.
In politics, major changes rarely occur through gradual evolution. More often, they develop through ruptures and turning points where old values, institutions and habitual patterns of action are upended, forcing participants to take entirely different paths.
Four key challenges
At present, there is no sign yet of any serious catastrophe or turning point, although the many crises have created a great deal of anxiety in the air. There are several sources of this anxiety, but if we try to briefly summarize the major challenges and dilemmas of the 21st century, I would identify four.
First is the tension between global openness and national closure. On one side is the belief — held by liberals — that greater internationalization and openness will, in their own way, benefit everyone. On the other side is the fear of losing distinct identity and sacrificing "national interests," among other concerns, voiced by national conservatives. This category includes topics such as immigration, culture wars, trade wars and similar current issues.
Second is the technological transition, which is accelerating and often has unpredictable consequences. This includes warnings that automation, robotization and artificial intelligence will soon take away traditional jobs, alongside opposing views suggesting that new technologies will allow many countries to break free from poverty and the middle-income trap.
In general, political parties and politicians are not yet capable of speaking thoughtfully about technological change. What prevails instead are ignorance (on the right-populist side), cheerful optimism (among neoliberals) or dystopian scenarios painted by left-wing thinkers, who foresee a new feudal society where most people grow poorer while a handful of tech giants rule.
The third major challenge stems from the growth of socioeconomic inequality, which has accelerated in the Western world since the 1970s. Changes in technology and economic structures — specifically the shift to a post-industrial society — threaten to worsen the situation even further.
In the 20th century, the great question was whether citizens' well-being should be entrusted more to the market or the state. While this dilemma remains relevant in the 21st century, a new dimension has emerged: universalism versus particularism.
In other words, should the welfare state and social benefits be accessible to everyone, regardless of nationality, skin color, sexual orientation, values, etc. — as social democrats believe — or should assistance be provided only to those who have "earned it" (white, "normal," native citizens, excluding immigrants, other minorities and so on)? This worldview is known as welfare chauvinism and its main proponents are right-wing populists.
The fourth major challenge, of course, is climate change, whose scale could be so vast that the potential damage is difficult to even imagine. When it comes to climate policies, extreme positions dominate: among social democrats and liberals, there is boundless optimism about the green transition, while on the right-populist side, there is total climate skepticism, with claims that climate change has nothing to do with human activity.
Who could phrase a third way?
In politics, the ideological landscape is becoming increasingly black and white. Are you a liberal or social democrat supporting the green-woke ideology, believing that global openness and complete tolerance will make everyone happy, that the green transition is inevitable and that the government should treat and support everyone equally, regardless of their origin or immigration background? Or are you a right-wing populist or national conservative who holds the exact opposite views on all these issues?
There seems to be no third way attempting to bring the center ground together. It is therefore no surprise that the level of social and political polarization in some Western democracies has reached that of the 1930s, and no remedy appears to be in sight to halt its deepening.
But is the situation truly so hopeless? Who, after all, would have the skill to articulate a more moderate middle ground? As I hinted earlier, mainstream social democrats, liberals, greens on the left and right-wing populists and national conservatives on the right are all likely to remain outside that circle. They have all already invested too heavily in intensifying the current standoff and all stand to reap political dividends from its continuation — and even its escalation. They lack the ideas, motivation and courage to seriously reshape their ideological positions, fearing that neither their voters nor their party members would understand if they suddenly began advocating more compromise-oriented and innovative ideas on many important issues.
Therefore, the seeds of more moderate worldviews can only begin to sprout on the fringes of social democracy, liberalism, conservatism and green ideology. These must be circles that are not more radical than the so-called mainstream — immediately ruling out all manner of left- and right-wing radicals, as well as radical feminists, eco-socialists and so on — but instead are much more willing to compromise and open to the creative synthesis of new ideas.
We may not yet know much about these circles, just as little was known in the 1930s about Christian democracy or the social democrats who supported less orthodox forms of Marxism.
The contours of the middle ground
What might this middle-ground doctrine look like? Let us attempt to outline the contours of a centrist platform that would address all four of the 21st century's major challenges. A new third-way ideology would likely need to find a balance between global openness and national closure, where neither an open-door policy nor nationalist self-isolation is considered sustainable.
The same should apply to the battleground of culture wars, where both the current woke ideology and the intolerant right-wing populism opposing it would be consigned to the dustbin of history, replaced by something far more rational and aligned with practical needs.
The new third way should take the risks associated with technological change extremely seriously. It should curb the tech giants' desire for control and profit, defend workers' rights, yet do so without succumbing to left-wing overregulation or market-strangling excesses.
The envisioned centrist ideologies would likely abandon today's generous and universal welfare state. However, instead of discriminating against and marginalizing minorities — as the welfare-chauvinist right-wing populists dream of — they would systematically protect the potential losers of globalization, the green transition and technological change. Ironically, these losers are not women and minorities, as often assumed, but less-educated men.
Let us not forget that the moderate ideologies of the 20th century — social democracy and Christian democracy — thrived precisely because they attracted the potential losers of industrialization, namely the working class, gradually deradicalizing them. We have no hope of escaping today's vicious cycle of polarization if we cannot cure the virus of radicalism and status anxiety among young and middle-aged less-educated men — the main losers in the great structural and cultural shifts of the 21st century.
The new middle ground must adopt a much more realistic approach to the climate crisis and the green transition — one that takes into account actual technological and societal capabilities. In my view, the current over-the-top green transition optimism and idealistic climate radicalism have no future, just as the total climate denial prevalent on the political right does not.
If 21st-century political ideas fail to acknowledge that the green transition, like any major societal transformation, will have both winners and losers, and if they cannot restrain the greed of the winners while alleviating the pain of the losers, we have no hope of breaking out of today's vicious cycle of polarization.
Does the West still have time?
There is no doubt that shaping the new centrist ideology will not be an easy task. Beyond practical policy solutions, it will require a coherent narrative and a foundation of values that clearly explain to the average voter who we are, why we are undertaking this effort and how everyone will benefit.
As I mentioned earlier, major political changes are rarely linear or evolutionary. They are marked by turning points and disruptions, where previous path dependencies are broken and new, untrodden paths are found. Just as in the 20th century, it will likely take a major crisis or catastrophe in this century to demonstrate that the old ways can no longer continue.
Many believe that the current green-woke ideology has already shown its inability to address major challenges in a way that resonates with the majority of voters and avoids provoking ever more hardline reactions like Trumpism or Orbanism. We will likely have to witness a similar failure of right-wing populism and national conservatism to understand that, just as extremism on the left did not work, neither will extremism on the right. Only then might centrist ideologies have an opening — if, by that time, they are intellectually mature and have charismatic, inspiring advocates.
But do we have the time? Scientists warn that the more severe global impacts of the climate crisis will reach us before the middle of the century. The technological transition, driven by the rapid advancement of artificial intelligence and other technologies, may take unexpected turns that will begin to erode the fabric of society and the skeleton of economic structures much faster and more dangerously than we would like.
Here in Europe, we must also recognize that we are living in an increasingly multipolar world, where the West's economic and political influence continues to decline while the power of other centers — primarily in Asia — strengthens. These new power centers are not necessarily democracies, or at least not liberal democracies in the Western sense. Perhaps the centrist doctrine that will shape the face of the 21st century will be formulated not in Europe or North America at all. If so, this would also mark the inevitable sunset of the Western-centered world.
--
Follow ERR News on Facebook and Twitter and never miss an update!
Editor: Marcus Turovski