We have agreed in our security policy principles that Estonia's national security is indivisible. Its foundations are social cohesion and the state's resilience, economic security and vital services, internal security and public order, as well as military defense and international action.

But if only the military is exempt from austerity or sees its budget grow, we cannot talk of ensuring broad-based national security. While it is believed that a military threat could develop after the war in Ukraine ends, non-military threats have already skyrocketed.

Both the Internal Security Service and NATO have spoken about what the realization of such threats means.

Our main effort should be directed at preventing and stopping developments that pose a threat to national security. Security crises do not come about organically and are instead facilitated by the adversary in the form of creating the necessary, mainly non-military conditions.

Our adversary uses a combination of hybrid measures against us. These are intelligence (both physical and cyber), attempts to sabotage vital infrastructure, hostile influence activity, taking advantage of corruption and organized crime, supporting extremism, and terrorism.

Most of the Russian Federation's hybrid operations conducted in the territories of European states are curated by Russia's special services. Our countries and societies are harmed in ways which do not cross the threshold of what would amount to a military attack. These threats can and must be managed.

Positions prepared during peacetime and a weakened society allow the adversary to switch from non-military activity to military activity with little difficulty. By then, it may be too late to start introducing changes quickly and effectively as the adversary will already have done considerable damage to our security.

Russian special services were involved in creating the necessary conditions, in the form of separatism, in Ukraine leading up to 2014, after which special troops were used to carry out a hybrid operation in Eastern Ukraine and Crimea. This was followed by conventional warfare in 2022.

We need to see national security and how to ensure it integrally. The most effective way to prevent security crises is to hamper the adversary's activities now and on a daily basis. From the point of view of the Ministry of the Interior, the ISS and PPA form the country's peacetime line of defense against security threats. In a situation where Estonia is ready to lay down a tax to rapidly develop the Estonian Defense Forces, the Internal Security Service and the Police and Border Guard Board must not be overlooked.

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