"Many forms of Government have been tried, and will be tried in this world of sin and woe. No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all-wise. Indeed it has been said that democracy is the worst form of Government except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time..."
Sir Winston Churchill

"May you live in interesting times," goes the old Chinese curse. The times are not only interesting, but also challenging. Should we be surprised? In fact, no — because Russia has not changed. Russia will remain a threat to our way of life well into the future.

Does history repeat itself? Not exactly, but its patterns and lessons tend to resurface in new forms. We cannot stop history, but we can understand it better — and in doing so, better prepare for the future.

General Pyotr Lushev, the last commander of the Warsaw Pact, vowed at the time of the alliance's dissolution that within a generation, Russia would restore its power and influence and begin dictating global decisions once again.

In reality, Russia never gave up its aggressive policies — it simply had less power. Examples include Russia's involvement in the Transnistria War (1990-1992), its intervention (1991-1993) in the South Ossetia and Abkhazia conflicts, supporting separatist movements against Georgia's central government, its participation (1992-1997) in backing the Tajik government against rebels and, of course, the Chechen Wars (1994-1996 and 1999-2009). A generation is generally considered to span 20 to 30 years.

The 2008 attack on sovereign Georgia aligns with General Lushev's vow and the wars in Ukraine (beginning in 2014) and Syria (in 2015) are a logical development consistent with the nature of the Russian state.

After each new act of aggression, the parliamentary democracies of the Western cultural sphere declared it a wake-up call for the free world. Yet Vladimir Putin and other Kremlin leaders failed to pull Western political leadership out of its habitual comfort zone.

Paradoxically, it was the 47th president of the United States, Donald Trump, re-elected to office, who succeeded in doing just that. The extent to which conventional norms have changed was vividly illustrated by the Oval Office meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. There's no point in critiquing the meeting, even though it clearly deviated from established norms. From Estonia's standpoint, it was a discussion between the heads of two friendly and sovereign states.

Still, we must ask a series of questions, assess emerging trends, shape future policies and analyze the thinking and motivations behind the actions of the U.S. administration in order to defend our national interests and support Ukraine in their war for independence.

To paraphrase Sun Tzu, knowing yourself and your enemy is not enough — understanding your strategic ally is also crucial. We must ask: Are we witnessing merely the behavior and worldview of a sitting president and his inner circle, a short-term whim, or are we dealing with fundamental changes in the nature of governance in a transforming global world?

Is this transformation unique to America or are similar signs of change appearing among our other allies as well? Will the nation-state system that began with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 — with its core elements of national sovereignty, legal equality of states, the principle of non-intervention, religious tolerance and rules-based international order — endure? Have changes already occurred without us noticing or have we consciously chosen to ignore them?

If there is one constant in the world, it is that change is ongoing — in both the environment around us and in our social systems.

The market state

The historical development of states, forms of governance and the dynamics of change are well described in American scholar Sir Philip Bobbitt's book "The Shield of Achilles," which suggests we may have reached a historical turning point: the familiar nation state could be giving way to the "market state," a transformation with the potential to reshape global governance. The market state is a new form of governance that prioritizes economic competitiveness over traditional sovereignty.

It is evident that the new U.S. administration favors this market state model, one of whose leading proponents is political theorist and entrepreneur Curtis Yarvin, often quoted by U.S. Vice President JD Vance.

Yarvin's key proposals include running the country like a corporation under a CEO-like figure who makes strategic decisions to maximize national wealth and stability. Centralized power, he argues, would allow for more efficient and decisive leadership compared to democratic systems.

He also advocates dismantling democratic institutions, calling for the elimination of existing representative and bureaucratic structures and replacing career civil servants with loyal appointees to eliminate entrenched conflicts of interest and streamline governance.

Adhering to such views calls into question the democratic principles we are accustomed to and risks undermining the separation of powers and encouraging authoritarianism.

The U.S. administration's sympathy toward Yarvin's ideas is noticeable — even in the language used by its leading figures. For instance, the term "deal" has increasingly replaced the word "agreement," indicating a potential commodification of Western core values. However, sovereignty and national integrity are not things that can be traded on the stock exchange.

Still, implementing Yarvin's ideas would be difficult. Unlike Vladimir Putin, President Trump is subject to congressional oversight and constitutional checks. The U.S. constitutional system, established in 1787, was designed to balance power, protect individual freedoms and limit government authority, while ensuring democratic participation and legal accountability. It is a time-tested system, resistant — though not immune — to distortion. Julius Caesar, after all, managed to upend a republican system that had lasted nearly four centuries.

This may also explain President Trump's admiration — or perhaps envy — toward authoritarian leaders such as Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin and his efforts to emulate their degree of centralized power.

Given the difficulties in realizing Yarvin's market-state model, the White House's recent foreign and trade policy instead resembles the features of 16th to 18th century mercantilism: government intervention, extensive economic regulation, subsidies, tariffs and monopolies to control trade and production with the aim of achieving a trade surplus by maximizing exports and minimizing imports.

In a way, this mirrors the colonial-era mindset of mercantilism, where nations sought to secure markets and resources through the establishment of colonies.

With some caution, we can draw parallels between the colonial ambitions of China, the United States and Russia. Beijing aims to subjugate Taiwan, Moscow has annexed Crimea and occupies a significant portion of sovereign Ukrainian territory and U.S. statements regarding Canada and Greenland are not far removed from the objectives of the aforementioned authoritarian states.

But is the shift toward the market state unique to the United States or is it also occurring in other democratic nations? While no democratic country has explicitly adopted the market state model as defined by Bobbitt, certain recent developments in policymaking suggest a clear tilt toward market-oriented strategies.

The eras of Gerhard Schröder and Angela Merkel provide a clear example. Schröder initiated a transformation of the welfare state with a market-oriented approach. Merkel continued along this path with her "Wandel durch Handel" (change through trade) strategy, based on the belief that economic cooperation with Russia and China could encourage political and social reform in those countries.

At best, this may have been political naivety, but more likely — especially considering Schröder's later career as a Kremlin agent — it served both Germany's and his personal interests. The greatest cost was paid in the devaluation of Western cultural foundations: democracy, the rule of law, human rights and social justice. The strategic choices of Merkel and Schröder are, unfortunately, at the root of many of the current security challenges facing the Western world.

It is reasonable to assume that Winston Churchill's paradigm — "Nations have no permanent friends or allies, they only have permanent interests" — remains a viable decision-making model, even within the European Union, where prioritizing national interests is still the norm. The recent pandemic experience demonstrated that the principle of solidarity only functions when resources are abundant and the likelihood of risk materialization is low. Thus, political realism remains the guiding principle for most countries.

It is worth noting that NATO's Article 5 is not based on the principle of solidarity but instead reflects the vital interests of its member states, aligning with political realism. Therefore, there is no reason to doubt the activation of NATO's collective defense mechanism.

How does NATO fit into the context of the market state? President Trump has used rhetoric that has raised concerns about a potential U.S. withdrawal from NATO. However, he has never formally or explicitly expressed a desire to leave the alliance. Even under market state conditions, the U.S. administration has ambitions to maintain global leadership, which requires an international network and market advantage.

It is true that the United States has been the largest contributor of resources to collective defense, but it also enjoys certain privileges in return — such as near-monopoly access to intelligence gathering and analysis. NATO member states are the largest and most reliable market for American arms manufacturers, meaning a significant portion of U.S. contributions to NATO ultimately supports its own economy. The question, then, is whether the U.S. can afford to leave NATO. It is quite likely that the leadership of major defense contractors would advise preserving NATO membership — and thus maintaining the U.S. market advantage.

While this turbulence undermines trust, it also creates opportunities for Europe's defense industries. The scientific and manufacturing capacity of European countries is on par with that of the U.S. With the political will to act, it is possible to achieve independence from American systems. Special emphasis should be placed on developing European satellite communications in the space sector, to prevent the emergence of a monopoly in access to information and communications — essentials for functioning in the digital era.

Political realism and Ukraine

How does political realism manifest in Ukraine? Political realism is not an ideology, but a theoretical framework that can be paired with various ideologies — liberalism, conservatism — so long as they are grounded in state self-interest and power politics.

Hans Morgenthau once said: "International politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power." We may not like it, but global politics in recent times has largely reverted to a pragmatic and rational enterprise in which states primarily pursue their own interests and seek to enhance their power — not idealistic goals or shared values.

As with many things, the metrics of pragmatism and rationality differ across cultural spheres. What seems irrational to the civilized world may appear rational to Kremlin powerbrokers. Therefore, we cannot — and must not — evaluate the actions of an adversary by our own standards. Instead, we must strive to understand the enemy's worldview and decision-making processes far more thoroughly.

The war raging in Ukraine is also a power struggle, but it is not merely a conflict between two nations. It is a clash between totalitarianism and a world order rooted in parliamentary democracy.

Fortunately, supporting Ukraine's war of independence aligns with the interests of most democratically governed countries in Europe and beyond. Unfortunately, the current U.S. administration's affinity for dictators, its willingness to strike deals with war criminals and its drift away from traditional allies have significantly altered long-standing power dynamics.

It is increasingly difficult to dispute the recent assertion by Canada's new prime minister, Mark Carney, that the United States' 80-year period of global leadership has come to an end. Sadly, this decline in American dominance coincides with a marked rise in China's global influence.

Estonia's possibilities and challenges

What are Estonia's opportunities and challenges in a political realism environment influenced by the market state model?

The market state model is not suitable for Estonia. We lack the scale, capital, intellectual and human resources necessary to thrive under such a system. Nonetheless, certain features characteristic of the market state have increasingly appeared in Estonian governance.

For example, already back in 2010, former Chancellor of Justice Indrek Teder remarked at a Postimees opinion leaders' luncheon that Estonia's political culture had become overly political-technological, with parties functioning like corporations, focused primarily on gaining and maintaining power.

Although both the market state and Estonia's governance model exhibit corporatist tendencies, their origins differ. In business, the drivers are profit and efficiency. In Estonian politics, however, a significant number of politicians and top officials concentrate on power retention, facilitated by the manipulation of the current electoral system.

Like Finland and Sweden, Estonia uses the proportional representation method developed by Belgian mathematician Victor D'Hondt. But unlike Finland and Sweden, where candidate lists are open, Estonia uses semi-closed lists, favoring internal party hierarchy over voter preference.

Corporatism in governance leads, in the long term, to a decline in competence. The prevailing principle becomes not what you know, but whom you know.

Position requirements are often tailored to the individual being appointed, rather than to the competencies the role actually demands. When top-level appointments are justified with absurd claims — such as the candidate's ability to stack firewood or their accent-free Estonian and having studied only in Estonia — things have gone wrong.

Beyond the decline in quality, such practices insult society's cognitive and intellectual integrity and erode the moral compass. As a result, the quality of strategic-level decisions has deteriorated, leading to a loss of competitiveness in the international arena. This is also reflected in Estonia's slipping rankings in global competitiveness assessments.

Sociologist Juhan Kivirähk has noted that political decision-making often relies on the momentary perceptions of decision-makers, while expert analysis is disregarded. This is further compounded by the influence of lobby groups and the dominance of certain top officials who shape their administrative areas according to familiar or personally advantageous practices.

To uphold the Estonian Constitution's preamble — which emphasizes the preservation of the Estonian people, language and culture through the ages — under the pressures of political realism and market state dynamics, we need a broad societal consensus and long-term vision. This must transcend the four-year election cycle and focus on more enduring goals and directions.

It is logical to assert that Estonia's best option is a democratically organized nation state. A strong, inclusive representative democracy is critical. Before World War II, Finland's democratic system enabled it to defend its independence and act on the will of its people. Estonia's autocratic governance did not. Finland maintained its sovereignty, Estonia fell under occupation.

It is also important to recognize that our Constitution is based on the principles of the nation state. These principles must simply be implemented wisely. In a global political realism environment, our actions must be guided by national interests. These should not be replaced by pseudo-interests, beliefs or ideologies.

Take the example of banning caged-hen farming. The goal is noble, but without accompanying restrictions on the sale of caged eggs, we create an unequal and business-suppressing environment for our own producers — handing a market advantage to foreign competitors.

The same pattern appears in other sectors — be it in zealous climate targets or the aim to fully transition to renewable energy. Of course, we must work toward more sustainable and environmentally friendly practices, but if these efforts greatly impact our internal systems while having negligible effects globally, we are only undermining our own sovereignty.

Why do we pursue such initiatives? The official answer is that we want to set an example. But the real reason may be a desire for approval. One cannot preserve and advance a nation state with a servant's mentality. Defending national interests does not require that all our decisions please every actor within the international conglomerate.

Estonian officials serving in European institutions must defend Estonia's interests in Europe — not the other way around. Gustav Suits' principle — "Let us become Europeans, but let us remain Estonians" — remains relevant and worth upholding.

A nation state governed by parliamentary democracy requires a societal agreement. We must return to President Arnold Rüütel's initiative aimed at ensuring societal unity and long-term development by involving different social groups and emphasizing cooperation and shared values.

President Rüütel emphasized that the issue at stake is national survival, and that this social agreement should include an analysis of the current situation and a vision for the future. In a worsening security environment, national unity is essential — not only the ability to rally against an enemy, but the ability to unite for common goals.

Political forces dismissed President Rüütel's initiative, which led us into a state of uncertainty. Today's political climate is marked by the weakening of parliamentary culture, dominance of the executive branch, weak oversight, lack of strategic vision, disjointed plans of action, limited citizen participation — in other words, a weak civil society — and no foundational agreement on key political decisions.

Only the president can serve as the guardian of such a societal agreement. The president must have a popular mandate to unify the nation. A president elected by the parliament may not become a unifying figure. For example, unlike President Rüütel, President Kersti Kaljulaid became a polarizing force who amplified societal divisions. It may well be wise to trust the people's will, foster civic engagement and adopt a system of direct presidential elections.

Core interests of the Estonian state and people

The legal foundations of a parliamentary nation state rest on three essential pillars: a coherent historical narrative, a clear strategy and a legal framework based on national values. Without historical self-awareness, a society cannot create an effective legal system or a functioning strategy.

A national security framework is shaped by four key components: the environment, core interests, strategy and instruments of state power.

The interplay between domestic and global environments — both increasingly shaped by political realism and market-state dynamics — provides the foundation for shaping national security policy and strategy. This strategy must be oriented toward protecting the country's core interests.

Estonia's national and state-level core interests are: security, the national values set out in the preamble of the Constitution — namely, independence and sovereignty, territorial integrity, Estonian as the official language, the protection of natural resources, the preservation of the Estonian people, language and culture through the ages — and economic well-being.

To achieve these core interests, we need a strategy. In its simplest form, a strategy is a combination of objectives, the means to reach them and the concepts guiding their use. Policy outlines principles; strategy describes the process. These must not be confused. Estonia lacks a strategy that answers the fundamental question: how?

The key terms in Estonia 2035 — change, create, support, reduce, integrate, renew — are all important. But none of them are spontaneous. Many initiatives are driven by lower-tier documents in a complex hierarchy. Individually, many of these are well-crafted, but they are not linked and thus fail to foster synergy or generate high-impact action.

One of the most attention-grabbing documents is the coalition agreement. But what is it or what should it be? In theory, it's a political agreement between the parties forming the government, defining their goals, priorities and shared vision.

While important for setting political direction and cooperation, the coalition agreement carries no direct legal force. If we borrow a concept from the military, the coalition agreement should function like a commander's intent. Field Marshal William Slim described intent as follows:

"During the war, dozens of operations orders were issued in my name, but I didn't actually write any of them myself. Someone else always did it better. But there was one part I always wrote — the intent. It's usually the shortest section, but always the most important because it tells everyone exactly what the commander wants to achieve and the concept for doing it. It's the one expression of will from which everything else flows. That's why it must be written by the commander himself."

Ministers lead their domains, which means the intent should be written by them. This, in turn, requires deep knowledge of the field and the establishment of professional standards for ministers. Too often, coalition agreements resemble a kaleidoscope — a system of mirrors filled with glass beads. Unlike a mosaic, where every piece fits into a predesigned pattern, a kaleidoscope generates a new optical illusion with every shake.

To make coalition agreements measurable, the focus often shifts to money, percentages, procurements, weapon systems, salaries and so on. A similar mistake is often made in strategy interpretation, where means become mistaken for ends.

When asked in the Riigikogu National Defense Committee whether Estonia has a military defense strategy, then-Ministry of Defense Permanent Secretary Kusti Salm answered that Estonia's strategy is "more ammunition."

True, in a commercial context, acquiring and selling assets can be an end in itself, as it yields revenue and profit — understandable from a business standpoint. But this logic does not translate to statecraft.

Tools and their acquisition are not goals, just as Estonia's aspirations to join NATO or the European Union were not goals in themselves — they were efforts to expand the tools available to secure our sovereignty. Sun Tzu's famous insight remains relevant: "Strategy without tactics is the slowest route to victory. Tactics without strategy is the noise before defeat."

We need a rise in quality and a culture of strategic leadership — especially as we transition from the information age to the digital age, where machine reasoning will increasingly automate parts of the decision-making process. Artificial intelligence is not patriotic. If we fail to create databases that reflect and protect our strategic core interests, we risk amplifying the influence of EU directives without properly translating them into actions that make sense within Estonia's local context.

To protect our core interests and implement strategy, we can apply the DIME model or its expanded version. DIME stands for the four main instruments of state power: diplomatic, informational, military and economic.

This framework is widely used in strategic planning to coordinate and deploy these elements collectively to achieve national objectives. For a small state like Estonia, these instruments must operate in synchronized alignment with a coherent strategic process. In a political realism and market-state context, diplomacy is especially vital.

The first meeting between Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Donald Trump in the White House on February 28, 2025 triggered a chain of events. On March 7, 2025, British Prime Minister Keith Starmer convened a summit of European leaders, attended by the presidents of the European Council and European Commission, as well as the leaders of Canada, Turkey, Norway and Iceland. Estonia was not among the invited.

The explanation that the British prime minister acknowledged an error may — or may not — provide a full account. British diplomacy, known for its weight and precision, typically does not make such mistakes. It would be wise to carefully assess the reasons, including potential missteps on our own part, in order to avoid similar exclusions in the future.

It is clear that Estonia must raise the quality of its strategic leadership. Not all shortcomings can be corrected at once, but we can begin with achievable steps that yield positive effects.

First, Estonia should replace its semi-closed proportional electoral lists with open lists. This would promote competence and reduce corporatist influence. Second, the president should be elected by popular vote, increasing civic participation and creating conditions for a true social compact. Third, ministers and other governance leaders should be subject to competency requirements to ensure the protection of the state's core interests.

Despite the harsh character of political realism and market-state pressures, we must also strive to uphold Confucius' five constant virtues: humanity, righteousness, propriety (the preservation of the Estonian people, language and culture), wisdom and trustworthiness.

These virtues — and the changes proposed above — can guide the actions of national leaders, providing a strong moral and ethical foundation for effective governance. Ultimately, they ensure societal unity and long-term development, involving various segments of society and emphasizing cooperation, shared values and the sustainability of parliamentary democracy and the Estonian nation-state.

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